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An American general who formerly headed the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization in Palestine stated recently: "The American mind 
is being manipulated as far as Palestine is concerned." He was referring 
to Zionist manipulations. My own experiences with the Zionist Organization 
of America, which refused to answer any of my requests for varied info:rmation, 
confi:rm the general's charge. Ny own acquaintance with the Palestine 
problem has revealed that the equities involved in the area have been 
buried under a mass of distortion, misinfo:rmation and insidious propaganda 
which have misrepresented the actual facts and veiled the historical and 
legal truth to the extent that the Palestinian victims are made to appear 
as being the wrongdoers and the Zionist wrongdoers as the victims. 'Ihe 
present problem in Palestine is the derivative of an extraordinary accumu­
lation of injustices, illegalities and violations by Zionism of many decen­
cies: violations of international law, violations of League of Nations and 
United Nations provisions, violations of fundamental human rights. 
For more than three-quarters of a century there has been interminable 
conflict between the indigenous Palestinian Arab people and alien-imported 
Zionist ideology which maintains that Palestine belongs to "the Jews." On 
the other hand, there is the international law perspective which rejects 
the Zionist ideological claim and its form of extralegal logic. It may be 
stated with historical assurance that the great powers and organized inter­
national Zionism have used power politics, including a large measure of 
military methods, to deal with the problems of Palestine. From this accu­
rate premise it may be erroneously deduced that international law has been 
a failure in the Palestine question. It would be far more accurate to con­
clude that international law has not even been applied in the Zionist-Pal­
estinian issue. 
'· 
A careful legal and historical analysis demonstrates beyond doubt 
that the B:i.lfour Declaration is invalid under the criteria of modern inter­
national law; it should also be recalled that the instruments of Zionist 
discrimination and oppression of the Palestinian people in Palestine­
Israel have not been established in a day or even as short a period of 
time as a half century, Zionist beginnings, at the latest, were at the 
First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland in 1897, From there Zionism 
has proceeded extralegally one step at a time in a carefully planned pro­
gram utilizing political, m.ilitary and propaganda instruments, culminating 
in the illegal military fai t accompli of 1948 when "the Jewish State" of 
Israel was installed by organized Zionism. 
'!he native Arab people were ruthlessly driven out as part of an 
Israeli master-plan to rid Palestine of its Arab people in order to build 
an exclusivist "Jewish" state, and the few Arabs who remained in "Israel" 
have been exploited and repressed by the Israeli Zionist establishment. 
Any objective student of the Middle East will reach these conclusions if 
he analyzes Zionist history and its consistent violations of international 
legal principles and norms, Moreover, without an understanding of these 
causative factors of the Palestine problem, it is important to recognize 
that the plight of the Palestinian people will continue to be ignorantly 
ignored, What must be axiomatically recognized is that the violent uproot­
ing of the Palestinians from their native land by international Zionist 
Jewry and their suppliants can have no legal or moral justification. Not 
only is it a violation of international law and the principles of the United 
Nations Charter, it also constitutes an unparalleled violation of elementary 
principles of humanity and civilization. 'Ibis, the writer has disclosed 
in his analysis of the Balfour Declaration in the context of international 
law. 
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1ora1gn 0!!1ce. 
November 2nd, 1917. 
Dear LOrd nothsch1ld, 
I have much pleasure 1n conve¥1ng to you. on 
. . 
behal! o� l:l1s M�jesty's. Goverr.rnent. the follow1ng 
doclarat1on o! sy::patny w1th Jew1sh z�on1st aspirations 
which nas been submitted to, and appr oved by, the Cebinet 
'His Ma.Jesty •a Goverru:ient view w1 th favour the 
establishment tn Palest1ne of a nat1ooal home tor the 
Jewish people. and \1.1 ll use their b.est endeavours to 
fac111 tat� the achievement of th1s object, 1 t being. 
c.laa.rly undarstood that. r.oth1ng shall be don3 v.nict. 
may prejudic e the c1v11 and reltg1oua rights ot 
eXlsting non-Jewish CCtm':'�n1t1es 1n _Pal9st1na. o r  the 
.. rlgh_ts and pol1 ttcal status enjoyed by Jews 1n any 
other country" . 
1 should be grat eful ·1! you would bring th1s 
declaration to th9 lOlowledge o! toe Z1on1st Federation. 
CHAPTER I 
Ilf'l'RODUCTION 
Statement of Purposes 'l'he Concept and Applicability of International Law 
What is meant by international law? In basic conception, inter-
national. law consists of a common body of norms or principles which are 
used in the sctlution of diverse international problems. It is essential 
that such norms or principles be applied consistently in order to promote 
the objectivity and uniformity associated w1 th "law" as opposed to ad hoc. 
or unprincipled decision-making in which a different ulterior rule is 
developed or executed for each problem. Upon the basis of this premise, 
international law may be accurately regarded. as a set of lllliform prin-
ciples which require at least minimum standards of reasonable and humane 
conduct in the world community. It is also important to recognize that 
the principles of international law are established. by consent and agree-
ment. Express agreement is usually termed treaty or conventional law, 
' 
and implicit agreement is usually te:nned customary law. Both are based 
primarily upon the consent of states as manifested by their governments, 
al though other pa.,rticipants including international public bodies and 
individuals have a role to play. Among the public bodies which act in 
the development and acceptance of international law, the League of Nations 
and United. Nations are particularly important. The League of Nations 
Covenant and the United Nations Charter are multilateral treaties agreed 
to by their members, as well as being the basic constitutions for the 
world community at their respective time periods. 
A third element is legally indispensable to a practical conception 
of international law: Even the most just and widely accepted. principles 
of law, such as those contained in the League Covenant and United 
Ja:tions Charter, are ineffectual in protecting human rights unless 
2 
"they are actually enforced and sanctioned. International law involves 
a whole sanctioning process ra?\ging from exclusive reliance upon per­
suasive procedures at one extreme to heavy reliance upon coercive 
aeasures at the other extreme, w1 th many intermediate stages including 
economic sanctions. As a general approach, the more coercive sanctions 
15houl.d be increasingly used where the persuasive ones have been found 
to be ineffective., There are very few situations either in international 
ar.11unicipal law where �nforcement procedures are either completely effec­
-tive or totally ineffective. Consequently, the most relevant questions 
concerning sanctions ares How effective is the present sanctions process 
and what steps may be taken· to improve it? 
A fourth element which requires specification is that among the 
inst! tutions created to serve mankind, the state is not above international 
law. Since states and their governments have the preeminent role in making 
international law, it is essential that they be held accountable for full 
compliance w1 th 1t. As a practical matter this means the personal account­
abill ty of government officia;ls which was established in international law 
by the Nuremberg Trial before the International Mi.11 tary Tribunal. 'The 
Nuremberg Principles of the individual responsibility of government 
officials adopted by the United Nations General Assembly! are applicable 
to officials of all governaents. 
V1 th regard to the historical Palestine Question, concerning 
international law we aay asks Is it a relevant and practical aeans to 
achieve justice and peace in the Zionist-Palestinian.issue and in the 
Mlddle Ea.st in general? It aay be stated w1 th historical assurance 
that the great powers have used power politics, including a large aeasure 
ot aili tary methods, to deal w1 th the pro bleas of this area. From this 
historically accura'tie assurance it may be erroneously deduced that inter­
national law has been an abysmal failure in the Middle Ea.st. It would 
be far more accurate to conclude that international law (even of the 
Covenant) has not even been applied or tried. The unprincipled power 
politics, conducted both domestically and intemationally, played in the 
Ml.ddle Ea.st have papered over the fundamental causes of the conflict 
s1 tuation and have not even deal. t with the results of injustice and 
Yiolation of law.2 The outcome of this dismal approach to the problems 
ot the area has been further militarization accompanied by indef1ni tely 
protracted conflict and the increasing destruction of international human, 
aa.terial. and legal values. 
Because of the abysmal failure of the techniques which have been 
utilized, international law is no longer only an ideal al temati ve, it is 
also, considering the eighty-year old ongoing ideology of Zionism, the 
only practical al temative to an indefinite continuation of the present 
' 
1!1ttaat1on which today has now. extended over nearly a full century. J 
So.bsequently, the purpose of this thesis is to reveal that the Balfour 
.Declaration is invalid under the criteria of international law and that 
1nteznational law has, in actual! ty, never been invoked in the case of 
the Palestinian Arab people nor in the Palestine Question. Where the 
provisions of the League Covenant and United Nations Charter on the 
·•ndates and trusteeships system have been flouted or ignored over a 
perl.od of nearly sixty yea.rs (1919-1977), there is a juridical obligation 
of intervention to maintain the legiL]. principles of each and to provide 
sanctions and enforcement to establish peace through justice and law. 
Statement of the Propositions 
Seven basic legal and historical propositions are advanced·with 
-regard to the rights of the Palestinian people as defined under international 
law. Recalling that it is historically. obvious that the two promises 
vbich Britain made in regard to Palestine, that is, the promise through 
Sir Henry McMahon then British High Commissioner in Egypt and the Balfour 
Declaration. were mutually exclusive and contradictory, the interesting 
fact about the Balfour Declaration, however, is that 1 t was invalid and 
incapable in law of affecting the rights which the Arab people have to 
Palestine as the indigenous inhabitants whose ancestors had been in con-
tinuous occupation of the country for centuries previous to the Hebrew 
invasion and in continuous occupation of the country for fourteen centuries. 
s 
Secoml y, when the Br1 ti sh Cabinet aade the Balfour Declara. ti on 
1 t did not possess sovereignty over Palestine and Bri tisb troops had not 
•t foot on Palestine soil, al though llili tary occupation would have dis­
allowed tmder the Laws of War., the arbl trary transfer or usurpation of the 
country which was still w1 thin Turkish legal sovereignty. The legal 
position in this regard is depicted by the well-known legal maxim that 
•no one can glve that which he has not got." 
'lhimly, the fact that the Bal.four Declaration was poll tically 
incorporated into the Palestine Mandate (not in the international man­
dates system) would not be valid against the Palestinian Arabs to dis­
possess them of title to Palestine, or to give t1Ue to the alien Zionists, 
tor the League of Nations also did not own Palestine. Under international 
law a country belongs to 1 ts people, 1 ts rightful indigenous 1nhab1 tants. 
Fourthly, the Balfour Declaration and the provisions of the man­
date were contrary to the letter and the spirit of the League of Nations 
Covenant, Article 22(1) of wh+ch provides that in regard to mandated ter­
ri torles the League acted on "the principle that the well-being and devel­
oiaent of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." It should 
be logically and legally noted that an unprincipled plan designed to con­
'Mrt the Arab 1nhab1 tants of Palestine, who formed more than. 93 per cent 
of the cotmtry' s population at the end of World W'ar I, into a minor! ty 
in a preplanned predominantly--or, as 1 t eventually turned out, an almost 
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exclusively--Jewish State (and one controlled by Zionist institutions) 
is not a plan which can be said to take genuine cognizance of the "well­
being and developnent" of the Palestinian Arab people. 
Fifthly, even assuming that the Bri ti.sh government was in law 
capable of making a "promise" about the future of Palestine to people 
other than the country's inhabitants, the Bal.four Declaration did not 
mean what the Zionists have erroneously claimed it aeant. For the Declar­
ation spoke of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people 
in Palestine--not a state comprising the whole or part of Palestine. In 
other woxds, even in violation of international law, there was to be an 
arbitra.rily declared and invoked against the will or assent of the people 
of Palestine a shelter or refuge for "Jews" in Palestine, no more. 
Sixthly, unprincipled decisions created against those whose 
rights are effected but not legally consulted for concurrence are invalid 
in international law. 'Ihe negotiating history of the Balfour Declaration 
not only reveals secret and private negotiations but, also, that the 
Palestinian peo1'J.e were completely excluded from the stealthy discussions 
despite the fact that their future status was being secretly jeopardized. 
Lastly, in the context of international law and universal morality, 
the Palestine Arab case--if a case needs to be made at all--stems in 
essence from the principle that the only title which any people has to 
its country comes from birth and long and continuous possession. This is 
7 
a crl terlon which is recognized as the international legal basis of the 
btegrity and security of all nations; no just and stable international 
cn:der can endure in the world on any other foundation. 
Contribution to Political Science 
The object of this thesis is to analyze the legal issues that 
arlse from the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and its inclusion in 
the Palestine Mandate. The wr1 ter has subjected to a critical legal anal­
ysis the principal facts and developments in the evolution of the Declara-
t1on and Zionism's dependence upon it as a "legal" title to the Arab home­
land. Until now no solution has been found or suggested for the Palestine­
Z1on1st conflict that takes in-to account the principles of international 
law and justice. While one might wonder whether any useful purpose is 
served by an examination of the. legal aspec�s of· a Palestine conflict 
created by unprincipled extra-legal power politics and maintained by il­
legal mill tary force, the wr1. ter believes that an analysis is needed of 
the appropriate legal purview of this issue which has been buried under a 
aass of distortion, misinformation and insidious one-sided propaganda 
which, in turn, have misrepresented historical and legal facts and veiled 
·the truth of the conflict to the extent that the victims are made to ap­
pear as being the wrongdoers and the wrongdoers as the victims. 
Vi thout an understanding of the conflict in the light of the 
principles of international. law and justice, regardless of conditions 
8 
created by force, peace efforts will remain futile. To this end, the 
historical analysis is largely derived from primary Zionist sources and 
the official documents now available from British Cabinet, Foreign Office 
and Colonial Office papers w1 th minutes and memoranda wr1 tten by those 
who have gone down in history. 'Ihese documents are left to speak for 
themselves and to show what led to one of the most intractable problems 
of today. 'nle legal methodology of this paper simply applies the rele-
vant legal crl terla of universal international law in which the law ap-
plicable to Palestine appears from the fundamental principles of the 
League's Covenant and mandates system and the legal rulings of the inter-
national courts of justice. Integrated into these international juristic 
principles is the legal criteria establishing the universally applied 
doctrine of self-determination that was so jarringly effaced in the case 
of Palestine. 
'lh1 s effacement was succinctly stated by Am bas sad.or Loy W. 
Henderson, then serving as the director of the Office of Near Eastern and 
African Affairs in the United States Department of State. In a top-secret 
aemoran�µm to the American Secretary of State of September 22, 1947 
Henderson declared: 
'lbese proposals[of the majority of the United Nations Special 
Comm! ttee on Pales tin� , for instance� ignore such principles as 
self-detennination and majority rule. '!hey recognize the principles 
of a theocratic racial state and even go so far in several instances 
as to discriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons 
outside of Palestine.4 
Inevitably, it was necessary to be selective in the choice of 
. ) 
extracts from the wealth of material available, but selection has been 
made on the basis of relevance to the sequence of events. It has not 
been possible in every case to give a document or source in its entirety 
9 
far reasons of length, repetition or the inclusion of irrelevant aatter, 
but references are given in each case so that readers wishing to study the 
fDll version aay do so. -Finally, the wr1 ter fervenily hopes that those 
interested in the Palestine problea will avail theasel�es of the h1stor-
1eal and legal information on this topic to objectively acquaint them­
selves with the serious issues of the ongoing Palestinian-Zionist conflict. 
Because the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government depends on 
an 1nfomed and intelligent c1 tizenry. Nowhere is the making of intelli­
gent choices more important than in foreign affairs. It may be safely 
adjmged that had Americans in,formed themselves of the Zionist program 
in Palestine, had all its defects, violations and policies been examined 
cr1 tically and dispassionately, it is pos� ble that the American people 
would never have allowed its government to support politically a Zionist 
aovement whose aim was to create an exclusivist Jewish State on the 
absurdity of a racial ideology postulating lineal descent from ancient 
Hebrews. 
Clarif'lcat1.on of Word and Concept Symbols 
Words without specified referents are highly ambiguous and are 
capable of having multiple and inconsistent meanings ascribed to them by 
1lrl ters and readers. In order to achieve ·clarity it is important to set 
forth def'lni tions connected with key word symlx>ls which appear throughout 
this stuiy. It is recognized that dependent on pol1 tical exigencies and 
biased ignorance these same word symlx>ls. are used by others, especially 
Zionists, with different interpretations than those employed here. The 
m. ter has consistently applied definitions utilized by anti-Zionist 
1.Dlividuals and organizations most of which are Jewish. In se.tting forth 
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a religious concept.ion of "Jew" and "Judaism" the wr1 ter is adopt.1.ng a 
basic tenet of tra.di t.1.onal. and contemporary Judaism. It should be immedi­
ately noted that Jews are not accepted by scientific social science 
disciplines as composing a dist.1.nct racial type, that is, they are not 
llembers of a •race". Moreover, it is of utmost importance to distinguish 
between Israelis, Zionists and Jews. 'lbese fundamental defini t.1.ons must 
be understood at the beginning in order to provide clarl ty for the sub-
sequent appraisals in this study. 
Palestine is the area bordered by the Mediterranean on the east, the 
Jordan River on the west, the Golan Mountains and the Sea of Galilee 
on the north, and the Negev and Sinai Deserts on the south. 'lbe 
Palestinian Arabs have inhabited this area since t.1.me immemorial. 
Since 1948, however, after the forceful military creation of the 
"State of Israel" on the same territory, the Palestinian people have 
been living in forced exile. 'lbroughout the entire Islamic era pre­
ceding the creation of the Turkish Ottoman empire, Palestine remained 
an identifiable region with more or less autonomous local government 
and administration. 'Ihis system was not only continued but in fact 
markedly increased under Turkish rule when Palestinian elected rep­
resentatives actually sat in the Turkish national assembly. Palestine 
remained, with its people, an identifiable part of the Islamic nation 
as well as the Turkish Ottoman empire as did other regions, such as 
Egypt, until England perfidiously established with the help of the 
League of Nations a protectorate over Palestine. However, even that 
colonial device, the mandate system, created against the will of the 
Palestinian people, spoke of the "provisionally independent state of 
Palestine." 'lbe mandate system was predicated on the existence of a 
Palestinian entity which under the mandator's administration was to 
develop into complete independence. 
While it should be emphasized that "Jews" are not a race, neither are 
the "Arabs" a race nor is the word "Arab" identical with Islam, the 
religion which sprang up among the Arabs and to which the majority 
of the Arabs today adhere. Primarily, the word Arab is a linguistic 
concept and with the language comes a culture, a literature. 
Broadly, Arabs are those who speak the Arabic language as. their 
mother tongue and inhabit what has been called, traditionally, Arabia, 
or in more recent days, the Arab world. There are Arabs who are 
Moslems, Christians and who are Jews. As for example, the Jews of 
Iraq, dating from ,586 B.C., if not earlier, were a completely Arabized 
community, spoke Arabic among themselves, introduced Arabic into their 
religious services, and wrote Arabic in Hebrew characters for their 
correspondence. 'lbeir social life was that of Arabs.5 
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Jew refers to a voluntary adherent of the religion of Judaism. '!he 
word is used by the writer to refer to an adherent of Judaism in the 
same way that Christian refers to an adherent of Christianity. 
Consequently, the sole element in the writer's use of the world Jew 
is the religious one. Sepha:rdim Jews are Arabs while Ashkenazim 
Jews are Europeans. Many Jewish communities like the one in Russia 
are descendants of the Khazars who are not Semites but rather, ac­
co:rding to Encyclopedia Judaica "a Turkish stock", who merely con­
verted to Judaism. Palestinian Arabs ( both Muslims--of the Islamic 
religion--and Christians) and Sepha:rdim Jews, who are Arabs (some are 
converts from Islam to Judaism ), are extracted from Semi tic peoples 
that inhabited the Middle East for the last 10, 000 years. It should 
not be necessary to emphasize the fact that there is no empirical 
basis upon which Jews can be deemed to be members of a single racial 
group which is a postulate of Zionism. For an excellent review of 
the distinction between racial conceptions in anthropology and non­
scientific racist ideologies see Comas, Racial Myths (UNESCO, 19;8), 
pp. 27-32· 
Judaism refers simply to one of the universal monotheistic religions. 
A Zionist ls an adherent or supporter of the poll ti cal doctrine of 
programs of Zionist organizations and need be neither an Israeli 
national nor a Jew, examples of which are Senator Henry Jackson, 
Vice-President Walter Mondale and Patrick Moynihan, fo:rmer American 
Ambassador to the United Nations! Significantly, a Zionist adheres 
to the doctrine that all Jews are possessors of a universal "Jewish" 
nationality and that the State of I'srael constitutes the national 
home of all Jewry, which is described in Zionist poll ti cal ideology 
as "the Jewish people" doctrine. American Zionist are part of an 
intricate organizational structure of the World Zionist Organiza.tion­
Amertcan Section, which is registered w1 th the United States De·partment 
of Justice as an "agent for a foreign govemment." Interestly, the 
United Jewish Appeal, which 1 s part of this organizational and inter­
locking corporate structure, is a United States tax-exempt organization 
despite being part of a structure that is an adm1 tted and registered 
agency of a foreign government and that channels its collected funds 
to Israel. To illustrate the degree of the Israeli Government's 
control over such organizations as the B'Nai B'Rith, see Joftes v. 
Kaufman, Civil Action Suit No. 3271-67 (1969), United States District 
Court, District of Columbia, wherein Mr. Joftes, the International 
Secretary of the B'Nai B'Rith revealed that that organization fell 
under Israeli Zionist control. 
Non-Zionist is a tenn created by Chaim Weizmann for those who are 
generally Jews, that is, they may be non-Jews as well, but reject 
"Jewish" nationalism ( Zionism ) but do not actively or vocally oppose 
1 t. 
*For a description of the Zionist and pro-Zionist poll ti cal activities 
on the part of these and many other American poll tical figures for the 
State of Israel, see any of the various reports by the American Jewish 
Alternatives to Zionism organization which rejects Zionism and the 
Zionist ideology of the State of Israel. 
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An anti-Zionist is a Jew who identifies himself or herself as "Jewish" 
by virtue of religious affiliation which entails no acceptance of 
transnational nationalistic or ethnic obligations. In short, they do 
not accept the Zionist "the Jewish people" nationality claim or racial 
doctrine. 
Isxael constitutes the poll tical embodiment of "the Jewish people" 
ideological doctrine relied upon by Zionism, an ideology that controls 
the Israeli Government. "'I'he Jewish people" doctrine is the most 
a11b1guous concatenation of world and word symbols employed by Zionism. 
Al though the term does not appear in Holy Writ, it was g:t ven an almost 
exclusively religious meaning until the founding of political Zionism 
in 1897. Its most usual use was as a synonym for "Jews," for 
"Isralei tes," "the Children of Israel," and "the people of the nook," 
aaong other Biblical depictions. The Zionist political movement has 
captured the term for its own political purposes and, consequently, 
the writer uses "the Jewish people" to refer to the claimed trans­
national constituency of Zionist secular nationalism. Even though 
the Zionist State of Israel gives a specific nationalistic meaning 
to the words, they have not rejected whatever political advantages 
accrue to them from the ambiguities of the words. Incidentaly, inter­
national legal instiutions and municipal law of all states except 
Israel reject this purely political doctrine. 
An Israeli is simply a national of the State of Israel or a legal 
citizen of Israel under principles of naturalization recognized by 
customary international law. It should be noted that most of the 
remaining Palestinian Arabs in Israel do not have, nor are allowed, 
"Isxaeli" citizenship by the Israeli Government. 
1he tem World Zionist Organization is used to refer to the poll ti.cal 
entity constituted by the First Zionist Congress in 1897. It is an 
international instrumentality controlled by Israel and designed to 
achieve the political objects -Of Zionism. Since the 1922 League of 
Nations mandate for Palestine the term has been equivalent to the 
tem "Jewish Agency." Article 4 of the mandate recognized the 
Zionist Organization as the Jewish Agency. '!he writer consequently 
uses the term to refer to the World Zionist Organization, including 
its individual and group members such as its affiliate the Zionist 
Organization of America. "Israel" and the World Zionist Organization 
are employed as the two principal political instruments of Zionist 
nationalism. 
'!he term Zionist-Israel Sovereignty is used to refer to the integral 
relationship between the State of Irael and the Zionist Organization. 
'lbe public law character of this relationship between Israel and the 
Zionist Organization is recognized explicitly in the Israeli Status 
Law of 1952 and the ensuing Covenant between the Government of Israel 
and the Zionist Executive of 19.54. '!he Covenant spells out an allo­
cation and coordination of goYernmental functions as between State 
and Organization in furthering the Zionist poll tical objectives of both. 
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Political Zionism, founded in 1897 by Theodor. Herzl, postulates that 
anll-Semi t!S11 is ineradicable and upon this doctrine, the Zionists 
l:ase their jurldical-poli tical. objectives that "the Jewish people" 
be constituted as a national! ty entity and that meabership in 1 t be 
conferred upon all Jews wherever they are li Ving. We must recall 
that the Zionist interpretation of "Jews" is a racial group interpre­
tation. A juridically novel device is the distinction in Israeli 
aunicipal law between "nationality" reserved. to Jews and "citizenship" 
tor Israelis (or those who live in Israel) who may also be non-Jews, 
such as in the case of a few Arab Palestinians. 'lbis distinction appears 
in identification documents released in Israel by the Ministry of 
Interior and was brought to world attention by the famed Shall t case 
where the children of Commander Shalit of the Israeli Navy, an Israeli 
and a Jew, 6were denied Jewish national! ty because their mother was a Christian. . 
Since the word J udenstaat is used frequently throughout this paper 1 t 
is iaportant to acknowledge 1 ts Z1on1stic defi.ni tion. The word 
Judenstaat derives from the publication of Theodor Herzl's political 
document Der JOO.enstaat (The Jewish State). 7 Herzl proposed a schematic 
plan for the national consolidation of all Jews which in Zionist political 
jargon translates into "the Jewish people." Herzl concluded that the 
solution to what he called "the Jewish question" was to separate Jew 
t'roa non-Jew by creating an exclus1v1st Jewish State. To Herzl the 
location of such a Jewish State was immaterial. He regarded Argentina, 
Uganda (which today is Kenya) and Palestine as equally accepta.ble.8 
F.ach of these areas represented to Herzl the national homeland of all 
Jews to which the "world Jewish nation" was to be centered and exclusively 
Jewish. Under the influence of the existing Love of Zion movement in 
Eastern Eu.rope, however, Herzl soon came to regard Arab Palestine as 
the desirable Jewish homeland or JOO.enstaat.9 Herzl wrote in Der 
Judenstaats "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an old 
ones It is the establishment of a State for the Jews." In German it is: 
"Der Gedanke, den ich in dieser Schrtft ausfiihre, 1st ein ural ter. Es 1st 
die Herstellung des Judenstaat.es." The meaning of Herstellung in French " is etablissement. In modem Zionist texts--for example, 'llle Zionist Idea, 
ed. Arthur Herzberg, New York, 19 59--the meaning is subtly altered to be­
coae 1 "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an ancient one: 
It is the restoration of the Jewish State." The German for "restoration .. 
would be Wiederherstellung; if Herzl had used 1 t, it would have implied 
that he wanted the revival of the ancient entity in Palestine called 
wisrael", which was far from his political national conception in Der 
Judenstaat. It should be noted that no "Jewish State" or "Israelite nation" 
in ancient Palestine or Canaan had ever exercised control over the coastal 
plain, inhabited by Phoenicians and Philistines, let alone Sina.1, Lebanon 
and northern Syria. 
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'Ibe term "the Jewish people" in Zionist jargon is the most ambiguous 
concatenation of word symbols employed in this study of the :Balfour 
Declaration. Al though the term does not appear in Holy Writ, 1 t was 
given an almost exclusively religious meaning until the founding of 
poll tical Zionism by Herzl in 1897. 1be Zionist movement has captured 
the term for its own juridical-political purposes and, consequently, 
the writer uses "the Jewish people" to refer to the claimed consti­
tuency of Zionist secular nationalism although extremist religious 
groups in Israel employ the term in the same way. Even though the 
Zionists give a specific secular nationalistic meaning to the words, 
they have not rejected whatever.political advantages accrue to them 
from the ambiguities of the words. This Zionist doctrine is based on 
a genetical or racial affinity between the Hebrews of 4000 years ago 
and the Russian, Polish, American and European Jews of today; in 
essence 1 t is the embodiment of a distinct Jewish race by which 
Zionists mean an undiluted racial continuity of blood, culture, 
history and destiny similar in doctrinal principal to the Nazi Aryan 
racial concept. In actual fact, _the Jews of Europe have no anthropo­
logical connection whatsoever with the Jews of Pal�stine. '!be current 
European political leaders of Israel, as well as the Jewish immigrants 
who hail from Central :s:urope, Poland, Russia and even the United States, 
are of Khazar extraction, descendants of Caucasian Russians whom 
Byzantine Jews converted to Judaism in the mid-eight century. 
The confusion arising out of the novel "Jewish people" Zionist claim 
is easily understood. Prior to the political creation of the 1897 
Zionist Judenstaat scheme, which· was mill tarily imposed in 1948, a 
political concept which would replace nationality or citizenship and 
emotionally attract some form of political allegiance was tacticaJ.ly 
indispensable to the Zionist scheme for a Judenstaat. Consequently, 
once the Zionist State was established and the municipal legal power 
to arbi tra.ri.ly but unila terially confer Israeli citizenship was gained,10 
the "Jewish people" concept had to be legitimized in order to further 
Zionist goals. "Jewish nationality, 11 which is borrowed from Halakahic 
law or the religious law of the ancient Hebrews, is decreed by contem­
porary Israeli secular laws. Halakah, or the religious law of the 
ancient Hebrew people, religiously applied to adherents of Judaism; 
the group to which it appl.te·s transposes to the Hebrew Le'om, or 
•peoplehood." Zionist secular! sts or n� tionali sts (such as Herzl, 
Sokolov and Weizmann) captured the most meaningful words and phrases 
from Halakahic law, gave them secularist definitions in order to achieve 
secularistic/nationalistic ambitions: these purely secular goals are 
outlined in the Zionist Ba.sle program of 1897. 
From the religious premise of the ancient Hebrew Halakalic law, Zionists 
easily transposed political or secular definitions, the "Jewish people" 
poll ti cal concept being one. Am Yi sroel, the "people of Israel," a 
phrase in the li tuigy of Judaism, has been similarly transformed into 
"the Jewish people. 11 "The Jewish people" in recent centuries had been 
the most appropriate term to describe or depict (Jewish) religionists 
who still religiously respect the theological Covenant and its reli­
gious calling. Th.is definition of the Jews was particularly appropri-
l.S 
ate in the Middle Ages and through the nineteenth century when Jews 
bad neither a land-base nor the organ! zed, secular demand for one. 
During that period, "the Jewish people .. was a purely religious des­
crtption for Jews.* It simply acknowledged the religious collectivity 
which had made a sincere com.mi tment to God, and the ind1 viduali ty which 
1.aplled the fulfillment of that commi taent at any place on earth, with­
out a common secular or poll tical coma.1 tment. 'lba.t clear distinction 
became blurred in the drive of the nineteenth century minority national­
isas, and purposely so in the Zionist insistence upon "Jewish" .national­
isa. The creators of "Jewish" nationalism (or Zionism) adopted the 
phrase "the Jewish people" and made 1 t synonymous with nineteenth 
century political-nationalistic aspirations }l 
Lastly, the wr1 ter acknowledges that Palestine is historically 
a geographical name of rather ioose application. Et111ological strict-
ness would require it to denote exclusively the narrow s1:trip of coast-
land once 1nhab1 ted by the Philistines, from whose name it is derived. 
'lbe modern sub:li visions under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Eapire 
were in no sense conterminous with those of antiquity, and hence do not 
&ffo:rd a boundary by which Palestine can be separated exactly froll the 
rest of Syria in the north, or from the Sinai and Arabi.an deserts in 
the south and east. Consequently, there is no ancient geographical 
tem that 1nflex1 bly delineates the area known as Palestine; nor 1 s there 
any reason as pertains to this thesis to reach back into antiquity be­
cause the Zionist-Palestinian conflict begins with the 1880s, with 
specific ag1 tation starting after the 1897 Basle meeting which implemented 
an activist and organized political Zionism in Palestine. Consequently, 
*It has been stated by Chaim Weizmann himself that his claimed constituency 
of "the Jewish people" in the discussions leading to the Balfour Declaration 
was a fabrication subsequently conceded by him. Refer to the public 
address by Weizmann at Czernowitz, Roumania, December 12, 1927, in Goodman, 
ed., Chaim Weizmann, Tribute in Honour of His Seventieth Birthday (1945), 
P• 199. 
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�r the purposes of this paper, the wr1 ter J!lUSt select an &rb1 trary 
mt appropriate historical departure point on what entails the area 
of "Palestine." 'lberefore, the demographic area w�ch included a 
people known historically as Palestinians at the time of the Zionist 




11 United Nations GAOR 1144 (1946); G . A. Res. 95( I ) ;  United Nations 
Doc. A/2'36 (1946) .  The principles also appear in 45 American Journal 
of International Law Supplement, Documents (195 1 ) ,  p. 125 . 
2'lbe most recently declassified. and published United States Govern­
aent materials which demonstrate this appear in (1947) Foreign Relations 
of the United States, vol. 5, (1971), pp. 999-1328. Recently released. 
official documents of the British Government show how decisions were 
made and policy fonnulated. Doreen Ingrams presents anhistorical 
compilation of these records in Palestine Pa ers 1917-1 22: Seeds of 
Conflict (New York: George Braziller, Inc . , 1973 • 
3rt may be easily predicted with considerable assurance that if  the 
present Middle East Peace Conference is to reach toward peace based upon 
justice, it  will have to utilize the principled criteria of international 
law. Another so-called "practical settlement" based upon naked power 
bargaining and expedient unprincipled calculation will provide a short 
interlude between more serious intense hostilities. 
4Forei Relations of the United. States 1 47, Vol. V (Washington, 
D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971 , p.  1157. 
5ror a discussion of the rights, duties and roles of the non-Muslim 
communities during the Islamic and Ottoman ( 15 34-1914 ) rule periods see: 
H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London : Oxford 
University Press, 1957), Vol. I,  part II, pp. 207-261 ; Majid Khadduri, 
"Intemational Law, " in Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny, eds . ,  
Law in the Middle East (Washington, D.  C. : The Middle East Institute, 1955 ),  
Vol . I, pp. 349-373; Yusif Rizq-Allah Ghanimah, A History of the Jews of 
!!!:9. (Arabic )  (Baghdad: al-Furat Press, 1924 ) ;  Cecil Roth, The Sassoon 
Dynasty (London: Robert Hale Ltd . ,  194 1 ) ;  Israel Joseph Benjamin II, 
Ei t Years in Asia and Africa from 1846 to 18 (Hanover: Published 
by the author, 1859 • When Palestine was illegally dismembered in 1948, 
Palestine ' s  Arab population numbered. l, J98, 000. According to the best 
estimates, that population is now approximately 3,500, 000 scattered about 
in forced exile by Zionism. 
6shalit v .  Minister of Interior, 23 P.D. 477-608 (1969), noted in 
Israel Law Review (1970) ,  pp. 259-263. For an excellent review of 
citizenship complex! ties in the State of Israel see Dr. Uri Davis, "'!be 
Land Where Palestinians are 'Non-persons' , "  Palestine Digest, July, 1976, 
PP• l-J1 Noman F. Dacey, "Democracy"in Israel, Southbury, Conn. 1 The 
American-Palestine Committee, 1976, pp. 7-9. It will simply be noted here 
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that the Israeli Nationall ty Law makes 1 t possible for a non-Jew to be 
born in the terrl tory under Israeli poll ti.cal jurisdiction and yet be 
clooaed to inherited statelessness. '!be Israeli Ministry of Interior 
bas to date refused to publish official. statistics on the number of 
stateless Palestinian Arab residents under Israeli law. 'Ibis is one 
of Israels most guarded secrets. It is also interesting tO n<?te that 
according to the Israel National! ty Law Part 1 , ·Section 2s Nationa.11 ty by Return, a Jewish infant born in Israel. after the establishment of 
the state in 1948 acquires Israel nationality not by birth, but by 
return as a Jewish immigrant under the law of Return. In Israel, once 
Palestinians have passed 21 years of age w1 thout applying for citizen­
ship, they have completely lost their right to ci tizen·ship and must 
pass their "stateless" status on to their offspring. 
· 
7'lheodor Herzl, '!be Jewish State (New Yorki The Maccabean Publishing 
Ccapany, 1904). 
&rbeocior Herzl, '!be Jewish State {Der J\K!.enstaat), trans. by Harry 
Zohn (New Yorks The Herzl Press, 1970), p. 10. In keeping with Zionist 
poll ti.cal doctrines the esta,blishment of Jewish setilements was :f'.rom 
the outset based. on the displacement of the indigenous population. See, 
for example, the provisions of the Jewish National Fund as early as the 
turn of the century. · It should be noted that Israel ha.s been ruled since 
1948 by a group of Zionists predominantly of F.a.stern European origin 
to whom a Jewish State and Jewishness mean a state b&sed on the culture 
of F.astern European Jewry. Herzl wrote, "Is Palestine or Argentina 
preferable? '!be Society {of Jews) will take whatever it is given and 
whatever is favored by the public opinion of the Jewish people. The 
Society will detel.'mine bOth points" (p. 10). · 
9rb1.d. � p .  27. "The idea which I develop in this pamphlet is an age oldOnes the establishment of a Jewish State.• 
1°tsrael1 c1 tizenship, under Zionist ideology, · 1s distinguished from 
J"9wish national! ty and religious a.ffillation • . The Zionist State main­
tains 1 ts exclusive secular jurisdiction over religious matters by 
conveniently preserving a misleading category of Jewish nationality in 
adM. tion to Israeli citizenships Israeli identity cards and birth 
certificates not only have those two categories listed separately, 
but to further accentuate the Zionist ideology, a third category for 
religion is added. Thus, a.n Israeli Jew is  a. citizen of Israel, a. 
Jewish national and a. Jew by faith. In the case of "Jewish nationals" 
Israel' s  Zionist establishment ell tes are applying "the Jewish people" 
Tacl.al concept. 
11 A distinction must be made in Zionist ideology between the 
concepts "the Jewish people" and "Israel . "  "Israel" const1 tutes 
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the 1948 geographical poli ti.cal embodiment of the "Jewish people" 
doctrine relied upon by Zionism. '!be distinction may be made clear 
by recognizing that the Israeli Supreme Court, a Zionist instrument, 
held in Attorney General of Israel v .  Eichmann, that "'!be connection 
between Jewish people and the State of Israel constitutes an integral 
part of the law of nations • • • •  " (Supreme Court of Israel , Criminal 
App. No. '.336/61 ,  ft'ay 29 ,  1962) .  It should also be noted that in this 
·case of Eichmann's trial the Zionist doctrine of "the Jewish people" 
was clearly enunciated by the Israeli Court. Israel is, in Zionist 
doctrine, one of the two principal political instruments of Zionist 
nationaliSJll. '!be other i s  the World Zionist Organization, which i s  
as o f  19.54 an official poli ti.cal 1nstr'llllent o f  the Israeli government. 
The public law relationship between the State of Israel and the World 
Zionist Organization (or Jewi sh Agency) i s  recognized explicitly in 
the Israeli Status Law of 1952 and the ensuing Covenant between the 
Israeli government and the Zionist Organization ' s  Executive body of 
19.54. It must be made clear that contrary to. the Israeli Supreme 
Court interpretation in the Eichmann case the connection between 
"Jewish people" and "Israel" has never been accepted as an "integral 
part of the law of nations. "  
CHAPTER II 
· p.ALE:)'.I'INE IN PERSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF 
PRE-WORLD WAR I JEWISH-ZIONIST IMMIGRATION ACTIVITIES 
An analysis of juridical rights of fore1:gners under the Ottoman 
Ca.pi tulations treaties and in accordance wi:th the diplomatic customs of 
this period is technical . But we can contribute some legal ·thoughts 
to· thi s  problem, for which Turkey, naturally wishing to be sovereign 
in its own terrl tory, 1 shortly upon the outbreak of World War I de-
noimced the imposed Western Capi tul.ations: 
'!he Department of State was officially informed by the Turkish 
Ambassador on September 10, 1914, that on and after the first of 
October the Ottoman Government had determined to abrogate the con­
ventions known as the "Capitulations" which he stated "restrict the 
sovereignty of Turkey in her relations with certain P.owers. "  The 
United States is one of these Powers. It was further stated that 
"all privilege and immunities accessory to these conventions or 
issuing therefrom are equally repealed . "  The purpose was to re­
move "an intolerable obstacle to all progress in the Elnpire , "  
and the relations of Turkey to the Powers were . to be regulated 
henceforth by "the general principles of international law. 112 
Through the Capitulations the Ottoman Empire formulated the 
custom of granting legal immunity to non-citizens (foreigners or non­
Turkish residents based on Turki sh territory) and peoples conq.uered and 
incorporated under Istanbul 0 s  ruling authority (�n - example i s  PalestiID;ans).  
'lhe Istanbul. authorities were inclined to do so by means of the reason 
·of the difference between the law of the Koran applying to subjects of 
the Islamic faith and the laws of the non-Islamic countries. The es-
sential fact to be denoted i s  simply that the Turks in the midst of their 
territorial acquisitions spontaneously and generously recognized the 
right of the conquered to be governed by their own laws and customs in 
21atters held sacred by the Muslims, as well as in matters not of vital 
concern to the state. Thi s ruling concept is what the Zionist Israel 
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Za.ngwill partially referred to when he stated in 1921 : 
Were the Arabs given their own way, it i s  certain they would put 
a total em'OO.rgo upon Jewish immigration. But they are not to have 
their way. Palestine is to be ruled like a Br1 tish crown colony, 
and its inhabitants have lost the democratic rights which they 
enjoyed even under Turkey. J 
Whatever may have been the historical reasons and political mo-
t.1.ves guiding the Ottoman Turks in their policy towards their non-Muslim 
subjects, whether of tolerance, statesmanship, or practical political 
necessity, it is sufficient for the purpose of determining the origin 
and nature of the extraterri tori.al prvileges of foreigners in Turkey, 
simply to note in thi s connection that without the threat of powerful 
armies and battleships, the Chri stians, Jews and other subjects of the 
Sul tan received extensive immunities of legal jurisdiction resembling in 
certain respects those subsequently granted to non-subject foreigners. 
'!be origin of the juridical rights of foreigners, commonly 
termed Capitulations, in the Ottoman Empire reveals the distinction 
between Ottoman law and the concept of international law or legal custom 
employed by the Western nations. 'Ibe contrast reveals how alien peoples 
(foreigners) coming together have been allowed to retain their legal 
customs and to have their actions tested or reviewed juridically by 
their separate legal standards; that i s  to say, how law was regarded as 
personal, traveling with the person and controlling his actions, instead 
of territorial, in the Anglo-Saxon sense of applying to all persons ir-
respect! ve of national! ty within the poll tically recognized sovereign 
boundaries. '!be Turks by reason of their reverence for custom in general 
felt constrained to recognize the customs of subject nationalities or 
peoples incorporated in the Empire . It was rather the acknowledgment of 
the general practice of the times--a conformity to the accepted rules of 
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international intercourse . If, however, the act of voluntary acceptance 
of international legal custom (i . e . ,  the confirmation by Sultan Mohammed 
of the ancient poll tical and commercial privileges granted to the mer­
chants of Genoese of Gala ta in 1453) i s  accepted, the recognition of the 
legal rights of the Venetians a year later (April 15, 1454) assumed still 
the legal context of voluntary arrangements even though the rights of the 
Venetians resulted from a treaty concluded at Adrlanople. 'Ibis treaty 
looms as very significant because i t  became the precursor, but net. proto­
type, of later agreements between Turkey and Western nations, commonly 
temed Ca.pi tulations, but in a different context. 
The two treaties standing out beyond all others in the matter of 
Western world Ca.pi tula tions are the treaty of 1535 between Sul tan Soliman 
a.nd Francis I of France, and that of 1740 tetween Turkey and France ; 
these treaties, as well as others, inured to the benefit of the nations 
w1 th poll ti cal and commercial interests in �he Ottoman Empire and would 
help generate the destruction of sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire . It 
may be said that France first obtained for the rest the major immunities 
of legal jurisdiction claimed by all the Powers in the subsequent treaties; 
incrementally these Powers secured special privileges through the process 
of forcing " juridical" extra terrl tori.all ty, making the Ottoman authorities 
legally impotent against foreign non-subject nationals in the Empire . 
'!be United States was one of the beneficiaries of the French treaties, 
claiming and exercising legal juri sdiction in the Ottoman Empire i n  ac­
cordance with the Treaty of 1830 between the two countries, until 1914 
when Turkey denounced the imposed Western Capitulations. 
This juridical system of one-sided "international law" obtaining 
in Turkey, by which foreign governments exercised legal jurisdiction on 
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Turkey' s soil (Palestine was part of Turkish sovereignty) ,  was humiliating; 
in fact, it denoted that up to 1914 (the First World War) that Turkey 
was not .al.lowed, in the context of the dichotomous Western view of 
"international. law" due respect to the sovereign rights of Turkey as 
an independent, equal state in the family of nations. In other words, 
aven in 1914, according to the basic principlesof international. law as 
regards the juridical. concept of sovereignty, Turkey should have had 
legal jurisdiction over foreigners, as well as subjects, in all matters 
affecting municipal public law and order in the Empire. '!he presence 
of usurper foreign consular courts, which decided all questions regard-
ing their respective foreign nationals, violated the international law 
concept of sovereignty. 'lhese foreign tribunals illegally disavowed 
Turkey's sovereign rights. A nation subnits to �uch illegal inroads 
upon its sovereignty and its legitimate exercise of jurisdiction over 
those in its boundaries only when forced to do so; for these reasons 
of violation of national. sovereignty, the Turkish Ambassador on Septem­
rer 10, 1914, informed the American Government that his government 
"determined to abrogate the conventions known as the ' Capitulations' "  
which "restricted the sovereignty of Turkey." 
'!he subject of foreign imposed Capitulations is very relevant 
to the subject treated in this paper because of the juridical violations, 
in the context of international. law principles, of Turkish sovereignty 
previous to the war's outbreak, and the illegal immigration, under the 
imposed Capitulations, of Jews (and Zionists) into Pal.estine4 under the 
external. protection (extraterritoriality) of foreign Powers . Consequent­
ly, it becomes necessary to discuss the official policies of the Ottoman 
Government with regard to illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
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Official Ottoman policy regarding Jewish settlement in Palestine5 
from 1881 to 1917 was that the Ottoman state was strongly opposed from 
the outset to modern Jewish settlement in Palestine
·
. 6 'Ihe Ottoman 
Government' s  policy must be seen as a reaction to nationalism in general 
and to Zionist nationalism in particular. After 1880. the Ottoman Govern-
m�nt viewed nationalism which had poli ti.cal statehood or nationhood aims 
as a threat to the multi.ethnic, multi.national principle of state organ-
iza.tion on which the Ottoman comity was 1::ased. :But, along with its owri 
internal administrative problems and deficiencies, the Porte was mili-
tar:Uy unable to stand up to the various powerful external constraints 
effectively imposed by the Great Powers.7 
To put its policy into practice, the Ottoman Government placed 
restrictions on Jews, many of which were Zionists, entering Palestine 
from 1882 onwards, policies designed to preve.nt Jewi� settlement in the 
country, especially Palestine. Ottoman opposition to Jewish settlement 
was intensified in 1897 when the Zionist international (European) move-
ment, seeldng a Jewish State in Palestine, was founded; in 1901 the re-
strictions against Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine were re-
vised in the form of consolidat�d regulations. :But, al though Ottoman 
I 
policy and the reasons for it  (Zionism being one) was clear and consistent, 
it failed. 'Ibis was partly because the restrictions were not complete 
(for example ,  Jewish "pilgrims" were never barred from Palestine) and, 
importantly, because the European Powers refused to acquiesce in the 
restrictions on the reason that they ran counter to the f o:rei gn privileges 
they and their nationals enjoyed under the imposed Capitulations. 8 
lieville Mandel writes: 
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Even when the entry restrictions were most severe , Jews could always 
vis1 t Palestine as "pilgrims" and outstay their welcome. If the 
(Ottoman) police tried to expel them, they could appeal to their 
consuls, whose files are full of accounts of Jewish immigrants being 
harried on reaching Palestine--precisely because the Jews made full 
use of their consuls' protection. And there were few obstacles that 
could not be overcome by reference to the Capitulations, either by 
the consuls on the spot or by the Embassies at Constantinople where 
higher authorl ty could be brought to bear. 9 
In the summer of 1903 David Levontin arrived in Jaffa to open the 
Anglo-Palestine Company (the APC) .  '!his bank was the first Zionist 
institution, properly speaking in Palestine. But the Porte had 
known of the bank' s  connection with the Zionist .Movement from the 
moment its parent company, the Jewish Colonial Trust, was set up in 
London in 1898.49 An introduction to �zim Bey from the Brl tish 
Consul in Jerusalem did not help, and Levontin, soon encountered 
obstacles in Jaffa where the APC' s offices were to be established..50 
Indeed, by September 1 the Consul learned that the Porte had ordered 
�zim Bey to obstruct the APC' s openi ng51 (on the l:asi s of orders 
from Al:xiulhamid, if one of 'lheodor Herzl ' s  rather dubious contacts 
in Constantinople is to be believed)52. Only pressure from the 
Brl tish Embassy at Constantinople made the Porte relent in November 
1903.53 In December Levontin was infonned that "the Company would 
be permitted to conduct its affairs without hindrance, so long as 
1 t confined its operations to commercial matters" • ..54 10 (Words in 
parentheses are from the orlgtnal . )  
An excellent example of Western encroachment of Turkish sovereign­
ty both before and after 185611 occurred in 1847 when the Russians had 
received from the British consul in Jerusalem a plan to transfer the 
Russian Jews (citizens of Czarist Russia) who were residing in Palestine 
to Brl tish Consular protection because many of them stayed in Jerusalem 
more than one year, in violation of the Russian law (municipal ) ,  and 
therefore under the Capitulations remained without legal proil.ection; the 
Turkish state was not allowed, even after the 18.56 Paris Treaty, to assume 
this jurisdiction. 
'!he nationalist currents and the political threat of having one 
ethnic or religtous group concentrated in one area and claiming it as 
independent terrl tory, posed an immediate threat to the idea of multi-
ethnic, mul tireligious coexistence, which was the constitutional basis 
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of the Ottoman state . 'Ille Jews in the Ottoman state enjoyed absolute 
freedom of religion, culture, travel and occupation. Until the 1870s 
Jews like other Ottoman subjects were free to settle wherever they de­
sired.. As late as 1876 Sul tan Al:dulhamid repelled a Jewish scheme, pre­
sented by Rabbi Joseph Natonek of Budapest ( October 21), for settling 
"a substantial contingent from among three million European Jews, but 
mostly from among Russian Jews1112 in Palestine. 'Ille emphasis of this 
plan was similar to that of post-1897 Zionism because Natonek' s letter 
suggested that a " special law" be enacted to regulate relations between 
the "Jewish colonists" and the "native" Palestine population .13 
The Ottoman Government, responding to Natonek, declared that al­
most all lands in Palestine were occupied, that the autonomy (Natonek' s  
"Jewish" autonomy) Natonek requested was incompatible with the adminis­
trative principles of a mul tiethnic and mul tireligious Ottoman state, 
and most significantly, the government called Natonek' s  attention to the 
fact that immigration into the Ottoman state was open to all individuals 
(as individuals) who wanted to establish themselves permanently as sub­
jects of the state, and that there were legal regulations for settlement 
which the Jews could use to do so.14 The Ottoman Government' s  political 
and legal position on any immigration was clear. It allowed individuals, 
regardless of religion or nationality, to emigrate to Turkey, but i t  
would restrict mass settlement--it would not permit one ethnic or religious 
group to establish numerical majority or exclusiveness in one specific 
area.15 Several decrees to this effect were issued, in 1884, 1887 and 
1888. Yet, despite these clear decrees, certain Jewish individuals and 
organizations as late as 190916 continued to propose mass Jewish settle­
ment in the Ottoman state . 
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Not disregarding other historical Jewish settlement plans, begin-
ning in 1890, the question of Jewish immigration into Ottoman territory 
became more than a serious concern for off'lcial del:ate and policy announce-
ments. Large groups of Jews from Russia and Roumania sought to migrate 
to the Ottoman state using any means available .  Many of these were either 
Zionists or migrated under Zionist organizational auspices. 
In 1896 the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA was a non-Zionist 
organization founded in 1891 by Baron Maurice de Hirsch) became interested 
/ in Jewish colonies in Palestine, sending its agent Joseph Niego in 1897 
to inspect possible colonization sites.17 Specif'lcally, the JCA turned 
their political sights to the north of Palestine and east of the Jordan 
River for reasons which should be made clear. Land purchases in the Sancak 
of Acre were not as difficult as in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem. / Niego' s 
inspection and views on Jewish colonization were shared by the JCA ' s  first 
full-time official in Palestine, David Haym, who reported in a JCA cor-
respondence that the Ottoman authorities in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem 
were opposed to organized Jewish settlement and referred all questions 
directly to Constantinople, whereas Ottoman authorities in the Sancak of 
Acre were more flexible and were prepared to present their superior, the 
Vali of Beirut, with fai ts accomplis. Accordingly, JCA' s attentions turn-
ed. northwards and in 1900 the author! ties in Beirut infonned the Ottoman 
Minister of Internal Affairs that some landowners wanted to sell land in 
the region of Tl berias to Narcisse Leven, president of the JCA. The JCA 
had intentions of installing groups of foreign Jews on the purchased lands 
while evicting the Arab fellahin tenants who rented the lands from the 
large Arab landowners. 18 
It is  interesting to note that -in 1901--shortly after the consoli-
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dated regulations19 on Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine were 
issued by the Ottoman Government--the Council of Ministers in Constanti­
nople ruled that Leven, as a foreigner, was legally entitled under the 
ottoman Land Code of 1867 to buy land in the Ottoman Empire, provided 
the ottoman authorities were assured that Leven would not install foreign 
colonizing Jews on the land. 20 Leven, acting as "simply a French Jew" 
while actually quietly acting as representative of the foreign b:i.sed 
JCA, sought to illegally cir.cumvent the 1901 Ottoman regulations which 
specifically prohibited the sale of Ottoman land to Jews who maintained 
residence abroad. 'lhrough illegal circuitous routes, the JCA had managed 
to acquire enough land from 1898 to 1901 for six Jewish colonies to be 
established. in the north of Palestine between 1899 and 1904. 
In June of 1904 land sales to all foreigners were prohibited with­
out authority from the Porte . When Ahmed Resid Bey, the Ottoman governor 
of the Mutasarrlflik of Jerusalem, succeeded Kazim Bey in July of 1904, 
one of his first actions was to send an official document to the foreign 
consuls in Jerusalem reminding them of the legal restrictions on land 
purchases by foreign Jews acting on behalf of foreign Jewish colonization 
organizations or maintaining re;:rl.dence. abroad. It is interesting to note 
that no tender offered by the Anglo-Palestine Company (APc)21 for any 
commercial concession or construction project in Palestine was ever ac­
cepted by the Ottoman Government.22 
'!hough the Ottoman Government placed restrictions on Jews entering 
Palestine :from 1882 onwards, and though its opposition to Jewish settlement 
was increased in 1897 when the Zionist Movement was founded and sought a 
Jewish State in Palestine, and though in 1901 Ottoman restrictions against 
Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine were revised in the form of 
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consolidated. restrictions (1901),  Ottoman policy failed. Largely, this 
policy failed because of foreign interventionist restraints imposed by 
the Ca.pi tulations; significantly, Ottoman policy failed of effective 
implementation even despite fears after the Seventh Zionist Congress (1905) 
which decided that Zionist Jewish State efforts should be directed ex-
elusively at Palestine . Even Ahmed Resid Bey, Ottoman governor of the 
Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem 1904 through 1906 expressed grave concern 
to the Porte in Constantinople (as did his predecessors) that it was 
impossible to restrain and prohibit foreign Jews from settling in Palestine 
without the cooperation of the foreign consuls.23 Additionally, Resid Bey 
subnitted a report in which he disagreed with continued Jewish immigration 
into Palestine . 24 As early as 1906 he observed that the Jews sought 
autonomy in Palestine. To depict thi s Zionist poli ti.cal goal he quoted 
from the Russian Zionist Menachem Ussishkin' s pamphlet, Our Programme , 
which was central to the debates at the Seventh Zionist Congress.25 
In Aprll of 1907 Ali Ekrem Bey, successor to Resid Bey in Jerusalem, 
wrote to the president of the Alliance Israllite Universelle in Constant-
inople:  
As for the business which you call poll tical--the business of land 
sales--1 t is incontestable that it is taking on day by day an un­
measured proportion which i s  contrary to the spirit of the ( Ottoman) 
Government • • •  'lhe Jews, as well as other groups, can buy land, but 
they must not appear to want to conquer Palestine • • •  So counsel your 
co-religionists moderation, equity and , above all, honesty. You 
know me enough to be convinced that I shall do all I can to �tevent 
a [lanc!i sale in which I suspect some illegitimate interest. 
In June of 1907, Ekrem Bey, the Ottoman governor of the Mutasarri-
flik of Jerusalem, wrote to the Grand Vezir stating that the legal entry 
restrictions needed the support of the foreign consuls to be effective . 27 
As noted at thi s approximate time the Seventh Zionist Congress (1905) aimed 
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at setillng as many Jews in Palestine as could be achieved and setting 
up in Palestine an independent Jewish government with the help of the 
Powers, notions not exactly designed to appeal to the Ottoman Government. 
Ekrem Bey attributed the inconsistencies, violations and ineffectiveness 
of the Ottoman entry provisions to the refusal of the European Powers to 
accept them because they inured to the extraterritorial privileges 
European national s enjoyed under the Capitulations. Obviously, militarily 
the Porte could not stand up to the Great Powers; hence, the Europeans 
violated or overlooked the Ottoman legal provisions with impunity. 
'!he 1901 consolidated regulations, though legally in force , had 
not and could not be applied. 'Ihe Jews ignored the absolute "requirement"· 
to carry a foreign national ' s  passport or equivalent document indicating, 
inter alia, the purpose of their visit while the non-cooperation of the -- -- . 
consuls in Palestine assured the foreign nationals without passports 
extraterritorial protection in Palestine though they were in violation 
of Ottoman law. Ironically, there was no hint in the Ottoman instruc-
tions to their own officials on how to de� with violations of legal entry 
provi sions because, not so strangely, the M1.nister of Internal Affairs 
had himself, because of the power of the European states to intervene 
in the Ottoman Empire, deprived the legal directives of all force by 
instructing the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem in 1904 "not to permit a s1 tua-
28 ti.on in which problems ari se with foreign eml:a.ssies." 
Jews, even when entry restrictions were most severe, could always 
visit Palestine as "Pilgrims, " as David Ben Gurion did, and stay. If the 
Ottoman authorities tried to expel them, Jews of whatever current 
nationality could appeal to their local consuls for protection despite 
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the fact they would be in violation of Ottoman visa stipulations. Archival 
material. of consuls' files in the Ottoman Empire are full of historical 
accounts of Jewish visitors ( "pilgrims" ) and illegal immigrants afforded 
extraterritorial protection by their respective consuls in Palestine . 
Records reveal that Jews made full use of their consuls '  protection. 
And there were few. obstacles that could not be overcome by reference to 
the Capitulations either by the foreign consuls on the spot or by the 
foreign eml:assies at Constantinople where more powerful foreign political 
authority could be placed against the Ottoman Government. 'Ihe severity 
of foreign encroachment on behalf of legal and illegal Jewish immigrants 
in Palestine i s  transcribed in a detail report by Ba.haaddin Bey, a former 
Commissioner for Jewish Affairs in Palestine at the Ottoman Ministry of 
the Intertor, Istanbul . In this official report he desc:ri bed the following 
features of Jewish-Zionist colonization in Palestine : 
'!he attempt of the Jews to separate themselves from the rest of the 
inhab1.tants; their retention of foreign nationality; their subnission 
of litigation to Jewish courts; their own paper-money ( by which he 
referred to the cheques of the Anglo-Palestine Company); their own 
symbols of statehood, in particular the blue-and-white (Star of David) 
flag; the Jewish National Fund stampe ; their supplanting Arab labour; 
their purchase of land in an attempt to possess themselves of the 
country; their disrespect of Turkish authority and of the Turki sh 
language in schools which inculcate Jewish nationalist and anti­
Turkish sentiment; and the autonomy of the Jewish colonies, with 
their own law-courts and defence services.29 
Already, upon the outbreak of the First World War the Zioni st 
Organization in Palestine was attempting, under the name of Zionism, to 
construct a Jewish government in the area. JO Although Turkish authorities 
legally deported some Russian Zionists, J1 the effective disruption of 
Zionist activities was prevented by the direct intervention of the 
American Government, certain neutral Powers and by admonitions from the 
German Government, which shortly would become an ally of the Turki sh state. 
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Jews entering Palestine illegally did not necessarily have to seek 
the political protection of consuls ;  they found other means of bypassing 
the Ottoman laws on entry, Ottoman officials accepted br1 bes, Jews en­
tered overland from Port Said (Egypt), they purchased land illegally in 
the name of ind.igneous Ottoman Jews ( those legally resident in the Ottoman 
Empire32) ,  in the names of Ottoman Arabs, and in the names of consuls and 
consular-agents. 33 'lhe circuitous means need not be e xtended. 'lhe point 
to be observed i s  that despite the Ottoman immigration regulations and 
land purchase laws, the Jewish community in Palestine grew larger, 13y 
1897 there were in Palestine 50, 000 Jews and 18 settlements .  And, most 
importantly, Zionism was already advancing its plans for a Jewish State . 
Previously, the writer referred to the fact that the Jews ignored 
the Ottoman absolute requirement to carry a passport or equivalent document 
indicating, inter alia, the purpose of their visit. Article 1? of Ottoman 
law regulating foreign passports required that foreigners who entered the 
nation without the requi site Ottoman papers must obtain a passport or 
equivalent from their consul within 48 hours as well as paying a fine of 
40 piastres. J4 'lhis legal provision offered Jewish pilgrims, unintendedly, 
a way to circumvent the law and . enter Palestine. It i s  also interesting 
to note that whereas European Powers regulated passport provisions in their 
respective terri torlal sovereignties, Ottoman authorl ties were not allowed 
to regulate the distrl bution of passports to foreign travellers in Ottoman 
territory; those entering Ottoman territory illegally simply acquired a 
passport or equivalent from their consul in requisite time and became 
"legal , "  Jewish pilgrims utilized this enforced capitulation to enter 
permanently while the Ottoman Government remained impotent to act. Jewish 
pilgrims utilized the three-month residence permit they received on arrival 
in exchange for their passports , because it guaranteed their entry to 
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Palestine, while their expulsion (unless voluntary) became impossible as 
the Powers' regulated Ottoman actions. On the other hand, once Jewi sh 
Pilg:ri.ms re-acquired their passports at a later date, their status under 
the Capitulations was now in i;;he hands of their consular government making 
the Ottoman authorities unable to act even after (or before) residence 
permits expired. Ul ti.ma tely, Ottoman authorities in their own terrl tory 
remained at the subservience of simple onerous non-cooperation from 
foreign consuls in Palestine. 
'!he significance of violation and external constraints on Ottoman 
law regulating Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine i s  seen in the 
fact that over half of the 50 ,  000 Jewish settlers who remained in Palestine 
by 1908 were Jewish nationalists (Zionists) who were dedicated to the 
erection of a Jewish State made Arabrein .  '!hough a few of these Zionists 
became Ottoman subjects, the vast majority did not, so that they could con­
tinue to enjoy the privileges and immunities allowed Europeans under the 
C:i.pi tulations. Benefiting doubly under the Ottoman Millet system and the 
�pi tulations these Zionists began laying the foundation for a Jewish State . 
'!he Jewish population of Palestine, by 1908, had risen to about 80,000 or 
over three times its number in 1882 when the first entry restrictions 
were implemented . '!he entry statistics underscore the failure of the 
Ottoman Government to regulate Jewish settlement in Palestine . '!his failure 
must be attributed to the Capi tulations system in which the European Powers 
uniformly refused Ottoman con1trol over their internal affairs. In short, 
1 t became impossible to restrict Jews, including Zionist nationalists, 
from settling in Palestine without the cooperation of the foreign consuls 
and emmssies. 
Consequently, the Turks had evinced strong opposition to Jewish 
coloni.zation, particularly Zionist, of Palestine even previous to the 
emergence of Herzl and the World Zionist Organization. 'Ihis Ottoman 
hostility to any large-scale Jewish/Zionist immigration was officially 
predicated on contentions that settlers retained their original citizen-
ship, usually in the case of Jews, as Czarist "Russians. "  In consequence ,  
Ottoman courts possessed no legal jurisdiction over these settlers, the 
result of the foreign imposed Capitulations. Juri sdiction remained under 
the aegis of foreign consulates who in turn exploited these consular 
powe.rs vi s-a-vis, and to the detri�ent of Ottoman sovereignty. As a re­
sult many alien Jews were settled in the area of Palestine against the 
will of both the Palestinian people and the Ottoman Government. 
'Ille author introduced this chapter .with a denouncement by the 
Ottoman Government of Western intrusions into the sovereignty of Turkey 
when that government declared that international relations between i t  and 
the Western world would be henceforth regulated as of 1914 by "the general 
principles of international law . "  While the writer revealed the degree 
to which Western nations under the Capitulations egregiously violated 
Turkish sovereignty, little was related about Zionism ' s  premeditated schemes 
to violate international law principles by having installed over Arab 
Palestine an illegal colonial protectorate scheme . 35 Zionism was prepared 
long before the Balfour Declaration to collaborate with any imperial Power 
willing to illegally impose a colonial protectoratte over a portion of 
Turkey's territorial sovereignty . 36 From the time Herzl publi shed Der 
Jud.enstaat in 1896, the Zionist movement was aware that its political 
goals could only be achieved by the help of one or more of the imperi.ali st 
Western Powers. 37 The history of early Zionism--that is,  the years between 
1896 and 1917--is documented with unremitting schemes to secure imperialist 
favor.38 Herzl , as early as 1896, offered Zionism as an agent for imperial-
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colonial policy: 
If His Majesty the Sultan (of Turkey) were to give us Palestine, we 
could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey. 
We should fom there part of a wall of defence for Europe in Asia, 
an outpost of civilization against 00.rbari. sm.39 
Herzl was even clearer during the Second Zionist Congress in 1898: 
Asia is the diplomatic problem of the coming decades • • •  we may in all 
modesty perhaps recall to mind that we Zionists whose practicality 
of View people like to dispute, recognized and announced as imminent 
the coming development of European rivalry (refers to the imperial­
ist competition to divide the non-white world) a few years before 
the others did�O 
David Wolffsohn, the Zionist Cologne ( Germany) banker, who was 
elected to succeed Herzl after the latter' s death in 1904, reported a 
private talk between the German Grand Duke Friedrich von Baden (a rela­
tive of the Gennan Kai ser) and Kaiser Wilhelm II in October of 1898 : 
'!he Kaiser was even said to have been ready to assume protectorate 
powers over the new ( Jewish) state . He was said to have expressed 
the wish to receive a Zionist deputation in Jerusalem so that he 
could disclose thi s to i t .  41 
Dr. M. I .  Bodenheimer, important German Zionist official , wrote : 
In a communication addressed to Count Eulenburg, the German Ambassador 
in Vienna., Herzl had compiled all points of view in order to move the 
Kaiser into taking up the cause of Zionism in his hand • • • •  '!he return 
of the Jews to Palestine would bring culture and order into that 
neglected corner of the Orient. By means of the German protectorate 
we would arrive at an orderly state of Affairs. In this letter, the 
Grand Duke reportedly inf�:rmed Herzl that the Kaiser was full of enthusiasm for the cause. 2 
Later, Bodenheimer wrote: 
Our imagination had been urged on unchecked on account of the extra­
ordinary event (Zionist delegation meeting with the Ge:rman Emperor in 
Jerusalem in 1898 ) .  So following the word of God in the Bible, I 
demanded the land stretching between the brook of Egypt and the 
Euphrates, as the region for Jewish colonization. In the transitional 
period the land would be divided into districts which would come under 
Jewish administration (while under a German protectorate) as soon as 
a Jewish majority was reached .43 
� 
This candid scheme, already in 1898 of a Greater Israel concept 
(Eretz Israel ) ,  which today is still applied by controlling Zionist ide-
.. .. 
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ology and institutions in Israel , did not, for tactical reasons, meet 
1 ld.th Herzl ' s  approval . 44  Herzl told Bodenheimer: 
('lhe) • • •  time was not ripe for my (meaning Bodenheimer' s) extensive 
thoughts; i t  would be more appropriate for the time being to create 
a gem cell out of which a (Jewish) state could grow organically. 
He (Herzl) had in mind a land company in which sovereign rights and 
royal prerogatives ( Germany ' s )  would be • • •  safeguarded. We hoped 
that when the Kaiser assumed power over the pro1i:ectorate, these 
rights would show themselves to be of such value that a chart�red 
company similar to that of Rhodesia10 would be built on them. 45 
After the Kaiser refused to accede to the Zionist scheme for a 
Judenstaat in Palestine46 Bodenheimer declared : 
Despite the ( Zionist) failure in Jerusalem, Herzl did not want to 
drop the idea of a German protectorate . Already, then ,  Herzl repre­
sented the view that for us (Zionism) the question was solely whether 
we would come under German or British :protection. Had the Kaiser 
leaned towards our cause , the (Zionist) movement would have had a 
German prientation. 'Ihe question pressed for a decision in the near 
future . 47 
'Ihe interests of German imperialism and those of German-speaking 
Zionist leaders, though not always mutual in the sense that they perturbed 
an impotent Ottoman nation and ally, was symbiotic; the Zionists in which-
ever camp they may have wanted to stand--that is, Britain or Germany--saw 
political opportunities to trade their support in exchange for an imperial 
promise on Palestine, which belonged legally to Turkey. When the German 
Kaiser refused to permit German · Zionism the territorial allocation of 
Turkish Palestine (should this deal have been consummated , Turkey' s  sover-
eignty would have been egregiously violated although impotent to act against 
a transfer of its territory) ,  Herzl , in 1900 at the Fourth Zionist Congress, 
which was astutely held in London_, declared : 
England the mighty, England the free, will understand us and under­
stand our ( Zionist) aspirations. With England as starting point we 
could be certain that the Zionist idea ( Judenstaat) will grow mighty 
and rise higher than ever before . 48 
Herzl now cultivated British favor and the British Government put 
l '  
... 
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forward the proposal that a region in Central Africa (where the modern 
state of Kenya now stands) be placed at the disposal of the Zionist move­
ment for Judenstaa.t settlement. Brita.in, having some imperial power in 
Turkish sovereign affairs, despite its weakness and confronted by Ger­
many' s military and political power over the Sublime Porte, was in no 
position to illegally allocate a portion of Turkish territory to the 
Zionists at this time . Interestingly, while Herzl advocated acceptance 
of the "Uganda Plan"49 and support from British imperialism, 50 wide 
circles of Zionist officials and members were opposed to it, not least 
among them the Gennan Zionist faction which saw its political connection 
with Gennan imperialism wrecked if the British proposal was accepted. 5i 
In this open drive of Gennan imperialism into the Near East (competing 
with '.Br1. ti sh imperialism in the area), the inchoate Herzl Zionist organi-
za.tion led by German-Austrian Zionist Jewry, cultivated the favors of the 
Gennan Empire since Germany retained supreme political leverage in Instan-
bul .  'Ihu:s, among the opponents of the Uganda Plan at the 1903 Zionist 
Congress the Gennan Zionist leader Dr. Nossig was prominent .52 
'Ihe hi story of international Zionism ' s  deployment and officious 
use of ooth German and British imperialisms in order to achieve their 
Judenstaat under either' s  colonial-imperial protectorate umbrella is ex-
tremely interesting but not for explication in this paper. 'Ihe wrl ter 
simply reveals that .Turkish sovereignty, despite international law pre­
cepts, was open to violation with impunity; moreover, Zionism had no regard 
for these principles of international law .53 Protectorates were one form 
of terri tori.al annexations violating international law. Finally, in 1914, 
the Ottoman Government determined not only to "abrogate" the violations 
of its terri tori.al sovereignty (the Capitulations), Turkey also detennined 
to assert equity in international law: 
that the (international ) relations of TUrkey to the (Western) Powers 
were to be regulated henceforth by the general principles of inter­
national law. * 
Zionist documentation reveals that after the 1903 Zionist Congress, 
German Zionist leaders did not relax their efforts to gain support and 
I assurances from the Imperial German Government for a colonial protectorate ! over Palestine as a Judenstaat. 54 Gennan Zionist leaders still favored 
I I a German annexation policy--that is,  the colonial protectorate scheme over 
Palestine--in the Near East. '!he outbreak of the First World War still 
witnessed German Zionists standing in support of German annexation policy 
in the Near East. It is interesting to observe that leading political 
officials of the German Empire allowed the Zionists many favors because 
they considered them likely to yield poll tical rewards internationally 
during the war.55 
Shortly after the start of the war the Ottoman Empire joined the 
Central Powers in alliance against the Entente Powers. 'lhe international 
Zionist movement could not permit itself the option of choosing sides. 
Proclaiming to be an international "Jewish movement" the Zionist Actions 
Committee moved to neutral Copenhagen, Denmark. And in December of 1914 
it announced that Zionist organizations on both belligerent sides were 
to adhere to the principles of strict neutrality at all times. 56 
'Ibi s  facade neutrality was breached by the political activities 
of chaim Weizmann in England , whose admitted Anglophilia and Germanophobia 
earned for him the strongest �ensure of the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau. 
Formation of a "Jewish Legion, .. 57 an organic link between the Zionist 
political entrenous on the British side in Ottoman Palestine and the con-
quest of Palestine by Lord General Allenby, represented a most serious open 
violation of Zionis� neutrality, and its creation called forth strong de­
*see footnote two of chapter two . 
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I nuncl.ation by the Zionist Bureau in Copenhagen ,  but not for reasons of 
neutrality, for i t  was as much imbued w1: th the past important contributions I of and to Zionism in the Gennan Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monar­chy and did not wish to have current poli ti.cal achievements co-opted and 
jeopardized. lhe facts are that, in relationship to the Zionist organiza-
tions of all countrie s ,  with the sole exception of Czarist Russia, German 
Zionism reigned para.mount. Li.chtheim declared that from the time of Herzl ' s  
death in 1904 to the war of 1914, German Zionism contributed more in terms 
of propagandistic effort, establishment of companies and finances in Pales­
tine than any other country' s  Zionists,· except those in Russia. 58 German 
Zionism, even on behalf of non-subject (L e . ,  non-Germans) Russian and 
other F.a.stern European Jewry in Palestine, was able to officiously use 
the preeminence of German imperial power over the Ottoman Sultanate, a 
fact of which the Zionist Bureau i n  Copenhagen was aware . 
Consequently, Weizmann, who was co-responsible for the Jewish Legion, 
ran openly counter to the directives of his Russian Zionists and other 
Zionist confederates on the continent and elsewtiere who fully beli eved 
and hoped for victory of the Central Powers in World War I . 59 Weizmann' s  
chief external Zionist support �erived from some significant American 
Zionist leaders . As, for example ,  Stephen S .  Wise and Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis, whose critical antagonisms towards Germany by 
1917 did lead American Zionism allied with Weizmann' s  faction to proclaim 
"Better no Jewish Palestine, than as a gift from the Turkish assassinocracy 
and its German ally. "60 ·It is important to observe that, though political 
Zionism publicly has debunked and protested that i t  desired no Judenstaat 
in Arab Palestine, it privately and assuredly understood the real meaning 
of the "Jewish national home" scheme in Palestine . For i t  was American 
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Supreme Court Justice Brandei s61 who affirmed in a private interview with 
� Balfour, Bri ti.sh Foreign Secretary (1916-1919 ) ,  at the Paris Peace Conference 
• • •  that Palestine should be the Jewish homeland and not merely that 
there be a Jewish homeland in Palestine . 'Ihat, he assumed, i s  the 
·· commitment of the Balfour Decl�a ti on and will, of course, be con­
firmed by the Peace Conference . 62 
To which Balfour "expressed entire agreement . .. 63 
While Wei zmann was actively cultivating British political support 
for a Jewish State in Palestine, in Egypt (a British acquired protectorat e )  
during the winter o f  1915, Josef Trumpeldor organized the first Jewish 
mill tary contingent in the British army--the "Zion Mule Corps" which saw 
service in the unsuccessful British attack on the Dardanelles mid-way through 
the First World War. 64 
Zionists negotiations with the German embassy in Istanbul, Turkey, 
which included Ottoman authorities, emphasized "Jewish friendliness"65 
with Turkey during the war; Zionism suggested that a legion of Polish 
Jews 10, 000 in number should be formed to fight with the Turkish army in 
the defense of Palestine against the British invasion. 66 However, the 
development of this legion was to be dependent on a definite assurance 
from Turkey to support Jewish colonization (Zionist organized) of Palestine 
after the war. 67 Interestingly� in view of the more favorable political 
attitude towards Zionism in Britain, Zionism decided that such a military 
project risked losing more than it would ultimately gain, and i t  was aba.n­
doned. 68 Zionist authorities felt that Turkey would lose the war and be 
territorially partitioned among the Allies after her defeat. On the other 
hand, Zionist official Vladimir Jabotinsky believed that the Allied Powers 
would be victorious and that the Turkish Empire would be partitioned among 
the winners. 69 He thought i t  politically essential that Zionism give as­
sistance to the Allied Powers, particularly the Briti sh, in order to have 
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a ·aubstantial claim upon the Allies and the British, specifically the 
Jd:tish, at the end of the war .  70 It was, as Jabotinsky said, very ,es­
mntial to awaken in the British "an appetite for Palestine . "  71 He pro-
]IOaed to organize "the Jews" in F.gypt into a military unit that would 
fight as a unit with the British army. 
'lhe ignorance of Zionist history shown by the public is grotesque . 
SI.nee the poli ti.cal interests of world Zionist Jewry ( their Jud�nstaat 
scheme) constrained the official leaders of the International Zionist 
Organization to a supposed policy of complete neutrality during World 
War I, Zionists adopted an expedient and amicable international scission 
which would appear externally as internal disagreement and strife, but 
which developed a mutual activity within the apparent division of the two 
groups on their respective sides of the Entente-Central Powers' war. 
'lheir mutuality was "the Jewish State" under any conditions. For example ,  
while we have mentioned Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor, i n  Palestine itself, 
certain other leaders of the Zionist movement had, at the outbreak of the 
war, reached 
• • •  an understanding with the Turkish Government to set up a Jewish 
Legion in order to protect the country. Two representatives of these 
circles--Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (who later became President of Israel ) and 
David Ben-Gurion (who later became Prime Minister among other posts) 
proposed in November, 1914, to the Turkish Commander-in-Chief the 
setting up of a Jewish volunteer legion with the stipulation that 
this legion would remain in the country for the duration of the war, 
and would only defend its population in case of attack. The Zionist 
proposal was accepted by the military counci1 . 72 
'lhe power of Germany ' s  intervention into the sovereign affairs 
of the Ottoman Empire is ·revealed by the fact that when Jamal Pasha , the 
Turkish Commander-in-Chief in Syria and Palestine, in reply to the for-
mation of the Jewish Legion in England, issued an evacuation order to the 
Zionist settlers in. Palestine, Gennan Zionists sought help from Kai ser 
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Wilhelm to protect the Zionist colonies in Palestine. Nahum Goldmann ,  73 
important Zionist official , wrote as a member of the Di vision of Jewish 
A:ffairs74 in the German Foreign Office: " • • •  finally Kaiser Wilhelm him­
self was persuaded to seek the cancellation of the orde r .  'Ihat helped • .,75 
'lhus, upon the outbreak of the war a Zionist liaison office was established 
in Copenhagen in order to maintain political connections between the 
Zionists on ooth sides of the front. However, despite the fiction or 
facade of political neutrality, Zionists were not committed to the notion 
of poll tical neutrality. In England, Zionists were more successful than 
the pro-German Zionists. On Novembe r  2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration 
was issued and the orientation of the Zionist movement was henceforth 
internationally decided. 'Ihe man responsible was Chaim Weizmann who, 
being in the Manchester political constituency of Lord Arthur Balfo u r ,  
had endowed his officious pro-British Zionist allegiances with arguments 
similar to the proposals Herzl and the German Zionists had made to Germany's 
Wilhelm II : 
We can reasonably say that should Palestine fall within the British 
sphere of influence, and should .Britain encourage a Jewish settle­
ment there, as a British dependency, we could have in twenty to thirty 
years a million Jews out there, perhaps more; they would develop the 
country, bring back civilization to it and form a very effective guard 
for the Suez Cana1 . 76 
· 
As a result of the defeat of Germany the pro-German faction in 
the Zionist movement lost its former influence and was superceded by the 
pro-British Zionist faction. But before Germany's defeat, in an effort 
to still cultivate the . favors of International Zionism--the issuance of 
the Balfou r Declaration embarrassed ooth the pro-German Zionists and the 
German Government77--the German Foreign Minister on January 5, 1918 , sulr 
mitted to members of the Zionist international Executive still present 
in Berlin a memorandum whi ch read : 
1� 
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With regard to the endeavours of the Jewish community and of the 
Zionists in pa.rticular, we welcome • • •  particularly the intention of 
the Imperial Ottoman government to promote a flourishing of Jewish 
settlement in Palestine through the safeguarding of free emigration 
and settlement, within the country' s absorptive capaci ty. '!he 
Imperial Ottoman government, which has constantly proved its friendly 
attitude towards the Jews, allows them regional self-rule and the 
free development of their own culture in accordance with the country' s  
(Turkish) laws. 78 
Otto Warburg, a German Zionist and president of the World Zionist 
Organization, stationed i n  Berlin received the German memorandum . When 
in 1920 at a poll tical rally following the annual Zionist international 
conference held in London (Balfour gave the major address) Warburg was 
not allowed to address the meeting. 'Ihe pro-British Zionist faction now 
controlled and directed Zionist activities. Significantly, Max Nomau79 
stressed in his speech the poll tical and military significance of the 
"Jewish State" in regard to the security of the Suez Canal . Zionism had 
attached itself now to British imperialism; i t  would use this poll tical 
80 attachment to construct the Jewish State over the proceeding decades. 
Zionist vi sionaries under the aegis of British imperialism and 
Palestine Mandate did not come to share their knowledge and culture with 
the native Palestinians. The Zionist settlers, led by the Zionist elite 
and guided by such Zionist doct�nes as Hebrew Labor, or Conquest of Soil , 
which in Zionist jargon meant the "redemption of the 'Land of Israel ' .. 8! 
and the "regeneration of the ' Jewish character' "  to be achieved only-
through exclusive "Jewish Labor, " actively organized separatist Jewish 
institutions di sallowing any relationships in any way with the local 
Palestinian population. 82 Zionist pioneers, under the aegis of settler 
colonialism, were in essence conducting what nineteenth century Europe 
carried out as pockets of settler colonialists in Algeria, Rhodesia, Angola, 
South Africa, Namibia--all of which have been or still are international 
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trouble spots. 'Ihough Zionist literature and practice i s  replete with 
racist segregation, even as late as 1957 Israeli official Abba Eban, who 
comes from South Africa, claimed that the goal of Israel i s  not one of 
integration. "Qui te the contrary, " he declared, "integration i s  rather 
something to be avoided • .,83 It was this racially exclusi vi st vision of 
the purely Jewish State that led David Wolffsohn, the president of the 
Zionist movement in 1905, to instruct the Zionist director of the Anglo­
Pa.lestine Company in Jaffa84 not to cooperate w1 th Arab Palestinian of­
ficials in the Levontin Plan (an Arab-Zionist cooperative scheme put 
forth by Levontin in order to strengthen politically the Zionist APC ' s  
position in Palestine) to develop the ciftliks (crown lands) in the region 
of Jericho and the Dead Sea.85 Despite the fact that Herzl ' s  original 
Judenstaat was publicly repudiated by the British Government as well as 
ostensively "denied" by the Zionists, Zionism served only Jewish interests 
under the cloak of serving the interests of all in Palestine. Rather than 
coming to Palestine in order to help by their far-flung resources and 
efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its indigenous 
and settler inhabitants, Zionism quietly pursued their goal of a Judenstaat 
and cared not the least for the ·original indigenous Palestinian Arabs. 
While Sir Herbert Samuel , prominent British Zionist official and 
first British High Commi ssioner over the Palestine Mandate, would define 
the Balfour Declaration as meaning that 
'Ihe Jews • • •  should be enabled to found (in Palestine) their home, and 
that some among them within the limits that are fixed by the numbers 
and interests of the present (Palestinian) population, should come to 
Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop 
the country, to the advantage of all its inhabi tants.86 
Yet, conversely, he would also espouse in March of 1915 the founding 
of a Judenstaat with the direct help of Britain and the United States; 
1 ,  
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Sumel recommended a British protectorate in which it was 
hoped that under British rule facilities would be given to Jewish 
organizations to purchase land, to found colonies, to establish 
.educational and religious institutions, and to cooperate in the 
economic development of the country, and that Jewish immigration, 
carefully regulated, would be given preference , so that in the course 
of time the Jewish inhabitants grown into a majority and settled 
in the land, may be conceded such degree8of self-government as the conditions of that day might justify. . • • 7 
'lhus, under the cloak of a twisted sense of inteznational law 
and morality, and despite Brl tain' s official protestations and repudiations, 
Br1 tain would in practice come to endorse the Zionist enterprise in Pales-
tine in violation of principles of international law and in violation of 
its self-accepted mandate obligations to the Palestinian Arab people. 
Chapter Two 
1F.a.ch of the Western Powers, during the twenty years between 
1894-1914, coveted and forcefully acquired Ottoman dominions. '!be 
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Sul tan had to surrender several provinces in Asia Minor to Russia, 
Cyprus and Egypt to Great Britain, Tunisia to France , Libya to Italy, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. to Austria. Under external military duress,, 
Ottoman territorial sovereignty was violated by the Western nations, 
although thi s subject of another aspect of violating international law 
principles will not be discussed in this paper. But, may it suffice, 
to understand that further, during the First World War, Russia wanted 
Constantinople and the Straits; France wanted Syria; Britain desired 
the areas of Palestine , Syria, Transjordan and Iraq; Italy desired 
territory in Asia Mi.nor and the Government of India (under British 
control) had a hunger for the area of Iraq. The Western Powers, 
during the war, conspired to further partition the Ottoman lands. 
For an excellent explication of the Powers' territorial schemes see 
George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, chapter XIII. 
2American Journal of International Law, VIII , ( October, 1914), 
P• 873. 
3rsrael Zangwill, "Zionism To-Day, "  '!be Yale Review, January, 1921, 
p. 251. Zangwill also asserted that the Palestinians simply were not 
to be accorded the rights designated by the provisions of the Class A 
mandates system which recognized the right of territories formerly 
under Germany and Turkey to eventual independence--the establishment 
of self-governing institutions and the rise of an independent state. 
4After 1882, numbers of Jews still came from Europe to join the old, 
pious Palestine communities, but over half of the 50, 000 newcomers who 
remained in Palestine by 1908 were Jewish nationalists (Zionists) 
fonning the "New Yishuv" and dedicated to rebuilding "their people ' s  
'patrimony'" in Palestine ; while many of the 1903 Second "Aliyya, 11 
in ad.di tion to being political Zionists (i . e . ,  not cultural Zionists), 
had been affected by the Russian revolutionary movement and were imbued 
with a mixture of ideologies. A few of these Jewish nationalists became 
Ottoman subjects, but by far the majority did not, so that they could 
continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities granted to Europeans 
under the Capitulations. Benefiting doubly from the Millet system on 
the one hand and the Capi tulations on the other, they quite consciously 
set about laying the basis for an independent Jewish exi stence in 
Palestine which became the prelude to the Jewish State. Even in the 
absence of legal permission from the Ottoman authori ties, the Zionists, 
drawing upon assistance from the World Zionist Organization, opened the 
Anglo-Palestine Bank in 190J and the Jewish National Fund began acquiring 
land in 1905. In further proscription of legal pennission the Palestine 
Land Development Fund was founded in 1908 to make land ready for exclusive 
Jewish settlement. With these and other sources of financial assistance 
provided by the extraterritorialized Jewish Colonization Association, 
the number of Zionist settlers violating Ottoman sovereignty in Palestine 
reached 12, 000 by 1914 out of an estimated Jewish population of about 85,000. 
.S"Pa.lestine" i s  herein used as defining the area refe�d in 
ottoman documents as "Arz-i Filistin" , which at the end of the 
nineteenth century was not a single ad..ministrative unit ;  i t  was com­
posed of the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem to the south and the Sancaks 
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of Nablus and Acre in the north ; the�e Sancaks were part of the Vilayet 
of Sa.m ( "Syria") until 1888, whereafter these Sancaks were administrative­
ly incorporated in to the new Vilayet of Beirut . 
6 The modern period i s  considered to have begun with the increased 
immigration of Jews out of Imperial Russia and Ea.stern Europe generally 
in the early 1880s. The pre-Zionist period is considered as 1881-1897; 
w1 th the latter date being the implementation of political Zionism 
established. by the Ba.sle Zionist congress. 
?Previous to 1881, Ottoman immigration and settlement policies were 
different, for, on March 9 ,  1857, the Ottoman Government i ssued through 
the High Council of the Ta.nzimat a decree on immigration and settlement 
that was sanctioned by the Sul tan. The decree stated that immigration 
into the Ottoman state was open to anyone who would agree to give their 
allegiance to the Sultan, to become a subjec� of the Ottoman state and 
to respect the country ' s  laws. For an excellent overview of Ottoman 
policies see Kemal H .  Karpat, "Ottoman Immigration Policies and Settle­
ment in Palestine , "  Ibraham Abu-Lughod and Ba.ha Abu-Laban, eds . ,  
Settler Re · mes in Africa and the Arab World: The Illusion .of Endurance 
Wilmette, Illinois: . The Medina University Press International , 1974 , 
pp. 57-72. As regards Zionism and its Jewish State political goals in 
Palestine, it is interesting to note that the Ottoman decree of 1857 
did not incite immediate interest among the Zionists and non-Zionists 
in Europe (includes Russia) .  'Ibis is especially significant in view of 
the fact that beginning in 1839, with the establishment of the British 
consulate in Jerusalem ( the first European representation in the Holy 
City), the British made strenous efforts to stimulate the settlement of 
Jews in Palestine. '!he British had planned to establish and protect the 
Jews in Palestine in the hopes of creating in the Ottoman domain a group 
friendly to England, a group that would check and balance the Russian 
influence among the Orthodox Christians, and the French influence among 
the Maroni tes. For those who are interested in breaking through the 
enduring Zionist myths--:that Palestine "belongs to the Jews"--the Karpat 
article i s  enlightening. It is interesting to note, before the rise of 
political Zionism, the protection and tolerance accorded indigenous 
minorities, including Jews, by the Ottoman Government in Istanbul . See 
Ottoman Archives, Foreign Mini stry, Idare I ,  555, November 16, 1840; 
Idare , or Administrative, refers to the departmental internal communi­
cation and "555" to the file number with the date of issuance of the 
Ottoman Imperial pronouncement referred to as a " fi:rman. "  Thi s  format 
will be used whenever Idare is used as a footnote. 
· 
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8see Neville J. Mandel , "Ottoman Practice as Regards Jewish Settlement 
in Palestine: 1881-1908 , "  Middle Eastern Stu:li.es, II, (January, 1975), 
pp. JJ-46. Also see his article in the Middle Eastern Studies, X (no . J, 1974) regarding official Ottoman policy (not practices) to Jewish 
settlement in Palestine from 1881 to 1908. Mandel refers to the pre­
Zionist period as 1881-1897. David Ben Gurion was one such "pilg:ram . "  
Ben Gurion states, "Herzl initially believed that he would be able to 
obtain a charter for settlement in (Palestine) • • •  from the Turks, and 
al.ways opposed ( Jewish) infil tra.tion--that i s ,  settlement in violation 
of ottoman laws, which prohi bi. ted Jewish immigration and penni tted visits 
for only three months (which could easily be abused and circumvented under 
the capitulations). These laws also forDa.de the purchase of land by non­
Turkish Jews ( i . e . , those who would not declare their sincere intent to 
live as Turkish citizens ) .  The members of Hovevei Zion ignored these 
edicts. Emigration to (Palestine) • • •  continued ; land was purchased and 
settled . "  See David Ben Gurion, Israel A Personal History (New York : 
1971), p. 42 .  I have added the words in parentheses to clarify what 
Ben Gurion chose to leave vague . 
9Ibid. , p .  35. As the Jews became familiar with local conditions, 
they found other ways of circumventing the Ottoman restrictions and laws. 
As for example, they could enter Palestine by land by landing in Egypt, 
they could buy land in the names of old-established Ottoman Jews and 
in the names of local Arabs, consuls or consular agents. See Mandel 
for an excellent review of circumvention methods. During the pre-Zionist 
period (1881-1897) the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem was the main focus 
of Jewish settlement in Palestine. In 1882 the total Jewish population 
of Palestine was 24, 000. By 1897 there were 50 , 000 Jews in Palestine 
despite Ottoman legal constraints • 
. 10ibid . ,  p .  JB .  The Sixth Zionist Congress was convened in Basle 
in August of 1903. At the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basle in December 
of 1901, the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayeme t  Leisrael ) was voted 
into existence with funds to be used "exclusively for the purchase of 
land in Palestine and Syria." See Abraham Gra.nott ( earlier Granovsky) ,  
Boden und Siedlung in Palaestina ( Berlin ,  1929 ) ,  p. 183. The original 
German quote reads: "ausschliesslich nur zum Landkaufe in Palaestina 
und Syrien . "  
11The extra.territorial violations of Turki sh sovereignty continued 
even after the Paris Treaty of 1856 which in theory only--i . e . ,  not in 
practice--"accepted" the Ottoman state in the comi t� of European nations, 
this comity including (but in practice not rendered) reciprocity in 
international law principles over foreign nationals .  Only in theory 
did it recognize the Ottoman state as an equal to European states .  
For, one year later, the Ottoman state i ssued the decree on immigration 
and settlement in their sovereignty which, being an "equal" in the 
comi ty of the 1856 treaty agreement, would or should have in international 
law allowed Turkey jurisdiction over foreigners residing in the Empire , 
foreigners previ�usly covered by the Capitulations encroachments. 
120ttoman Archives, Foreign Ministry, Idare , 177, 47646/18). 'lhe 
second number (47646/183) indicates the office number. 
13rbtd. 
14 Ibtd. One reason for disallowing massive Jewish immigration as 
early as 1884 was that large groups of Muslims from southern Russia, 
deprived of their homes, needed to be resettled in the Islamic state. 
150ttoman Archives, Foreign Ministry, Idare , )46, 14)8/1624, July 
18, 1900. 
16nr. Alfred Nossig of the Jewish Committee of Berlin proposed his 
settlement scheme in 1909. 
17'lhe JCA managed to acquire enough land from 1898 to 1901 for six 
Jewish colonies to be e stablished in the north of Pale stine between 
1899 and 1904. 
18'lhe JCA has acquired about 8 , 000 acres (or J1,500 dunams of land) 
near Ti berias in early 1901, much of this land from the Sursuqs family. 
'!he Arab tenant fanners rose up in protests through both legal and 
violent reactions against the JCA purchases. As a result,  the Porte 
abrogated the Leven purchases a.t the end of 1901. 
19'lhe consolidated regulations went into force in 1901. 
20Foreign Office 195/2097, enc. to no. JJ, April 26, 1901, Sir R.  
Drummond-Hay (Beirut) t o Sir N.  O' Conor ( Constantinople ) .  
21'lhe APC was the first Zionist institution, properly speaking in 
Palestine . The Ottoman authorities had known of the Zionist bank ' s  
connection with the European Zionist movement from the moment its parent 
company, the Jewish Colonial Trust, was set up in London in 1898 . '!be 
APC opened up its first offi ce in Palestine in the summer of 1903 in Jaffa . 
22central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem, W/124/I August 24, 190J, D .  z .  
Levontin (Jaffa),  "Report II , "  p .  171. 
2Jisrael State Archive, Jerusalem, Turkish material , no. 100, December 
28, 1905, Secretariat of Admin. Council ( Jerusalem) to Grand Vezir 
(no. 29) ,  and to Minister of Internal Affairs (no . 87) . 
24rsrael State Archives, Jerusalem, Turkish material , no. 2J, 
Nobembe:zr 28, 1906, Resid Bey to Grand Vezir. 
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25consul t, for Zionist land practices in Palestine, John Ruedy, 
"Dynamics of Land Alienation in Palestine , "  Association of Arab­
American University Graduates, Inc . ,  Information Papers No. 5, May, 197' 
(North Dartmouth, Mass . :  AAUG, 1973), pp. 124-31,  130; for Zionist 
political aspirations as early as 1909, see Moshe Menuhin, '!he Deca­
dence of Judaism i n  Our Time (Beirut : The Institute For Palestine 
Studies, 1969), pp. 502-5. 
26 Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris, IX F22 : April 25, 1907, 
Ekrem Bey (Jerusalem) to I .  Fernandez ( Constantinople).  Word in paren­
theses added by the writer. 
27rsrael State Archive , Jerusalem, Turkish documents, no . 42, 
June 23, 1907, Ekrem Bey to Grand Vezir. 
28 Israel State Archive, Jerusalem, Turkish documents, no. 34, 
September 8, 1904, Ottoman Minister of Internal Affairs to Resid Bey. 
�ba.ssies were located in Constantinople .  
29N . M. Gelber, Hatsharat Balfur Vatoldoteha ('!he Balfour Declara­
tion and its Coming into Being) (Jerusalem, 1939), p .  190. Bahaaddin 
Bey wa.s appointed before the war Kaimakam of Jaffa in Palestine, Also 
see Menuhin,  op. cit. , pp. 502-5. 
JOA. Bohm, Die Zionistische Bewegung, I (Tel Aviv, Palestine, 1935), 
p. 293. Bohm is a Jewish author of a history of the Zionist movement. 
31Interestingly, a number of Russian Zionist Jews were given refuge 
in Egypt. 
32'Ihere were two groups of Jews in Palestine : Sephardi Jews and 
Ashkenzi Jews. '!he Sephardi ( Oriental) Jews were generally Ottoman sub­
jects and Arabic speaking and enjoyed internal autonomy in the religious · 
affairs of their own group under the Ottoman Millet system. 
33see E. Yellin, Le-ze' eze' ai ( Jerusalem, 1938 ) ,  pp. 171-2, 31-J ; 
see also D . z .  Le�ontin, Le-erez avotenu, I (Tel Aviv, Palestine, 1924), 
p. 56. 
34G. Young, Corps du Droit Ottoman , II ( Oxford, England , 1905-06) ,  
p .  267. 
35'Iheodor Herzl , Der Jud.enstaat ('!he State of Jews) ( Cologne, 1914), 
p. 30. 
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Chapter IV of this paper discusses Zionist-Erl ti sh terri tori.al as­
pirations in Palestine during World War I in greater detail. Inter­
national law did not accept a territorial title forcefully imposed 
by conquest or enforced cession of territory. See Cattan, Palestine 
and International Law, chapter IV, section I,  "Legal and Political 
Sovereignty." Lowenthal , op. cit . ,  a Zionist editor of Herzl' s  diaries, 
wrote, "In 1898 Palestine • • • •  contained eighteen Jewish rural settle­
ments, called ' colonies� ' none of them over twenty years old, and 
only three or four large enough to warrant the name of village . Per­
haps 4500 Jews, all told, lived on the land. None of the settlements, 
moreover, had a legal -l:asi s for its ex:i stence; penni ssion to rside 
in Palestine , buy land, or build, was obtainable only through bribery 
or outwitting the (Ottoman) laws. Al:x::>ut 45,000 Jews lived in the 
cities, chiefly Jerusalem and Jaffa; • • • •  " (pp. 276-77) .  
36Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, (New York: Harper and Bros. , 
1949), p.  188, 205; Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p .  514; Herzl , 
L'Etat Juif, French translation (Paris :  Lipschutz, 1926) ,  p .  23, in 
which Herzl states, "The Society of Jews will negotiate with the 
sovereign authorities of the territories in question, and it will do 
so under the protectorate of the European powers, if they find the 
arrangement to their liking. "  Also see Herzl , ibid. 
38see, for example,  Marvin Lowenthal , 'lhe Diaries of 'lbeodor 
Herzl (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1962), pp. 150, 152, 179 ,  215, 
�249, 252, 267, 272, 365, 366, 374-77. 
39Herzl , Der Judenstaat, p .  30. 
40 Speech, delivered at the Second Zionist Congress in Basel 
(Vienna, 1898) , p .  5. 
� ) Dr. M.I.  Bodenheimer, So Wu:rde Israel ('lhus Israel was Created , 
(Frankfort on the Ma.i n ,  19.58), p.  71.  Wolffsohn became president of 
the Zionist movement after Herzl ' s  death . Zionism has always put for­
ward the political deception of co-habiting with Palestinian Arabs, 
rather than exposing their intentions of dispossessing them from their 
homeland. It is interesting to note that, if we might follow this 
Zionist deception, when David Levontin, who opened the Zionist Anglo­
Palestine Company in Palestine (Jaffa),  explored with the Sublime 
Porte, only as a political means of strengthening the APC' s  position 
in Palestine, the idea of an Arab-Jewish cooperative scheme to develop 
the crown lands (ciftliks) in the region of Jericho and the Dead Sea, 
David Wolffsohn, the President of the Zionist Movement finnly in­
structed Levontin in March of 1905 to desist from it. In 1905 the 
Seventh Zionist Congress fonnally decided that all efforts would be 
expended to create the Jewish State in Arab Palestine . 'Ibis infonna-
tion is irrefutable evidence that Zionism never did desire to co­
hab1. tate with Arabs in Palestine and that Zionism sought an exclu­
sive Ju:lenstaat made Arabrein as early as 1905. 
42ib1.d. , p .  95. Words in parentheses are added by me to clarify 
the quote. 
43Ib1.d . ,  p .  100. Words in parentheses are added by me to give 
clarification to the quote. 
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44Ib1.d. � See also Lowenthal , op. cit. ,  pp. 276-298, chapter entitled 
"In Palestine . "  
4�odenheimer, op. cit •. , p.  100. In 1889/1890 the British South 
Africa Company founded by Cecil Rhodes gained concessions from which 
the British colony in present-day Rhodesia later developed. This 
area is currently suffering severe racial strife between a minority 
white government and a preponderant black population. Words in paren­
theses are added by me to clarify the quote. 
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. 
The German Government refused because it was not interested in pro­
voking its Turkish ally by supporting the establi shment of an alien 
Jewish State in Palestine which was under Turki sh sovereignty. 
47Bodenheimer, op. cit. ,  p.  107. Rather than the British orienta­
tion formed during World War I .  I have added the words in parentheses 
to clarify the quote. 
48Quoted in Josef Cohn, Eng1and und Palastina (Engl.and and Palestine) 
(Berlin, 1931) ,  p. 69; see Marvin Lowenthal , ed . ,  The Diaries of 
'Iheodor Herzl (New York: Grasset and Dunlap, 1962) ,  Chapter 25, en­
titled "The ' Uganda' Congress." 
49Lowenthal , op. cit. , p. 407. "Herzl gratefully accepted the 
Uganda scheme and sul:mitted it for ratification by the (Zionist) Cong:i-ess 
in 1903 • • • •  The Seventh ( Zionist) Congress 1904 . • •  decided not to em-
bark upon the Uganda adventure • • •  Herzl died of a broken heart in 1904 . "  
Lord Melchett, a British Zionist Jewish citizen, i n  'lhy Neighbour 
( 1936) ;  cited in 'lhe Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (New York : Arno Press, 
1972) ,  P • 362. 




Ilaus J. Hermann, "Political Response to the Balfour Declaration 
in Imperial Gennany: Gennan Judaism," 'Ihe Middle F.ast Journal , XIX 
(Summer, 1965) ,  p .  309, 311. October of 1897 saw the formal establish­
ment of the "Zionist Association for Germany" ( Zionistiscl1e Vereinigung 
fUr Deutschland); its leadership had been recruited from the Zionist 
students' associations. But in 1914, the "moderate" Zionist leaders· 
lost control of the movement to the radicals, largely anti-Germany 
Zionist elements headed by Kurt Blumenfeld during the June Zionist con­
vention at Leipzig. Blumenfeld had stated that Zionists in Gennany 
must cease considering themselves as Germans , and begin thinking in 
terms of being members of a "Jewish peoplehood" espousing exclusive 
Jewish nationality. In essence, that Gennan Jews should not think of 
themselves as rooted in Germany. As a result of the radical Zionist 
faction controlling the German Zionist organization, moderate Zionists 
organized the "Association of National German Jews" (Verband National­
deutscher Juden) in May 1921, led by Dr. Max Naumann. Germany prior to 
World War I was a leading power in Europe and had greater political sway 
over the Sublime Porte. Already in 1888 , the powerful Deutsche Bank 
received railway concessions in Turkey, and in 1890 the first trade and 
friendship treaty between the German Empire and the weak Ottoman Empire 
was consummated, inaugurating a political closeness between strong and 
weak political partners that culminated in December of 1899, when the 
agreement on the construction of the Baghdad Railway was completed • .  
..52r.owenthal , op. cit. , pp. 406-41.5. '!his section i s  entitled the 
"Uganda Congress" . 
53As, for example ,  see ibid. , pp. 276-77; Vincent Sheean , Personal 
History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969 ) ,  pp. 333-98, 344. 
54see, for example , Bodenheimer, op. cit. ; Klaus J .  Hermann, op. cit. , 
pp. 303-320 .  
55tternnann, ibid . ,  p.  316; Max Cohen (Reuss) ,  Die politische Bedeutung 
des Zionismus (Berlin, 1918 ) ,  p.  26; Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, 
pp. 215-16; Paul Goodman , 'Ihe Jewi sh National Home (London : J. M. Dent 
and Sons Ltd . ,  1943 ) ,  p.  98 ; Kurt Blumenfeld, Erlebte Judenfrage, ein 
Viertel Jabrbundert deutscher Zionismus (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags 
Anstalt, 1962), p.  121 . Similar efforts were meanwhile underway in 
Britain, where the pro-Bri tish Zionists were attempting to persuade 
British wartime officials that a Bri tish declaration on the establishment 
of a Jewish national home (an exclusive Judenstaat) in Palestine would 
yield international political rewa,rds for the Allies, most notably that 
such a declaration would stimulate American Jewry to work for a United 
States ent'ry into the war. 'Ihe programs and schemes of international 
Zionist Jewry on both sides of the war ' s  combatants i s  extremely inter­
esting and illustrative of Zionism 7 s  design to address i tself to any 
wartime alliance system that would be beneficial solely to Zionism ' s  
Judenstaat goals in Arab Palestine. 
'I 
.56R1chard Lichtheim, Die Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus 
(Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1954), p .  207. Lichtheim was the German 
Zionist representative in Constantinople, Turkey. 
57Nevill Barbour, Nisi Dominus: A Surve of the Palestine Controvers 
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Abu-Lughod and Ba.ha Abu-Lal:an, eds . , Settler Re mes in Africa and the 
Arab World : The Illusion of Endurance Wilmette, Illinois :  'Ihe Medina 
University Press International , 1974), pp. 43-53; Moshe Menuhin, op. cit . ,  
p. 42; Israel Shahak, "'Ihe Racist Nature of Zionism and of the Zionistic 
Sta. te of Israel, " American Jewish Al terna ti ve s to Zionism Inc. : Re ort 
fil..(December/Janurary, 1975 197 , pp. 12-22. 'Ihe Zionist term " ' redeem' 
or 'redemption' of the land of Israel , "  as has been perpetually utilized 
by the Zionist movement, has a specific ideological definition. 'Ihe 
land after its acqui sition by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) was not to 
be sold to the Jewish settlers; titles or title to it was to be held 
by the JNF in perpetuity as the property of "the Jewish peopl e . "  In 
short, the land was never to be sold but only leased to Jewi sh settlers 
for periods not exceeding 49 years. 'Ihe JNF was controlled, previous 
to 1948 when it came under the control of th� Israeli Government, by the 
World Zionist Organi zation. For Zionist ideological perceptions relative 
to land purchases in Arab Palestine see Israel M. Biderman, Hermann 
Schapira: Father of the JNF (New York, 1962) ,  Vol . II . Hermann Schapira 
proposed in 1897 the establishment of an organization ( the JNF) to 
"redeem the land of Palestine . "  
Israeli Professor Shahak allows us to look at the current activities of 
the Jewish National Fund in Israel and the Arab occupied lands. He reports 
the following: "Most of the land in Israel belongs or is administered by 
the Jewish National Fund • • •  which is an institution of the Zionistic 
organization, and operates an admitted racist policy: It forbids to non­
Jews on its lands to dwell or to open a business and sometimes even to 
work, only because they are not Jews ! Such policy not only enjoys (in 
Israel ) perfect legality (in contrast to a similar discrimination against 
the Jews which is illegal in most countries of the world) but is supported 
by all the instruments of the Israeli rule. In such a manner many whole 
towns were created in Israel , which are . . •  ' clean of Arabs' and this legally, 
or as we should say rather, ' clean of Gentiles ( goyim) ' .  In other towns, 
like Upper-Nazareth, only one special quarter i s  ' devoted' to the dwelling 
of Arabs. Any attempt of an Arab to buy or to rent a flat from a Jew is 
opposed openly and legally by all the branches of the (Israeli ) government 
(The Ministry of Housing, municipality, etc . )  and also by the illegal op­
-position of the Jewish inhabitants which i s  nevertheless supported by the 
Israeli police . I can only remind you that nobody opposes an operation 
of the sale or the rental of a flat in Nazareth, if the buyer or the 
leasee is a Jew; which means according to the admitted racist defintion 
of this world employed legally in Israel , a human being who can prove 
that his mother, his grandmother, his great-grandmother and his grand­
mother of his grandmother were Jewesses • • • •  Anther example in the same area 
can be g1. ven if we remember the case of Mr. Muhammad Ma' aruf, an Israeli 
citizen from the village of Dir-El-Assad, who wanted to open a factory 
in the town of Carmiel . This was officially prohibited to him because 
of the official reason that Carmiel i s  ' out of bounds' to non-Jews, and • •  , 
at the end he had to build his factory out of the 'pure ' boundarie s  of 
Carmiel . I want again to emphasize, that there i s  no limitation what­
soever on any Jew to open a business or to dwell in any place in Israel 
and therefore those limitations which operate on the great majority 
of the Israeli lands constitute a grave racial discrimination. I can 
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dwell or open a business in any place of my choice (of course if I cQme 
to an agreement with the previous owner) but only because· my mother :was 
a Jewess. An Israeli citizen whose only mother was not a Jewess can not 
enjoy thi s right. He encounters racist discrimination from which he 
suffers any day of his life. 
"I want to continue with this subject in order to show that: A)'lhere i s  
no connection between thi s and what i s  called among us by the name of 
'securl ty' : Thi s limitation is enforced in a raci st way against all 
non-Jews • • • •  B) This racist discrimination i s  not connected with anything 
described by as 'left' and ' right' or hawks and doves, inside the Zionist 
movement. On the contrary, the two most racist blocks in Israel are the 
Zionistic ' socialists' and the ' National Religious � ,  and the holy alliance 
between them i s  l::ased on their common support of racism • • • •  " 
'Ihe Lehn article adds the following perspective : "Since title to the land 
purchased by the JNF was to be held in perpetuity 'as the inalienable 
property of the Jewish people, ' use of the land required the development 
of a system of long-term leasing, the lessor being the JNF. 'Ille land 
could be leased for specified purposes for periods up to forty-nine 
years, at the end of which the lessee could renew the lease for a similar 
period, a total of ninety-eight years. Under these circumstances, the 
lease itself had considerable value and could, subject to the lessor's 
approval , be sublet, sold, mortgaged, bequeathed, or given as a gift. 
Rent, paid annually, was assessed at 2 per cent (agricultural ) or 4 
per cent (urban) of the value of the larid ;  the lessor had the right to 
make periodic reassessments of the land and to raise the rent accordingly. 
'!he lessor had the further· rights, which could be. exercised at its dis­
cretion, to inspect the property, to decrease the amount of land held, 
and to take l:ack the land if the lessee was held to have violated the 
tenns of the lease . 
"All of these terms, including the lesse e ' s  rights, were subject to one 
overriding condition, made explicit in the lease : the lessee must be 
Jewish. Accordi�gly, the land could not be leased to a non-Jew, nor could 
the lease be sublet, sold, mortgaged, given, or bequeathed to anyone 
but a Jew. Non-Jews could not be employed on the land or even in any 
work connected with cul ti va ti on of the 1 and. Viola ti on of this term of 
the lease rendered the lessor the right to abrogate the lease without 
compensation to the lessee (upon the third violation) and rendered the 
lessee liable for damages to the lessor. 
"Since the JNF eventually became the largest private land-owner in 
Palestine, holding title by 1948 to 53.8 per cent of the Jewish-owned 
land, its practices were adopted by, or, at times, imposed on, other 
Jewish land-owners . "  It should be noted that in 1960 the JNF and the 
Israeli government concluded a paper agreement clarifying the relationship 
of the JNF to the state. In essence, now the racial JNF policies regard­
ing the leasing of land, followed since the JNF inception in 1901, were 
applied to all state lands (Arab land expropriated by the Israeli govern­
ment after May of 1948 ), which, together with JNF lands, now constitute 
over 90 per cent of the land in Israel , on which non-Jews (Arabs) are not 
allowed . 'lhe implication of thi s fact for Arabs in Israel , and for any 
eventual settlement of the conf1.ict, should be obvious to even the dullest 
of minds. 
1111 • •  
Among the numerous violations of the mandate by the British, in favor 
of the Zioni st scheme in Palestine, were JNF racialist practices in land 
transactions and the method of its acquisition to the detriment of the 
Palestinian Arab people. The John Hope Simpson report for the British 
government in 1930 reported that the land "has been extraterri torialised" 
and that thi s was not "only contrary to the provisions • • •  of the Mandate, 
but • • •  in ad.di tion a constant and increasing source of danger to the 
country" (pp. 54, 55) • 
'lhis writer strove to acqilire the most recent information available 
on JNF landholdings from the Zionist Organi zation of America which i s  
controlled by and acts on behalf o f  the World Zionist Organization/ 
Jewish Agency of Israel . But the ZOA office in New York chose to ignore 
my requests for thi s information which was requested variously on 
February 5-; 8 and March 8 ,  1976. Apartially reproduced copy of my 
February 8 letter to Mr. Paul Flacks of ZOA i s  included in the Appendix. 
82 See, for example ,  as early as the end of the First World War, for 
Zionist settlers' violent reaction toward Palestine Jews who rebuffed 
Zionism' s  "Jewish labor" insistence, in Walter Francis Stirling, Safety 
Last (London : Hollis and Carter, 1953) ,  pp. 112-23. Stirling was the 
British mili tary administrator of the Jaffa district in Palestine 1920-
1923, who recalled the "Gestapo methods ( so severe )" applied by the 
Jewish Agency which insisted that Jewish non-Zionist employers dismiss 
all Arab employees and employ only Jews. 
83Quote i s  taken from a letter by A . M. El-Messiri to The New York Times, 
November 13, 1975 .  El-Messiri is the author of '!he Encyclopedia of 
Zionist Concepts and Technology: A Cri.tical View. 
84'!he Anglo-Palestine Company opened its first office in Palestine 
at Jaffa in 1903. Herzl died in 1904. 
85The Ottoman Government never accepted any commercial tender placed 
by the APC for any concession in Turkish Palestine because it understood 
the nationalist aspirations of Zionism's plans for a Jewish State in 
Palestine. See D. z .  Levontin, "Report II, "  August 24 , 1903, p. 106, 171. 
86 Storrs, op. cit. ,  p .  378. 
87John Bowie, Viscount Samuel (London, 1957), p .  172 . 
CHAPTER III 
BASIS OF ZIONISM' S POLITICAL THEORY AND CLAIM TO PALESTINE 
Zionism, known also as "Jewish" nationalism or Zionist national-
isa, advocates the political doctrine of "the Jewish people" nationality 
clai.11. 1 The Zionist political movement in 1897 fomally expounded the 
theme of the existence of a "Jewish people, "  or a "Jewish race, •  or a 
"Jewish nation," advocating that "the Jews" are racial descendants of 
ancient Hebrew tribes in Palestine.2 This central doctrine of "the 
Jewish people" nationality concept has not varied from the First Zionist 
Congress in 1897; political. Zionism desert bes 1 t as simplys 
Jews, wherever they are and no matter what their legal citizenship 
and nationality, are members of a transnational entity of "the 
Jewish people" and have legal "rights" in and legal obligations 
to • • •  Israel. • •  simply by Virtue of their identification as Jews. J 
Actually, political Zionism had sought to create a "Jewish" 
state in Arab Palestine and enVirons since 1882. 4 Th�odor Herzl, the 
�ounder of political Zionism,5 was thin.Idng racially when he spoke of 
Jews not in terms of religious faith but as "Ein Volk" (that is, one race 
or national! ty or peoplehood) f_or whom he sought distinctive geographical 
rights in Palestine as the "historical fatherland of 'the Jews . . ..  6 
Morris Cohen succinctly commented on the racial philosophy of early 
Zionisms 
This constant tendency to emphasize the consciousness of race • • •  
bas • • •  led • • •  Jews to adopt the very popular racial philosophy of 
history, represented on the teutonic side by Chamberlain's 
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, or, on the Russian side, 
by Slavophils like Katkoff. Zionists fundamentally accept the 
racial ideology of these anti-Semites, but draw different con­
clusions. Instead of the Teuton, it is the Jew that is (to the 
Zionist) the pure and superior race. 
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'!be scientific adequacy of the ethnologic, historic and philolog1c 
evidence by which all this is supported would be beneath contempt 
were we not dealing with widespread beliefs of a pathetic inten-
s1. ty • • • •  Nevertheless, these beliefs are radically false and pro­
foundly inimical to liberal and humanistic civilization. History, 
and Jewish history especially, shows that the claim to purl ty of 
race on the part of any civilized people is entirely mythical • • • •  7 
'lbe doctrinaire assumptions of Herzl and his successors are 
fourfold and are the practices of present--day Israel . 8 'lbese Zionist 
ideological assumptions a.re a 
1 .  Jews and Gentiles are inherently incapable of living harmoniously 
in the same society. Anti-Jewi shness is an incurable Gentile 
affliction. 
2. For self-preservation, all Jews must settle together in the same 
country. Herzl was willing to accept 6, 000 "uninhabited" square 
ailes of Africa's Uganda offered by the Br1 tish. However, the much 
llOre powerful emotional appeal--and for reasons of attractive poll t­
ical support by using the appeal of "Palestine" the land of the 
"Israelites"--of Palestine made that land the ultimate choice for 
�oloniza.tion and the eventual Jewish State . 
3. Non-Jews must either be displaced from the Jewish State or kept 
apart from the Jewish settlers by legal and social walls of group 
separation. 
4. Gentile cooperation is needed from two sources a Anti-Semites who 
will stimulate Aliyah ( that is, Jewish migration to Palestine ), and 
at least one Great Power whose backing can make up for the scattered 
smallness of world Jewry. Herzl sought the sponsorship of the 
Russian Czar, the Gennan Kai ser, the King of Italy, and the Turkish 
Sul tan. His political efforts were more successful in enlisting the 
support of Great Britain. His successors were more successful in 
acquiring the poll tical support of Brita.in and then the United States. 
Moreover, the Zionist-Israel ideological doctrine of "the Jewish 
people, " while portraying the Jews as one nati on, one people, one race, 
contains three major political characteristicsa 
1 .  "'!he Jewish people" doctrine, to Zioni sm, is a poll tical-legal 
entity which entails "rights" in and owes obligations to a 
sovereignty (Israel ) which is foreign to any other country except 
Israel . Said another way, the legal "rights" and obligations of 
"the Jewish people" entity are "rights" of the Jewish collectivity 
itself and not of the individuals which comprise the collectivity. 
Consequently, to the extent that "rights" and obligations are in­
volved, they are group "rights" and obligations rather than in­
dividual ones. 
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2. "'lbe Jewish people" Zionist doctrine i s  a transnational entity 
which i s  not limited to Jews who live, or wish to live, in the 
· 
State of Israel . The Zionist aims or claims are addressed to Jews 
outside the sovereignty of the State of Israel, to Jews who have 
a legal and nationality status other than Israel. 
). "'!he Jewi sh people" doctrine is an involuntary entity which 
aeans that i t  includes all Jews simply because they are Jews and 
w1 thout regard to the personal preferences of any Jew. For example, 
the involuntary factor of the claimed legal connection of all Jews 
w1 th the State of Israel--actually in strict Zionist ideology, 
"E:retz Yisrael"--makes no room for any exception for United Stat.es 
and other non-Israeli nationals who are Jewish by rellgion.9 
Consequently, the essence of political Zionism i s  the doctrine that Jews 
a.re "one people" and the corollary that Jews must have a Judenstaa.t or 
a state for the Jews. The base of the Zionist demand for a sovereign 
exclusively "Jewish" state was--as i t  still is--the contention that all 
Jews belong to a single ethnic-national (racial ) entity called "the 
Jewish people,• distinct and apart from the national entities of the 
countries in which they· live and claim legal citizenship; secondly, 
Zionism employs the poll ti cal doctrine to promote activities throughout 
the world to entice Jews to emigrate to Palestine-Israel and bring about 
the declared Zionist territorial objective of making the area the "national 
homeland" of world Jewry. 
Additionally, i t  should be understood that Zionist diplomacy with 
the British governmental Zionists such as Balfour in 1917 postulated a 
definitive objective : that "the Jewish people0 be accepted as a trans-
national nationality entity and that arbitrary membership in it be con­
ferred upon world Jewry • 10 As we will soon see, the British governmental 
Zionists under criticism from anti-Zionist British Jews rejected the 
Zionists' claim when i t  clarified 1 ts stance i n  the safeguard clauses 
of the Balfour Declaration. Both safeguard clauses were placed in the 
declaration contrary to the explicit negotiating objectives of the 
Zionist leaders, as we shall shortly reveal. 'lbeir inconsistency with 
the official Zionist draft proposal of July 18, 1917, and the three 
central political objectives embodied in that proposal will become 
obvious in chapter five. 
Zionist claim to a "historic title" to Palestine was first ad-
vanced by the World Zionist Organi zation to the Peace Conference in 
P&r:1.s in i919. 11 The Zionist memorandum, under the heading "The 
Historic Tl tle", explained the basis of the Zionist claim as follows: 
( 1 )  The land i s  the historic home of the Jews • • • •  
(2) In some parts of the world, and particularly in Eastern Europe, 
the condition of life of millions of Jews are deplorable • • • •  
The need for fresh outlets is urgent • • • •  Palestine would offer 
one such outlet • • • •  
(J) But Palestine is not large enough to contain more than a pro­
portion of the Jews of the world • • • •  A Jewish National Home in 
Palestine will , however, be of high value to them • • • •  
(4) Such a Palestine would be of value to the world at large , whose , 
real weal th consists in the heal thy diversities of its ci vili-
za ti ons. 
( 5) Lastly the land needs redemption. Much of 1 t is left desolate • • • • 12 
Consequently, the Zionist claim to Palestine was primarily based 
on ancient "Biblical Prom1ses"1J of four-thousand years ago that God 
promised Abraham that "unto thy seed have I given this land, nl4 and, 
to Zionism, that the words "seed of Abraham" mean only those who today are, 
by religion, Jews, whether or not they are the physical descendants of 
Abraham . ( This ideological concept is referred to by the Zionists as 
"the Jewish people" racial doctrine . )  
Author! tative literature of the Zionist movement shows that the 
removal of the indigenous Palestinian Arab people was, from the beginning, 
a doctrinal program of Zionism. 15 The drastic reduction, if not total 
removal , of non-Jews is still, thirty years after the minorl ty Zioni st 
.. 
cCllJIUni ty unilaterally proclaimed 1 tself a "Jewish State" in Palestine, 
an ideological corollary of the doctrine of rellgio-raclal Jewish ex-
clusivism, which ls the central essenc� of Zionism. For, when Zionism 
arose as a penchant or call for Jewish self-segregation in a terrl tory 
in which a "Jewish State" would be founded, 1 ts poll tical adherents 
knew that the "Jewishness" of the proposed state would be incompatible 
with the continued exi stence of a non-Jewish majority, or even a sub-
stantial minor! ty, unde� 1 ts national poll ti cal control . In essence, 
Zionist trad1 tional policy has been to make the Jewish State Arabrein 
(free of Arab people ) . 16 
Consequentially, the Zionist policy has historically been that 
the Palestinians, or most of them, had to be removed by one means or 
another if the aim of Zionism was to be attained.17 'Ibis is the reason, 
as the American King-Crane Commission reported to President Wilson in 
1919, "the Zionists looked forward_ to a practically complete dispossession 
of the present (Arab) inhabi. tants of Palestine . .. l8 
'!he program of the Jewish national home , clearly expressed by 
even the moderate Z1 oni sts, was to increase Pal es tine' s Jewish numbers 
by immigration until such time as "the Jews" should outnumber the indigenous 
Arab people and usurp the exclusive prerogatives of governing. '!he Zionist 
policy had as 1 ts final aim the submergence of the natl ve Arabs under 
a new Jewish State controlled by Zionism. '!he principles of inter-nation­
al law were to be simply ignored and repudiated in the Zionists' gradual-
1st national ter:ri torial goal to construct their "Jewish" state . 
Zionists argue that their poll ticalconcept of a continuing 
"Jewish people" throughout the history of mankind, as predicated on the 
notion of the "chosen people," was implicitly recognized in the Balfour 
Declarat1.on.19 First, the concept of a subjective "Jewish nation" 
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internationally distributed, existing through more than twenty centuries 
without terrl tory, government, or poli ti.cal cont1.nu1 ty, and imposing 
obligations and limitations upon all adherents of the Jewish religious 
fa! th, rega.rdless of ethnic origin, choic� of nationality, or time of 
conversion to Judaism (or for that matter continued adherence to Judaism), 
bas no foundation or precedent in any internationally recognized legal 
doctrine. 'lhe international commun1 ty has explicitly and specifically 
rejected 1 t.20 
When in 1959 Clarence L. Coleman Jr., President of the American 
Council for Judaism,21 requested that the Department of State clarify 
the relationship between the State of Israel and American citizens of 
Jewish faith, Parker T .  Hart; Acting Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, respondeda 
I have for reply your letter of October 15, 1959, to the Secretary 
of State rega.rding American-Israel relations especially as they per­
tain to the status of American citizens of the Jewish faith • 
• • •  (T)hat the United States Government does not condone the involun­
tary identification of its c1 tizens with a foreign state.22 
Moreover, the United States Government has legally declared the 
rejection of Israel' s  "the Jewi·sh people" claim as a concept of inter-
national lawa 
Accordingly, 1 t should be clear that the Department of State does 
not regard the "Jewish people" concept as a concept of international 
law.23 
'lhe universally recognized national! ty entity in international 
law is the national state; an individual. has the single nationality status 
of a particular state . '!hough a state has wide discretion in conferring 
its national! ty status, there are certain international juridical limi ta-
tions upon the recognized procedures legally used to confer nationality 
me�bership1 
6.5 
l.  National.1 ty at birth may be acquired either through the terrl toria.l 
principle of jus soli , 24 or by the principle of jus sanguinis.25 
2. National.1 ty membership may be acquired through naturalization 
but the provisions of the municipal nationality law must not conflict 
w1 th the applicable limitations of international law. That is, an 
individual who is an alien by birth may acquire nationa.li ty member­
ship in a state through his voluntary choice and under the prescrip­
tive municipal law of the country. 
3. National! ty membership may a.lso be conferred by recognizing dua.l 
nationality. "'!he classic example of dual national! ty i s  that of a 
person born in one country of nationals of another country, who 
acquires the nationality of the former by reason of the place of 
birth, jure soli , and that of the latter by virtue of the nat1onal1 ty 
of the parents, jure sanguinis. 1126 
"The Jewish people" Zionist national! ty claims are used by 
Zionism-Israel to change the juridical status of Jews in states other 
than Israel, that is, to add to the existing Zionist "Jewish" nationality 
of Jews a further membership in "the Jewish people" national! ty entity 
expounded by Zionist ideology. 27 An elementary duty of protection on 
the part of a political society or state is the legal protection of 1 ts 
nationals' citizenship status against foreign attack or subversion of 
that national! ty and citizenship status.28 Only a national state has 
the unique juridical competence and recognition to constitute a national-
1 ty entity. Even where a particular international organization or public 
body is controlled by the same political constituency that controls a 
state, i t  is only a national state that constitutes a nationality entity. 
One of the staggering and strange features of "the Jewish people" 
national! ty ent1 ty claim which requires 1 ts instant rejection in inter-
national law is that i t  does not comprise the nationality of a national 
state. Even though "the Jewish people" is claimed by Zionism to have a 
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juridical relationship to the State of Israel, 29 1 t is clearly obvious 
that the claimed nationall ty of "the Jewish people" is not the same as 
the nationality of the State of Israel. Unheard of before and totally 
rejected by international la.w, the national! ty of "the Jewish people" 
is an additional "national! ty" entity in the sense that it is composed 
of individuals identified by religion who are the nationals of the 
countries of their respective legal residence. But Zionism continues 
to press this absurd ad.di tional nationality until such time, in the 
political jargon of Zionistic terms, as when all the "exiles" are 
•1ngathered" to the Zionist State of Israel .JO 
'lbe Zionist political-ideological philosophy clearly stipulates 
that a Jew could not be a member of any other national! ty except "the 
Jewish people"nationali ty, that a Jew is "in exile" outside of "Eretz 
nsrael, "  and that a Jew is a Jew by "nationality." All three concepts, 
besides being very dangerous to the international commun1 ty in that these 
Zionist ideas and practices have created and are still provoking Middle 
East conflict, are unacceptable as juridical claims in international. law.31 
Concluding, since we are concerned only with international law 
considerations, no attempt will be made here to controvert the queer and 
extra-legal proposals made in the Zionist memorandum. JZ 'lbe Zionist claim 
of a historic title to Arab Palestine has no basis in international law 
or in historical fact. 'lbe modes of acquiring terrl. tory are well defined 
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under international law and the claim of a historic title is not one of 
them. The term "historic title" has no relationship in international 
law whatsoever with a claim to recover a territory from the hands of 
another people on the ground of its former occupation by the claimants 
some time in distant history . '.33 International law would not countenance 
a claimant concept which, instead of ensuring peace, order and stability, 
would create the most dangerous and violent conflicts in modern inter­
national relations. 34 Ancient historical connection gives no title, 
no rights, no claim to territory. And much less does it displace the 
t1 tle or justify the dispossession--in Palestine 1 t was forceful dis­
possession--of the indigenous inhabitants of a country. 
Moreover, studious historical examination reveals that the 
"historical rights" of "the Jews" over Arab Palestine, even analyzed. 
in common sense, are pathetically absurd. Such claims are all the more 
absurd and inconsistent in view of the fact that the Jews who came :from 
Europe to Palestine are not racially ancestral "heirs" to the ancient 
Hebrew tribes; the Zionist claim becomes ever more specious when one 
understands that, historically, before the invasion of Palestine by Hebrews, 
Palestine had always been Semi tic-Canaanite, that is to say, ancestrally 
Arab in view of the fact that the Semite is geographically speaking of 
Arab world orig:1.n.35 In reality, any attempt to consider the "Jews" a 
race or an international "nationality" designated "Jewish" when they are 
68 
no more than another religious community--and a non-homogeneous one at 
that, for it too is  divided. into sects (Judaism is  a schismatic religious 
body}--constitutes hideous illiteracy.* 
* Another aspect of massive public ignorance as pertains to Zionist racial 
theories is  the intended lack of public infomation on Zionism's close 
and covert dealings with Geman National Socialism (the 'Nazi ' party) 
between 1933 and 1941 . For example,  see IG.aus Polkehn, "'!he Secret 
Contacts a Zionism and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 , "  Journal of Palestine 
Studies, V (Spring/Summer, 1976 ) .  This article is an excellent docu­
mented account of Zionist-Nazi Germany cooperation in which the Zionist 
official El.iezer Livneh (who had been editor of the Haganah publication 
during the Second World War) declared during a sympoSium organized by the 
Israeli newspaper Ma.ariv in 1966, "that for the Zionist leadership the 
rescue of Jews was not an aim in itself, but only a means" (i .e . , to 
establishing a Jewish state in Arab Palestine ) .  Readers should especially 
see pages 69 through 76. One reason why the Israeli government was so 
nervous and anxious about secreting Adolf Eichmann out of Argentina 
(rather than informing the Argentine government for his legal extradi ti.on 
to West Germany for trial ) and holding the ttrial of Eichmann in Israel 
and in no other place becomes clear; only in Israel could Zionist contacts 
with the Nazis be kept out of public view. Observe in Polkehn' s  article 
footnote sixty-five and pages 71 through 75 regarding the Zionist emissary 
Feivel Folkes who, today, lives in Haifa, Israel . 
Zionist leaders during the holocaust did not stop at manipulating lives. 
'Ibey also controlled. the sources of finance and communications, repre­
senting themselves before the world as the spokesmen of the "Jewish 
nation. "  They played a significant and prominent role in the unfulfilled. 
potential in rescuing Jewish people during and before World War II. In 
three vital areas they failed and impeded others' efforts: 1 )  in communi­
cations, 2) in material aid and J) in preventing annihilation. Had these 
failures stemmed from ignorance or mistakes, one might excuse their lack 
of ab1li ty, rut the b1 tter truth is  that their actions were determined by 
explicit policy and a fundamental Zionist principle .  'lhe first and fore­
most aim was to establish· the "Jewish State"--the masses of Jews merely 
served as convenient means. And wherever there existed a contradiction 
between the two , the needs of the masses, and even their extrication, were 
subordinated to the needs of the Jewish state-in-formation. The Zionist 
leaders saw the spilt Jewish blood of the Nazi period as grease for the 
wheels of the Jewish national state. To exemplify this fact see the quotes 
of Zionist officials excerpted. in Reb Moshe Shonfeld, The Holocaust Victims 
Accuses Documents and Testimon on Jewish War Criminals (Brooklyn, New York: 
Netu:rei Karta of U.S.A . ,  1977 , pp. 24-28.  
Chapter 'lbree 
1'lbeodore Herzl , L 'Etat Juif, French translation (Paris :  
Lipschutz, 1926). Herzl recognized: "'Ibey will hold i t  against 
ae, with all the reason in the world, that I am serving the 
a.nti-Semites' :purpose by declaring that we are a people ,  one peopl e . "  
(ibid . ,  p .  199).  Marvin Lowenthal , ed. ,  The Diaries of 'lbeodore 
Herzl (London : Victor Gollancz,  Ltd . ,  19.58); Chaim Weizmann, Trial 
and Error (New York : Harpers and Brothers, 1949 ) ;  Theodore Herzl , 
'!be Jewish State (London: H. Pordes,  1967) .  It requires a great 
deal of indulgence to read Zionists' astounding conjectures on the 
concepts of nation, race ,  people .  For example ,  Asher Ginsberg, 
known as Achad Ha 'am, one of the so-called " spiritual" philosophers 
of Zionism, stated in an article in the magazine Am Scheidewege, 
published in Berlin in 1923, vol . 2, p. 103, the following: "The 
steps on the ladder of creation are : minerals, plants, animals, 
human beings, and, at the very top, Jews. "  
2 'lbe ancient Hebrew connection with Palestine was short-lived, 
unstable ,  intermittent, long extinct, and based on nothing better 
than the fact of conquest and subject to the condition that there 
is a national or racial affinity between the Hebrews of 4, 000 years 
ago and the Russian, Polish, American and European Jews of today. 
The wri ter will quickly dismiss the absurdity of this Zionist claim 
in both historical fact and modern international law: because if 
this transl tory occupation by invasion can give the Zionists a 
"historic right" to the country, then it may be argued that the Arabs, 
who occupied Spain continuously for 800 years , could claim the 
country today, while the Italians could claim the British Isles and 
the American Indians and Aboriginees demand the withdrawal of the 
contemporary ruling inhabitants of the Americas and Australia from 
these countries. In essence, historically and legally, if all 
nations were to adopt or accept this absurd Zionist logic, the world 
today would be in utter chaos. 
3w. 'lhomas Ma.llison, Jr. , "Zionist-Israel Claims on 'the 
Jewish people '  Are Unconsti tutional11 , Issues, Winter 1962-63, p. 5. 
Should one desire to contest the "political" nature of the Zionist 
movement, I refer the person to the words of the President of the 
World Zionist Organi zation, Dr. Nahum Goldmann , who stated in 1959 
that "the Zionist movement is no longer ' political • , "  that the inter­
national Zionist movement "is a Zionist nationalist movement, "  and to 
"Zionism ' s  fundamental and unchanged conception of all Jews as pos­
sesors of a universal 'Jewish ' national! ty." 'Ibis Zionist ideological 
concept and Zionism0 s  attempt to impose i t  upon all Jewry precipi­
tates the intense debate among Zionist, non-Zionists, and anti-Zion­
ists. See Fonnal Policy Statements of the American Council for 
Judaism :  From September, 1959 to May, 1961, the letter of Clarence 
Coleman, Jr. ,  President of the American Council for Judai sm ,  dated 
December 7, 1959, P• 1 .  
I J  
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4 The environs, or area, to which the writer refers i s  histori-
cally documented by the Zionists. At the Parts Peace Conference 
the Zionists had hoped that Transjordan up to "close to and west of 
the Hadjaz railway" would be included in the area of the Palestine 
mandate to be opened to Jewish settlement. 'Ibis hope was officially 
expressed in the Zioni sts' memorandum to the Versailles Peace Confer­
ence and was not officially renounced until 1922. Chaim Weizmann, 
in his Trial and Error, p .  361, records how in 1922 all the leaders 
of the Yishuv , including Vladimir Jabotinsky, agreed to the renunci­
ation--but one not adhered to in practice--"not without some qualms , "  
but as the price of inducing Britain to confirm the mandate and 
accept the Balfour Declaration in the mandate. Earlier the doctrine 
of Hovevei Zion, "the lovers of Zion , "  a Palestinophile movement of 
Russian Jews begtnning in the 1880' s without any clear political 
outlook, sought to regenerate "the Jewish people" by establishing 
Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine. 'Ihe legal name taken in 
1890 by the groups inspired by Hovevei Zion thinking is significant : 
Society for the encouragement of Jewish agricultural and manual 
workers in Syria and Palestine. See also Leon Pinsker, Auto­
Emancipation, which advocated in 1882 the "re-establi shment" of a 
Hebrew state ; Robert John and Sarni Hadawi , 'Ihe Palestine Diary 
1914-1945, Vol . I (New York: New World Press, 1970), pp. 1-21. 
5tterzl ' s Zionism had limi ted appeal in the early decades. For 
an excellent interpretation of Zionism, or "Jewish" nationalism, see 
Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger, Judaism or Jewish Nationalism: 'Ihe Alterna­
tive to Zionism (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957); Berger, 
The Jewish Dilemma (New York : '!he Devin-Adair Co. , 1946) .  For an 
excellent legal explication of the idea of Zionism, see the wrttings 
of W . T .  Ma.llison, Jr. , Jewish-American Professor of international 
law at George Washington University. Jewish nationalism or Zionist 
nationalism i s  also defined as the ineradicable desire by the 
Zioni st movement to build a national home for "the Jewish people . "  
Israel , i n  defiance of international law, the United Nations Charter 
and the Geneva Conventions, has built 55 exclusively Jewish settle­
ments and colonies on occupied Arab lands captured from Syria, Jordan 
and Egypt since the June, 1967 war. For this number of settlements 
along with additional information see Arab Report, II, no. 1 ,  Decem­
ber 1 ,  1975. 
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The political Zionism launched by Theodore Herzl in 1896 for 
the creation of a "Jewi sh Commonweal th" (his Judenstaat scheme ) did 
not advance the claim to Arab Palestine as their "historical inheri­
tance . "  '!he Zionist Organization Jewish State scheme considered 
several areas: Palestine, Uganda, Mozambique, the Congo, Tripoli , 
Cyprus, Argentina, the Sinai Peninsula (El Arish) and even the 
western United States were considered as a prospective Zionist exclu­
sive colony. UNESCO' s official definition of racism i s  "anti-social 
beliefs and acts which are based on the fallacy that discriminatory 
intergroup relations are justifiable on biological grounds." 
Defenders of the United Nations' "Zionism equals racism" equation 
regard Israel ' s  basic 1950 Law of Return and 1952 Nationality Law 
as discriminatory since both grant to the world' s  Jews rights ·which 
they deny and withhold from Palestinians and other Gentiles. Among 
other Israeli practices so cited is  the fact that "more than 90 per 
cent of the land in the State of Israel falls under the regulations 
of the Jewish National Fund under which non-Jews cannot rent or buy 
a house or flat, or open a business ... 
7Morrls Cohen, "Zionism : Tri ba.lism or Liberalism , "  'Ihe New 
Republic, March 8 ,  1919, p. 182; Dr. Israel Shahak, "'Ihe Racist 
Nature of Zionism and of the Zionistic State of Israel, "  American 
Jewish Alternatives to Zioni sm, Inc. , December/January 1975/1976, 
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p. 12. Dr. Shahak, an Israeli Jewish citizen since the establish­
ment of the State of Israel in 1948, says 0that the State of Israel 
is a racist state in the full meaning of this term : In this state 
people are discriminated against, in the most permanent and legal 
way and in the most important areas of life, only because of their 
origin. 'Ibis racist discrimination began in Zionism and is  carried 
out today mainly in cooperation with the institutions of the 
Zionistic movement. 11 Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger, prominent American of 
the Jewish faith, reports in the same issue that "Zionism, by 
(Israeli ) law and historic ideological commitment is,  indeed, 
racist. "  (p.4).  
8Golda Meir, an ardent translator of Herzl ' s  thoughts into 
Israeli Zionist action, used the ethnic term "Arabs" rather than the 
religious term "Christians0 when on July 23, 1972, she, as Prime 
��nister, persuaded all but four of her Cabinet to refuse the 
Catholic Palestinian Arab villagers of Berem and Iqrit near the 
Lebanese border the right to return to their homes, which they had 
been previously promised by the Israeli Government when they were 
evacuated for: security reasons.  The Israeli Army forcefully evacu­
ated them in favor of Jewish immigrant settlers, who settled their 
homes. 'Ihe villagers' appeal to Meir brought her reported response 
that 1 t would be "an erosion of Zionist values to allow Arabs to 
return where Jews had been settled . "  Quote i s  from Wright, A Tale 
of Two Hamlets ( 1973) ,  p .  6 .  
9w .  'Ihomas Mallison, Jr. , "Zionist-Israel Claims on the ' the 
Jewish people'  Are Unconstitutional, 11 Issues, Winter 1962-63, p .  8 .  
In short, Israel and Zionism arrogate to themselves the legal claim 
of jurisdictional authorl ty in international law over Jews the world 
over. Said another way, the State of Israel and Zionism seeks to 
achieve the juridical objective that "the Jewish people" be legally 
constituted a transnational "nationality, 11 membership in which is  to 
be conferred upon all Jews wherever they reside as citizens. 
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t elOThe original principal purpose of the Zionist claim to " the Jewish 
1.'i fioPle" while privately negotiating the format of the Balfour 
, :. Dlclara.tion for nearly three years was to obtain the assent of the 
�Jfltish Government to "the Jewish people" concept through the implied 
eases of agreement of customary international law. One of the 
, cipal purposes of the reiterated Zionist "the Jewish people" claim 
international law contexts i s  to obtain the assent of governments 
.Other than the Government of Israel . Even though to Zionism "the 
.,Jewish people" i s  a novel ad.di tional "nationality," i t  does not meet 
the juridical criteria for even dual or multiple nationality in inter­
national law. "The Jewish people" membership claim, though advanced 
an a race theme by Zionists in 1917 and in the 1948 Declaration of the 
lstablishment of the State of Israel ( 0'Ihis right 'of the Jewish people 
to national rebirth in its own country' was recognized in the Balfour 
Declarati on • • • •  " ) , i s  invalid under the criteria of public international 
law. Ironically, the Balfour Declaration and later agreements concerning 
the same subject ( 0 the Jewish people0 nationality claims) denied the 
Zionists juridical authorl ty for "the Jewish people" nationality claims. 
'lbe safeguard clauses of these agreements are so unequivocal that they 
prohibit and deny the Zionist claims, such as the United States Government 
explicitly did in 1964. The "Jewish people" Zionist concept has never 
been accepted as a juridical claim in international law. Moreover, all 
the official Briti sh policy declarations and the history of the negotiations 
behind the Balfour Declaration, reveal that "a national home for the 
Jewish people" was not equivalent to assenting to or making Palestine 
into a Jewish state ,  nor couli the erection of such a Zionist Jewish 
state be accompli shed without the gravest trespass and violation 0£ 
international law precepts. Moreover, the Mandate for Palestine was, 
under the international law authority of the League of Nations Covenant, ' 
the basic international law instution ( the Mandates System) for the 
interim government of Arab Palestine agreed to by the League of Nations. 
Its provi sions, therefore , are of particular importance and" priority 
in implementing the juridical limitations to the Zionist scheme imposed 
by the Balfour Declaration as an international law aspect of the Mandate. 
11J . C . Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II 
(Van Nostrand, 19.56 ) ,  p .  45. Arguments over aboriginality in Pale stine 
are inconclusive and lead nowhere . The crucial factor i s  that the 
political Zionist movement developed at a time--Herzl conceived the 
Zionist idea during the nineteenth century, an era characteri zed by 
extreme nationalisms often with all its racist ove·rtones--when in order 
to fulfill its professed goals Zionism had to displace the existing 
majori ty people of the land called Palestine. It was not a movement 
of the majority people of the land tying to overthrow an imperial i st 
settler population. In actuality, the Zionist program i s  a colonial 
or settler movement. Herzl ' s  appeals to Bismarck, Cecil Rhodes, Joseph 
Chamberlain, the T6rld.sh Sul tan, were founded on the principle tha.t a 
colonial venture would be profi table to the power that sponsored i t .  
'!his information i s  all explicitly recorded i n  Herzl ' s  diaries. The 
"altruistic" intentions of his political efforts were explicitly negated 
by the fact that Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine demanded 
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Palestinian Arab displacement--both Muslim and Christian--to make room 
for the Jewi sh immigrant population. 
Herzl maintained that, once the Jewish State was founded, any of 
the then fourteen million Jews who refused to migrate to the Jewish State ' I should be classed as "anti-Semi tic . "  See Herzl , The Jewish State, trans­l lated by Louis Lipsky, 1947, p.  81 . The definition of anti-Semitism 
being most vigorously promulgated by Zionism and its adherents is "any 
talk of substance that i s  critical of Israel or Zionism. "  This handy 
use of such an irrational epi thet--also used as a subterfuge--has been 
unthinkingly imposed by Forster and Epstein who are both Zionists ( see 
their book The New Anti-Semitism, 1973) on the Quakers, Episcopalian 
Dean Francis B. Sayre , Senator Fulbright, columni sts Evans and Nov!tk 
and the Christian Science Monitor paper. An acceptabl e ,  non-politicized, 
non-Zionist and intelligent definition of anti -Semitism is given by the 
Universal Jewish Encyclopedia: "The tenn . , . to denote the movement to 
degrade Jews to an inferior position in all branches of life in the 
countries in which · they live. Generally, it i s  applied to individual 
and group inci ta ti on and action aiming to circumscribe the civil,  religious 
and political rights of the Jews; also to hinder nonnal relations between 
Jews and non-Jews. "  
12Ibid . ,  p .  46. The Zionist redemption doctrine, in essence, i s  the 
political objective of ingathering and settlement of the land of Palestine 
and its environs with the "people of Israel , "  that is, the "Jewish people" 
of the world , in the "land of Israel . "  Their program i s  to acquire the 
land for "the Jewish people . "  The Zionist memorandum stated that "by 
violence they were driven from Palestine"--totally ignoring the historical 
fact that it was by violent invasion that the Hebrews themselves con­
quered part of the country in the first place. It should also be noted 
that the Palestinians of today are the earliest and the original inhabitants 
of Palestine. Their settlement in Palestine can be traced back at least 
forty centuries al though, naturally, there were infusions of other racial 
elements into the Palestinians' ancestors. 
13'Ibere will be no attempt in this paper to examine and debate the 
explicit meaning of Biblical texts either to support or to oppose the 
contention that the present Zionist State of I srael i s  the "fulfillment" 
of Old Testament prophecies. It i s  sufficient to say only two things 
in this regard . First, none of the national o·r international tribunals 
which have, in the past, wrestled with the poli tical issues of the 
Palestine problem has ever admitted that ancient Biblical prophecies 
established any legal validi ty to the Zionist political claims to all , 
or part of, the area of Palestine. Second, even those Zionists who . 
claim, ex post facto, that the State of Israel does fulfill the 
Biblical injunctions, the military/political methods used to establish 
the state. 'Ibe best these people can say is that the Zionist­
nationalist movement became the Divine instrument. The closest these 
people can come to "logic" is to plead the expediency and the necessity 
for human intervention and political efficiency to speed up the process 
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lld,ch was to require God ' s  own time . 1he most chart table construc­
tt.on which can be put upon the Zionist State of Israel therefore , in 
the context of considering its Biblical legitimacy, i s  that through 
JQ11.t1cal and military methods having no sanction in the Bible at all , 
a political sovereignty (distinct from legal ) has been forcefully es­
tablished.. No more heinous distortion of the Bible could be imagined 
than using i t  to justify the brutal expulsion from thei r  homes and 
lands of modern Palestinians or to give succor to a political Israel 
that occupies territory and homes belonging naturally to another peo­
ple and reduces minority Arab inhab:l. tants to undesirables i n  prefer­
ence to an exclusive "Jewish" character. Jews are pawns in an elite 
political and totalitarian movement. 1hey are being concentrated in 
Palestine, not because they are in need of a so-called refuge or a 
haven, but in order to fulfill the purely secularist political aspira­
tions of a major ideological movement called Zionism. Palestine has 
seen many invasions throughout its complex history, but not since 
t.he first Hebrew invasion of some 3, 500 years ago has a similar situa­
tion of massacres ,  mass expulsions and near total dispossessions 
arisen in the Holy Land . To suggest that this i s  being done under 
Biblical prophecies i s  the height of grotesque ignorance. 
14 
When Abraham made a covenant with God through circumcision 
(Genesi s XVI I ,  8)  and all the land of Canaan (Palestine) was promised 
to him for an everlasting possession, it was I shmael , ancestor of the 
Arab tribes, who was circumcised, for Isaac had not then been born. 
If, therefore , one i s  to follow Zionist Biblical reasoning, Palestine 
was "promised" by God exclusively to the Arabs . 1he idea of the es­
tablishment of a state on the basis of arguments derived from the 
Bible i s  utterly unacceptable in international law and especially to 
twentieth century thinking. Considerations of a religious nature 
have no place in contemporary international law. '!here i s  no relation 
in international law between the establishment of a State and re­
ligious affiliation. But scriptural exegesis by Zionist anagogical 
interpreters has been utilized, but even then incorrectly, to claim 
"the Jewish people" right to "recover their sovereignty" over Palestine. 
According to the rules of international law established since the 
eighteenth century, a territory can only be subjected to the sover­
eignty of the occupier through actual indigenous occupation. In 
laying down conditions for the transfer of sovereignty in a State, 
international law has never admitted sovereignty claims based on re­
ligion. '!here exists no juridical precedents in international law to 
create a State for adherents of either a regional nor universal faith. 
See Edward Rizk, ·trans . ,  The Palestine Question (Beirut: The Institute 
For Palestine Studies, 1968); Sarni Hadawi , The Jews and the Bible 
{unpubli shed extract from the author to thi s writer); Elmer Berger, 
Judaism or Jewish Nationali sm (New York : i3ookman Associates, 1957) ;  
Israel According to -Holy Scriptures ( Cedar Rapids, Iowa: !gram Press, 
Inc . ,  no date). 
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15-ibe goal of pol1 t1cal Zionism as early as August 21,  1921,  was 
illustrated by one of Israel ' s  contemporary political leaders and 
longtime Jewish Agency official , Golda Meir, who declared on thi s date : 
•1t is not the Arabs the English will choose to colonise Palestine, 1 t 
is us (the Jews ) . "  See Mary Syrkin, Golda Meir (Pari s :  Gallimard, 1966 ) ,  
P• 63. 
16Americans for Middle East Understanding, A Secret Document: The 
Ioenig Document (New York : Americans for Middle East Understanding, 
19??). This document i s  reproduced fully in the Appendix. The 
so-called "Koenig Program" i s  the product of establishment Israeli 
Jews. Israel Koenig i s ,  at this writing, the "District Commisioner for 
the North . "  He is the Israeli official held responsible for putting 
into effect the policies of the Israeli Government' s  Interior Ministry 
in the Galilee District, where most of the remaining Arabs of Palestine 
live. Koenig handled the official processing o f  the document, including 
its delivery to "Rabin and other ministers. "  But the racially advo­
cated program reflects the views of other important Israeli poll tical 
figures. A full review from an authori tative, respected source of this 
document is found in Al-HaMishmar, one of Israel ' s  major daily news­
papers, dated September 7, 1976. Dr. Israel Shahak, of the Israeli 
League for Human Rights, wr1 tes in a personal l etter to American Jewish 
Alternatives to Zionism and Americans for Middle East Understanding: 
"The one really shocking thing which I think you should mention is the 
overwhelming support that Koenig got among the religious, that i s  
the orthodox Jews, here, including especially their rabbi s. Actually 
the assembled rabbi s of Galilee asked all the Jews to bless Koenig 
on the first sabbath after the publication of his report, during 
their ' call ' to the Torah reading . "  Koenig ' s  program , therefore , i s  
not the eccentricity o f  a maverick; h e  i s  in h i s  post at the dispo­
sition of the National Religious Party; this party is--as i t  has been 
for thirty years--an indispensible factor in the successive coalitions 
which have maintained the dominant governing position of Ma.pal . That 
is the political party of Ben-Gurion, Eshkol , Meir and Rabin, all of 
whom have been the toast of pro-Zionist American governmental officials 
professing passionate commi tment to "democratic principles and human 
rights." Koenig was actually called "Nazi" by parties located on the 
left of the Israeli political spectrum . The Koenig document itself 
is merely an addendum to all of the earlier racist policies imposed or 
enacted against Palestine ' s  Arabs (later Israel ' s  remaining Arabs ) .  
l7Felicia Langer, With M Own E es (London: I thaca Press, 1975 ) ;  
Sabri Jiryi s, 1he Arabs i n  Israel New York : Monthly Review Press, 1976 ) ;  
Sabri Jiryi s ,  The Arabs in Israel Beirut: The Institute For Palestine 
Studies, 1969 ) .  After 1948 , puni shment of remaining Arabs in Israel takes 
the form of indi scriminate imprisonment without actual legal protections 
and safeguards. Jiryi s, an Israel Arab attorney from Haifa was first 
imprisoned and then exiled because of his secretive transfer of the 
earlier Hebrew manuscript, by chapters, out of I srael . After more than 
a year of impri sonment and "house arrest" he was released but ordered 
out of Israel to Beirut. Additional confirmation of Israeli treatment 
of Arabs both within Israel and the Arab occupied lands i s  explicitly de­
tailed in reports of the Israeli League of Human and Civil Rights, headed 
by Dr. Israel Shahak. 
I " 
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Palestine Government, The Political Histor of Palestine Under 
British Administration (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1947 , p .  J,  
paragraph lJ. 
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l9Walid Khalidi , ed. , From Haven to Conquest (Beirut: The Institute 
ror Palestine Studies, 1971), p. 235. I t  should be noted that the 
Zionists as early as 1922 did not believe that the Balfour Declaration 
(which incorporates the phrase "Jewish people" ) was a valid claim to 
nationhood and sovereignty in Arab Palestine. For, i n  1922, Lieutenant r Colonel W.F. Stirling, nri ti.sh mili tary administrator i n  Jaffa (Palestine ) ,  
declared that the British Government should have allayed the fears of 
the Arabs and "counter the false interpretation being placed on the 
declaration by the Jewish Agency in Palestine and certain responsible 
Jews in Amert ca. " 
20nie United States Government has expressly rejected it, as i s  
evidenced by a letter dated April 20, 1964, and addressed to Rabbi 
Elmer Berger ( then execut.i ve vice president of the American Council 
for Judaism) wherein Assi stant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot 
legally asserted by American municipal law criteria "that the Department 
of State does not regard the ' Jewish peopl e '  concept as a concept of 
international law . "  A copy of this letter i s  included in the Appendix. 
21'!he American Council for Judaism, formed to counter American Zionism 
in 1942, was through the mid- 1960' s  anti-Zionist; American Zionists now 
control the Council and exhort Israeli state interests. See Moshe 
Menuhin, Quo Vadi s Zionist Israel? ( Beirut : The Institute for Palestine 
Studies, 1969), pp. 52-76. 
22Fonnal Policy Statements of the American Council for Judai sm : From 
September, 1959 to May, 1961 . The full letter i s  reproduced in this 
report as i s  the American Council for Judaism letter of October 15, 1959 
to Secretary of State Chri stian A .  Herter. Despite these legal safe­
guards, Israel still involves itself in imposing "Jewish people" 
nationality law obligations upon Americans of Jewish faith. '!hi s  i s  
done in diverse ways but basically through Zionist ideology of a claimed 
legal connection between "the Jewish people" concept and the State of 
Israel. Zionist organizations, such as the American Zionist Organization 
(ZOA ) ,  bypassing American juridical safeguards and acting as an instru­
mentality of the Israeli Government and the World Zionist Organi zation 
(WZO), have been able to intrude themselves into i nternal American 
politics largely because the United States Government has not enforced 
the provisions of the Friendship ,  Commerce and Navigation Treaty with 
Israel and the Foreign Agents Regi stration Act. nor the very impor-
tant First Amendment of the Constitution. Said another way, the poli­
tical and propaganda activities within the United States of foreign 
agents and their principals (in this case, the State of Israel and its 
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agent, the Jewish Agency/World Zionist Organization (JA/WZO) , and 
the agent of the JA/WZO the Zionist Organization of America ) are dis­
allowed. by American law, by treaty provisions between two states, and 
by a Constitutional First Amendment provision against religious dis­
crill1nation. For a full purview of violations of American juridical 
standards by domestic Zionist groups and organizations serving the 
Israeli Government see U.S . ,  Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Belations, Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign 
Principals in the United States, Hearings, before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Senate, 88th Cong. , 1st sess . ,  May 23, August 1 ,  1963. 
'lbe purpose of the investigation was to study the activities of 
•nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principal s including, with-
out limitation, foreign governments, forei gn poll tical parties, and 
individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, organi zations 
or other combinations of individuals, whether foreign or domestic ,  
acting i n  the place of, or in the interests of, or on behalf o f  a 
foreign government or foreign political party, tending or intended 
to influence the foreign or domestic policies or interests of the 
United States." 
23r.etter from Assistant Secretary of State Talbot of the United 
States Government to Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger, Executive Vice President 
of the American Council for Judaism, April 20, 1964 i n  8 Whiteman 
Digest of International Law 35, 1967. 
24An example of the jus soli principle is inherent in the Four­
teenth Amendment of the Uni ted States Constitution: "All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris­
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside . "  
25wbere the child a t  birth acquires the nationality of one or 
both of his parents. 
26Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington, D . C . : United 
States Department of State, 1942), p .  352. 
27'1bis category includes the Zionist Organization. In ad.di tion to 
national states there are other significant group participants in the 
contemporary world communi ty, including international public organiza-
tions or bodies, politi cal parties, pressure groups, and private assoc­
iations. But none of them has the unique juridical competence of the 
national state to constitute a national entity. Among the many Zionist 
reiterations of the basic legal claim to " the Jewish people" doctrine, 
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in varying political and legal contexts ,  the following are set forth as 
representative illustrations: Theodor Herzl declared "Let the sovereignty 
be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the 
rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall mange for ourselves • . • . 
The creation of a new State i s  neither ridiculous nor impossible . . • •  The 
Governments of all countries scourged by anti-Semitism will be keenly 
interested in assisting us to obtain the sovereignty we want." Quote 
taken from Theodor Herzl , The Jewish State (New York: American Zionist 
Ellergency Council, 1946) ,  p. 92. The Basle Program of the First Zionist 
Congress in 1897 stated, "The aim of Zionism i s  to create for the Jewish 
people a home in Palestine secured by public law ."  Quote taken from 
Alan R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel : An Anal sis of Zionist Di lomatic 
189?-1947 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959 , p.  5. Chaim Weizmann 
declared, "The Zionist Organization has taken the poll tical steps necessary 
to obtain the recognition by the other nations of the Jewish right to 
1 a home in Palestine. But we have never wanted Palestine for the Jews. 
'!he development of Palestine Jewry i s  not a party affair. The Balfour 
Declaration is addressed to all Jewry. It  i s  only logical that we have 
1 approached the Jewish communities of the world in order to put the 
work, whose maximum can never be achieved by a limited circle of Jews, 
on a broader basis, and in order to mobilize for it systematically 
all the forces of Jewry. " Quote ta!cen from Paul Goodman, ed . ,  Chaim 
Weizmann (London t Victor Gollancz,  Ltd . ,  1945) ,  p .  203. Fonner longtime 
President of the World Zionist Organization Nahum Goldmann stated, t•The 
object of the Jewish State has been the preservation of the Jewish 
people, which was imperilled by emanicipation and assimilation • • • •  " 
Quote taken from Taylor, op.cit. , p.  2 .  A · textbook on Zionism sponsored 
by the Zionist Organization of America declares, "The homeland itself 
must be not only the home of Palestinian Jewry, but also the home of 
the whole people, i .e . ,  potentially the home of all Jews. In striving 
to accomplish its task the Zionist organization has regarded itself 
as the representative and trustee of the whole of the nation , "  Quote 
taken from Joseph Heller, 'lbe Zionist Idea (New York : Schocken Books, 
Inc . ,  1949 ) ,  p. 73 . The Declaration of the Establishment of ttt� State 
of Israel states, "We appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora 
to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and 
upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization 
of the age-old dream--the redemption of Israel . "  Quote taken from 
Badi ,  ed. ,  Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel (New York : Twayne 
Publishers, 1961), p. 10.  David Ben-Gurion, fonner longtime Zionist 
official and Prime l"d.nister of Israel declared, "On the world scene and 
in the Middle East;·. Israel ' s  endeavours must be the same--mili tary and 
moral , but its destiny depends wholly upon the third domain, the Jewish 
people in all its dispersion. '!he State of Israel i s  a part of the 
�addle East only in geography, which is, in the main, a static element. 
From the more decisive standpoints of dynamism, creation and growth, 
Israel is a part of world Jewry. From that Jewry it· will draw all the 
resources and the means necessary for the upbuilding of the nation of 
Israel and the development of the Land; through the might of world Jewry 
it will be bull t and built again.  A commu.'1i ty of destiny and destination 
joins together indissolubly the State of Israel and the Jewish people. 
'lbere is an indestructible bond, a bond of life and death, between them. "  
Quote taken from State of Israel Governmental Year-Book, 19 2 (Jerusalem: 
'!be Government Printing Press, 1952 , p. 29. The District Court of 
Jerusalem in the Eichmann Trial Judgment declares, "In the light of the 
recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to 
establish their State, and in the light of the recognition of the established 
Jewish State by the family of nations, the connection between the Jewish 
people and the State of Israel constitutes an integral part of the law 
of nations." Quote taken from Criminal Case No. 40/61 ,  p .  32, section 
)4. 
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Dae last quotation i s  particularly significant in explaining the Zionist­
Israel purpose of continued reiteration of the basic legal claim in 
nrylng political and l egal contexts. The purpose i s  to take any 
Yoluntary relationships between Jews across national boundaries, such 
u relationships of philanthropy and religion, and change them into 
relations recogni zed in and established by public law. 
28 An interesting feature of the Zionist State violations of customary 
international law precepts i s  Israeli intrusions into the municipal 
legal system of the United States, although by no means confined solely 
to the United States. While i t  should be obvious that the United States 
Covenunent has the constitutional obligation to protect the Ameican 
citizen' s  undivided nationality status, the Israeli State Zionist 
establishment has refused to abide by this customary international law 
provision. In the American constitutional system, an individual (an 
American does not receive his constitutional rights by virtue of his 
11e111bership in groups or collect! vi ties) is legally entitled to his full 
and equal measure of constitutional rights without regard to extraneous 
factors such as his religious affiliation, national origin, or other 
incidentals which in our constitutional system are legally irrelevant. 
Such is not the case in the Zionist State of Israel . 
29Adolph Eicha.mann was charged with crimes against humani ty, but the 
principal Zionist charge s were "crimes against the Jewish people . "  
See the Israeli Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law ( 19 .50 ) ,  
4 Israel Laws 154, Fundamental Laws 162, defining "crimes against the 
Jewish peopl e . "  This I sraeli statute was applied in the Attorney­
General of the Government of Israel v .  Adolf, the son of Karl Adolf 
Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/61 ,  District Court of Jerusalem, Israel , 
December 11-12, 1961, affirmed Criminal Appeal No. 336/61 Supreme Court 
of Israel, May 29, 1962, cited hereafter when used as Eichmann Trial 
Judgment. 
JO"Since I called, at the beginning of my remarks, for absolute 
allegiance to the Jewish revolution, I shall now make a few concluding 
remarks about the goal , of our revolution : It i s  the complete ingathering 
of the exiles into a aocialist Jewish state . "  Thi s quotation is taken 
from Ben Gurion, "The Imperatives of the Jewish Revolution (1944 ) , "  in 
Hertzberg, ed . ,  The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader (1959 ) ,  
pp. 606-619. 
31rnconsi stency of this Zionist concept of a "Jewish nation" 1 s very 
peculiar: On the one hand Zionist doctrine rejects and condemns integration 
of Jews in the various countries; on the other hand, Zionism considers 
it normal that Jews should enjoy the advantages of "dual national! ty" 
defined by Zionist jargon. Obviously, Zionism ' s  strange inconsistency 
is wrapped up in political expediency. The official attitude of , Israel ' s  
Zionist establishment i s  that i t  condemns the integration of Jews into 
the various nations in which they live. The 1950 Zionist Law of Return 
is based on the narrowest racial and confessional principles. The absurdity 
of this Zionist law--which legally opens up the State of Israel to Jews 
only--is well illustrated i n  the case of the American Negro entertainer 
Sammy Davis, Jr. , who converted to Judaism. According to Zionist 
thinking, as legally formulated in the Israeli Status Law and the Law 
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of Return, Davis i s  now considered to be living i n  "exile" in the United 
States, his homeland, pining for the day to return "home" to Palestine � 
Ludicrously, while a total stranger i n  language , color, culture and race, 
can acquire the "right" to live in the Jewish State of Israel merely 
by adopting Judai sm, the evicted indigenous Moslem and Christian 
Palestinian Arab inhabi tants of their ancestral homeland are denied 
the right to live i n  the country of their birth and ancestors! 
J2An excellent historical and legal purview can 
Cattan , Palestine and International Law: The Le al 
Israeli Conflict London : Longman, 1973 . 
be found i n  Henry 
ects of the Arab-
33'Ihe King-Crane Commission, appointed in 1919 at the suggestion of 
President Woodrow Wilson, summed up the specious Zionist legal claim to 
Arab Palestine by declaring that " the initial claim, often subni tted 
by Zionist representatives, that they have a 'right' to Palestine based 
on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously 
considered. " Quota ti on taken from J • C .  Hurewi tz, op. cit. , p .  70. 
34In the context of both history and sociology, the even more 
aberrational conceptual elements in "the Jewish people" transnational 
nationality claims must, a fortiori , make them permanently invalid under 
public international law precepts. In fulfilling its constitutional 
and international juridical obligations by rejecting the absurd dis­
criminatory "Jewish people" racial-regigious Zionistic concept, the 
United States and the international community i s  also justified by the 
most fundamental considerations of morality. For, not the least of 
these fundamentals is separation of religious and political values 
sufficient to permit the exercise and development of religions of 
universal moral values free from political interference, coercion and 
discrimination . The writer presumes that religious behavior i s  based 
on positive moral values ,  although some inculcate negative values such 
as the ultra-nationali stic religious officialdom in Israel that i s  part 
of the Zionist ruling establishment. 
The fundamental role of theocracy in Israeli governing processes 
is not a subject of this paper. But the Israeli state system politically, 
religiously and juridically depicts the involuntary and coercive aspects 
of the "membership and identity" religious-racial conception of Zionist 
nationalism. Such a conception i s  readily seen, by official Israeli 
actions, as totally inconsistent with democrati c values and individual 
equality including religious freedom and secular integration/assimilation. 
Concerning the Zioni st conception of "democracy" see the infonnation 
collected by Norman F. Dacey, 'Ibe Golden Calf, especially chapter 25, 
and other public information sources from Dr. Israel Shahak of the Israeld.. 
League for Human and Civil Right s .  
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35semi te i s  a depiction for, including in ancient times, people such 
as Babylonians, Assyrians, Phoenicians, Hebrews and Arabs , and others 
of the eastern Mediterranean area . Before the invasion of migrant 
Hebrews Palestine had always been Semitic-Canaani te, that i s  to say. 
Arab, in view of the fact that the Semite i s ,  geographically speaking, 
of Arab origin. Consequently, the .basic historical fact that must be 
emphasized in any discussion of the Middle East problem, i s  that the 
land of Canaan or Palestine, which was inhabited by Canaanite peopl e ,  
who were Semites and therefore Arab, was later partially conquered 
by alien Hebrew tri bes. Contrary to Zionist mythmaking, Hebrews were 
not originally indigenous to the Palestine area .  'Ibey were early 
invaders in the land . 
CHAP'IER IV 
ZIONIST-BRITISH 'IERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS IN 'ffiE 
MIDDLE EAST 
The creation of the State of Israel was an extension of European 
imperialism.1  'lhat the Palestinians simply did not "exist" as a national 
people in the European consciousness is explicable only in terms of the 
imperialistic "white-man' s  burden" mentality that during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries led to a wave of European expansion. 
European supremacy had planted in the minds of even the most deprived 
of those who shared in 1 t the idea that any territory outside Europe was 
open to European occupation. A terrl. tory could be declared "unpopulated" 
simply because 1 t was not inhabited by Europeans under a European admin-
istration; that it was inhabited by a non-European people posed an 
"administrative problem, "  or a challenge to missionaries, whether religious 
or technological, but was of lt ttle significance otherwise. 2 
It was this attitude that made 1 t possible for the Zionist 
leaders and theoreticians to all but completely ignore the Arabs and 
deal exclusively with the European powers within the framework of their 
colonialist policies. As one of many examples, a note wr1 tten to the 
British War Cabinet in 1917 by Chaim Weizmann reads in part as follows: 
In subni tting our resolution we entrusted our national and Zionist 
destiny to the Foreign Office and the Imperial War Cabinet in the 
hope that the problem would be considered in the light of imperial 
interests and the principles for which the Entente stands.J 
A book review from the Jerusalem Times stated the followings 
That the Zionists shared the imperialistic mentality of nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century Europe "explains" their indifference 
to the Palestinian Arabs, but it does not, of course, excuse it.  
Neither can it be excused as an indifference resulting from la.ck of 
information, or misinformation, that led • • •  immigrants and ardent, 
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idealistic apologists alike to imagine Palestine as an uninhabited 
terr! tory: "there can be no doubt that i f  [Palestin� had been oc­
cupied by one of the well-established industrial nations that ruled 
the world at the time, one that had thoroughly settled down in a 
territory it had infused with a powerful national consciousness, 
then the problem of displacing German, French or English inhabitants 
and introducing a new nationally coherent element into the middle 
of their homeland would have been in the forefront of the conscious­
ness of even the most ignorant and destitute Zioni sts.4 
With the building of the Suez Cana15 in the 1850s-1870s Palestine 
received the close attention of Britain and France, both rival colonial 
powers. Moreover, the European Powers at the conclusion of the nine-
teenth century were fiercely competitive and had no regard for inter­
national law precepts . 6  Zionism used that colonial competitiveness to 
their poll tical advantage; Zionism tried to induce the relevant power--
al though i t  failed until 1917--to extend the necessary political support.? 
'Ihe competitiveness of the powers was related to their imperial ambition 
for the domination and ultimate occupation of the Middle East, then still 
part of the sovereign political entity known as the Ottoman Empire. a '!he 
aspiration of the European Zionists to induce the Ottoman Sultanate to 
concede the political right of exclusive Jewish colonization of Palestine 
ultimately was denied; 9 hence the similar political activity of Zionists 
in major capi tals of the European world in the hope that the powers--those 
competing for the control , di smembennent and eventual colonial occupation 
of what was euphemistically called "the sick man of Europe"--would per-
cei ve the "benefits" to be derived from the support they could extend in 
realizing the Zionist Judenstaat scheme .10 'lhe independent colonial am-
bi.tions of the European powers for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire 
was long contained by their mutual fears and suspicions of one another. 
But their respective interests in the Ottoman Empire were maintained by 
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the exercise of extra terr! toriali ty through the Ca.pi tulations encroach­
aents of Turkish sovereignty, a direct violation of international law 
precepts even at this time.11 As for example, British imperial interests 
in the Ottoman Sultanate is recorded as early as the immediate turn of 
the twentieth century by Julian Amery .12 Amery confirms the accuracy 
of Chamberlain's  statement in 1902 to Herzl (if Herzl could show him 
•a spot in the English possessions where there were no white people as 
yet, they could talk" about Jewish colonial settlementl'.3) but also re­
veals the motives of Chamberlain :  "Chamberlain • • •  was the first among 
Br1 ti sh statesmen to see in Zionism • • •  a means of advancing the interests 
of the British Empire, nl4 and that "a Jewish colony in Sinai might prove 
a useful instrument for extending British influence into Palestine proper, 
when the time came for the inevitable d.ismembennent of the Ottoman 
Empire. nl.5 When Chamberlain saw that a public political storm might be 
aroused by Herzl ' s  colonial "Cyprus, El Ari.sh and the Sinai Peninsul_a" 
scheme,16 Herzl confided "that not everything in politics is really dis­
closed to the public--only results, or whatever may happen to be needed 
in a discussion. nl 7 
'!he fundamental Zionist differentiation between Jew and non-Jew 
in itself does imply the superiority of one over the other.18 Zionists 
do believe in the superiority of the European Jew· (Ashkenazim) over the 
Gentile Arab in Palestine, and this is a function of Zionism ' s  close 
association to European colonialism.19 To obtain the necessary political 
support and commitment f'rom the European colonial powers, Zionism pre­
sented itself as a European colonial movement that sought not only the 
involuntary removal of the Jew from European society long before the rise 
of German National Socialism, but, more importantly, their relocation in 
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an area of economic and strategic value to European colonialism.20 It 
was no accident that Herzl and subsequent European Zionists actively pre­
sented themselves as collaborative agents of Eu.rope in the Middle F.ast 
thoroughly subservient and ready to protect European imperial interests. 21 
As Europeans of the Jewish faith (al though many Zionists were 
irreligious), Zionists were imwed w1 th European ideas of racial super­
ior! ty vis-a-vis African and Asian people and shared in the general 
European contempt of and whim to exploit the Asian-African worlds. Ac­
cordingly, Zionist Jewish nationalism justified its act of colonial set­
tlement in Palestine on several cond1 tions: (1) that such settlement 
would entail an occupation of an Asian land by a European people ; (2) 
that they would confer the benefits of European material civilization 
on the "backward, "  "nomadi c , "  "uncivilized" inhabi. tan ts of the land; and 
(3) that a settlement, entirely composed of European people, protected 
by European colonial.ism, would provide an important strategic base for a 
secure imperial presence. 
From the very beginning of Zionist settlement in Palestine Zionism 
pursued three policies simultaneously. 'Ihe first policy, still in evidence 
today, was the absolute denial o� the Palestinian Arab presence in Palestine . 
When that policy was exposed by Zionist Europeans of different humane 
interests and political persuasions, 22 Zionists admitted that the Arab 
Palestinian people existed but ignored and demeaned their traditional 
culture as devoid of the rudiments of civilization, or described the 
people as a nomadic population lacking the normal human attachment. to 
their homeland . '!he third Zionist policy, in close collaboration with 
Br1 tish imperlal interests, was predaciously designated in the words of 
the Balfour Declaration (a "Jewish national homeland" in
. 
Palestine ) and 
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later in the League of Nations Mandates '!he denial of the national and 
cultural affiliation of the Palestinian people who, in 1917, constituted 
93 per cent of the population, ·by referring to them as "the non-Jewish 
communities" of Palestine. It was under the protective umbrella of 
Britain, which lasted for thirty years, that the Zionist infrastructure 
was laid in Palestine and Zionism created the conditions for a Jewish 
State in the Arab world. 23 
Zionists arrived in Palestine as arrogant,  separatist colonists 
certain of their superior culture. 24 '!heir "Jewish" State, Herzl• s 
Judenstaat, to use the tenn founded by the founder of political Zionism,25 
would be as pure as "England is English" or as "France is French . "26 
Zionist consciousness led to racially based political, economic and social 
institutions in Palestine. 27 'lhe Palestinian presence was ignored; 
when that presence was felt, as through 1936-1939, it was confronted by 
military force. From the time of the Mandate on the Palestinian became 
the "invisi bl.e person" : present everywhere as a person and as a culture 
but absent from the Zionist reality. One is amazed to read Zionist 
literature for nowhere does the Palestinian in any shape infonn the Zionist 
delusion. 28 'Ihis invisi bill ty was not accidental. It is rooted in the 
racial consciousness of the European Zionists Asians and Africans, to 
this mentality, were an undifferentiated whole ;  if they existed at all , 
they existed to be exploited, expelled or suppressed lest they dilute 
the purl ty of the superior cul tu:re. When they resist, they must be 
hunted, destroyed or exiled as "terrorists." ( Terrori st is only the most 
recent national and cultural identity the Zionists have bestowed on the 
Palestinians who have sought to confront the Zionist alien state . }  
At no point were the Zionists willing to acknowledge the humanity, 
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equall ty or cultural affinities of the Palestinian peopl e .  For the Zionist 
aovement is, still today, a creature of nineteenth century European racial-
ism, and Europe justified its occupation, colonialism and exploitation 
of Africa and Asia on racial and cultural grounds. 29 In actual fact 
the Zionists purposefully excogl tated an exclusionist system from which 
the national Palestinian population was first excluded and later became, 
as Herzl ' s  Diary reveals, "spirl ted but penniless . .. 30 Zionists established 
a labor federation, but it was a "Jewish" federation ( the Histadrut) from 
which non-Jews were excluded . Membership with all attendant benefits 
are still exclusively Jewish despite the presence of an Arab Department 
in the Histadrut, which in itself, reveals the racial discrimination 
practiced by Zionism .  Arab labor was excluded from all industrial enter-
prises and urban occupations. When some Jewi sh workshops violated this 
Zionist dictum, they were physically sacked and assaulted by Zionists and 
Histadruti sts. 31 '!he Zionists established a Jewish system of '"Zionist 
education" predating the Balfour Declaration and, as one eyewitness Russian 
Jewish immigrant to Palestine recalled as early as 1909, became a "hot bed 
for wild insane political national!�" and " started an almost unbridgeable 
wave of hatred . .. 32 Non-Jews were automatically excluded . Zionist edu-
ca.tors emphasize4 the collective race entity of "the Jewish people" ir-
respective of place, citizenship or culture , instilled Zionist Jewish 
values, proselytized intense Jewish poll tical nationalism and postulated 
the idea of "Moladtaynooh. ,.33 These political-educational practices ful­
filled their Zionist goal . 'lhey produced a recognizable system of em­
bittered apartheid in Palestine very early in the twentieth century . 34 
It was at the Basle Conference in 189735 that the tenn "national 
home" was first used instead of Jewish State (Judenstaat). 36 Max Nord.au, 
an associate of 'lheodor Herzl explained: 
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I did my best to persuade the claimants of the Jewish State in 
Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would express 
all we meant, but would say it  in a way so as to avoid provoking 
the 'l\lrkish rulers of the coveted land. I suggested 'Heimstatte ' 
as a synonym for 'State' • • •  This i s  the history of the much commented 
expression. It was equivocal, but we all understood what it  meant. 
To us it  signified 'Judenstaat' then and it  signifies the same now.37 
Incidentally, the central theme of this historic Zionist Congress testi-
fled, as well,  to the great influence of the Gennan Zionists: "Zionism 
seeks to secure for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally 
secured 'home-location' (Heimstatte) in Palestine for the Jewish people."  
'lhe weak term "Heimstatte" rather than "state" or "Judenstaat" represented 
a political victory of the moderate Gennan Zionist leadershipJ8 over 
Herzl• s personal wishes in that matter. 39 
Consequently, the declared aim of the First Zionist Congress in 
1897 was the creation of a Jewish State. Toward this political goal the 
intentionally ambiguous sixty-seven word Balfour Declaration, presented 
deceptively as the work of the British Government, had been drafted with 
elaborate care by the Zionists.40 
Interestingly, it  was a prominent Jewish American, Mayer Sulzberger, 
fonner president of the Court of Common Pleas of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania,  who most vehemently addressed himself to the imperialistic 
philosophy inherent in Zionist thought. Sulzberger opposed Zionism, con­
tending that it denied democracy to those who lived in Palestine, 
Democracy means that those who live in a country shall select their 
rulers and shall preserve their powers. Given these principles a 
Convention of Zionists looking to the government of people who are 
in Palestine would be in contravention of the plainest principle of 
democracy. It can have no practical meaning unless its intent i s  to 
overslaugh the people who are in Palestine and to deprive them of 
the right of self-government by substituting th� will of persons 
outside, who may or may not ever see Palestine.41 
By 1917, persistent Zionist efforts began to show signs of success. 
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In no small part, victory with the Brl ti sh Cabinet was due to the role 
played by Herbert {Viscount) Samuel , 42 who espoused the founding of a 
Jewish State with the help of Brl ta.in and the United States. He pro-
posed the annexation of Palestine and argued that a protectorate over 
Palestine4J would "enable Engl.and to fulfill in yet another sphere her 
historic part of the civilizer of the backward countrles."44 Samuel , 
a Zionist, sul:mi tted a revised memorandum in March of 1915, which, ac-
cording to one authorl ty, "marked a turning point in the history of the 
Middle East and of the world, "45 for it enuciated what would eventually 
be translated into Brl ti sh policy. Samuel ' s  argument for a Br1. ti sh 
protectorate was that, 
Its establishment would be a safeguard. to Egypt. It i s  true that 
Palestine in Br1. ti sh hands would itself be open to attack, and the 
acquisition would bring with it extended mili tary responsibilities. 
But the mountainous character of the country would make its occupa­
tion by an enemy difficult, and, while thi s outpost was being con­
tested time would be given to allow the garrison of Egypt to be in­
creased and the defense to be strengthened • • • •  
A British protectorate , according to the Egyptian Intelligence 
Department report already quoted, would be welcomed by a large 
proportion of the present population. 'Ihere have been many previous 
indications of the same feeling. I am assured, both by Zionists and 
non-Zionists, that it  is the solution of the question of Palestine 
which would be by far the most welcome to the Jews throughout the 
world. 
It i s  hoped that under British rule facilities would be given to 
Jewish organi zations to purchase land, to found colonies, to estab­
lish educational and religious institutions, and to cooperate in the 
economic development of the country, and that Jewish immigration, 
carefully regulated, would be given preference, so that in the course 
of time the Jewish inhabitants grown into a majorl ty and settled 
in the land, may be conceded such degree of self-government as the 
conditions of that day might justify • • • •  
'Ihe course which i s  advocated would win for England the gratitude 
of the Jews throughout the world. In the United States, where they 
number about 2, 000,000, and in all the other lands where they are 
scattered, they would form a body of opinion whose bias, where the 
interest of the country of which they were citizens was not involved , 
would be favorable to the British Empire .46 
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Chaim Weizmann , president of the English Zionist Federation, 
confirms that in December of 1914 while breakfasting with Lloyd George 
(then Chancellor of the Exchequer),  Herbert Samuel, M.P. (then president 
of the Local Government Board) ,  related that he was preparing a memoran-
dum for Prime Minister Asquith on the subject of a Jewi sh State in 
Palestine.47 In fact, Samuel wrote three memoranda on the subject of 
Palestine becoming a Jewish State ; the first he subni tted January, 1915: 
The course of events (the wa�) opens a prospect of change, at the 
end of the war, in the status of Palestine • • • •  
I am assured that the solution of the problem of Palestine which 
would be much the most welcome to the leaders, and supporters of 
the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation 
of the country to the British Empire • • •  It is hoped that under 
Brl tish rule facilities would be given to Jewish organizations to 
purchase land, to found colonies, to establish educational and 
religious institutions • • • •  It is hoped also that Jewish immigration, 
carefully regulated, would be given preference so that in course of 
time the Jewish people, grown into a majority and settled on the 
land, may be conceded such aggree of self-govenunent as the conditions 
of that day may justify • • • •  
'Ihat the Zionists pressed the theme for a Brl tish protectorai!e 
is w1 thout question. For Weizmann wrote, 
If Great Br1 tain does not wish anybody else to have Palestine, this 
means that it will have to watch it and stop any penetration of 
another Power. Such a course involves as much responsibility as 
would be involved by a British Protectorate over Palestine, with 
the sole difference that watching is a much less efficient pre­
ventive than an actual Protectorate. I therefore thought that 
the middle course could be adopted : viz. the Jews take over the 
country; the whole burden of organization falls on them, but for 
the next ten or fifteen years they work under a temporary British 
Protectorate .49 
Weizmann' s tentative ideas belonged to a period. before the Man-
date system had been thought of and before the issuance of the Balfour 
Declaration. Palestine was to be admini stered in the style of a British 
protectorate rather than in the juridical style of an internationally 
mandated territory. 
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Many ind.1 vidual schemes were being mooted for the partition of 
the Turkish Empire. Asquith outlined the views of three of his Cabinet 
colleagues when he wrote to Venetia Stanley50 March 13, 1915: 
H. Samuel has wr1 tten an almost d1 thyrambic memorandum urging that 
in the carving up of the 'I\trks' Asiatic dominions, we should take 
Palestine, into which the scattered Jews cd in time swarm back from 
all the quarters of the globe, and in due course obtain Home Rule. 
(What an attractive community! ) Curiously enough, the only other 
partisan of thi s proposal is Ll9yd George , who, I need not say, does 
not care a damn for the Jews or their past or their future , but who 
thinks i t  would be an outrage to let the Christian Holy Places-­
Bethlehem, Mount of Olives, Jerusalem & c--pass into the possession 
or under the protectorate of 'Agnostic Atheistic France ' !  Isn ' t  it 
singular that the same conclusions shd be capable of being come to 
by such different roads? • • • •  So he (Kitchener) i s  all for Alexandretta, 
and leaving the Jews and the Holy Places to look after themselves . 51 
On March 12, 1915, Lord Crewe52 informed Lord Hardinge53 of the 
various terrl torial acquisitions and schemes under di scussion in London : 
1he fighting departments consider i t  important to hold a strong 
position on the flank of our direct road to the East, and they regard 
Alexandretta as the most favourable place. I can quite believe in 
its merits; but if its possession means holding the whole of the 
Euphrates valle¥, above Aleppo to Urfah, on to Baghdad, and thence 
to the (Persian) Gulf, it is a large proposition in itself; which if 
Russia takes Armenia, Italy Adana, France Syria, and Greece wants 
Smyrna, the 'I\trks remain w1 th Anatolia and little else. This may be 
inevitable • • • •  54 
'lbe third volume in the extensive biography of Winston s .  Churchill 
completed by Martin Gilbert, himself a British Zionist, included private 
papers of the Royal Archives that detail the complex evolution of British 
war and imperial policy. His narrative relates the Brl tish War Council 
proceedings of March 10, 1915 : 
'lbe war Council then discussed the future of Constantinople .  I t  was 
agreed that Russia' s claim both to the city and to the Straits should 
be accepted, provided , as Asquith wrote to Venetia Stanley, ' that 
both we and France should get a substantial share of the carcase of 
the 'IUrk ' .  Lloyd George pointed out to his colleagues that ' the 
Russians were so keen to obtain Constantinople that they would be 
generous in regard to concessions elsewhere. Both Asquith and 
Kitchener jumped at the chance of pressing Britain ' s  claim for the 
annexation of Alexandretta, which had, said Kitchener, a mill tary as 
well as a naval importance .  
/ 
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Because of the significance of these terr! torial questions Asquith 
had invited Bonar Law and Lansdowne to be present during thi s stage 
of the discussion, wanting any terrl. tori.al decisions to be given 
an aura of all-Party acceptance • • • •  Churchill. • •  argued that ' after 
the war there might be mutual jealousies and heartburnings' and 
that i t  was therefore 'very desirable to block in the general lines 
of the terms we required' .  He feared that if this were not done , 
Brita.in would be at loggerheads with France when the war was over, 
as some of their respective claims particularly over Alexandretta 
(in Syria), overlapped.. 
Lloyd George suggested. that rather than quarrel with France over 
Ale:xandretta., they should give i t  to France.  A good alternative, 
he suggested., ' owing to the prestige it would give us', would be 
Palestine • .  Kitchener declared dogmatically ' that Palestine would 
be of no value to us whatsoever� and pressed the claim for Alexan­
dretta.. Fi sher strongly supported Kitchener, and argued that 
Alexandretta. had ' a  special importance as an outlet for the oil 
supplies of Mesopotamia and Persia' . McKenna wanted to turn the 
discussion to questions of ' compensation outside the Mediterranean ' • • • •  55 
At thi s meeting the Council concluded. with the following: 
It was finally agreed that Russia would be infonned that Brl ta.in 
accepted her demand for Constantinople and the Straits, subject 
to Br1 ta.in herself obtaining her own terrl. torial desiderata., which 
would be �t forward 'as soon as there has been time to consider 
them ' • • • •  
Consequently, Herbert Samuel ' s  proposal fell on receptive ears 
when, in December, 1916 ,  Lloyd George became Prime Minister and Arthur 
Balfour, Foreign Secretary. Balfour's asociation with Zionism went "tack 
at least a decade, roughly to that period when his opinion was also 
vital in another area of European settlement, namely South Africa. 
Although that prospect was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm as a 
testament to the "liberal" English tradition, i t  would also set the 
stage for the subjugation of the South African majori ty. Balfour' s  
defense of the proposed. Union and Palestine schemes were rooted in the 
same creed which later dictated his approach to an analogous situation 
in Palestine . He thus believed, 
If the races of Europe have really conquered, by centuries of 
difficulty and travail,  great rights and privileges for themselves 
they have given some of those rights and some of those privileges 
9J 
to men quite incapable, by themselves, of fighting for them at all, 
or obtaining them at all. '!bat is the plain,  historic truth of the 
s1 tuation, which i t  i s  perfect folly for us to attempt to forget. 
It is this very fact of the inequality of the races which makes the 
difficul ty.57 
During the war Allied promises to liberate Arab people of the 
ottoman Empire were war maneuvers and not intended seriously. Not 
Wilson's fourteen points and subsequent discourses, as had been promised 
at the time of the anni stice, but the Anglo-French-Russian-Italian 
treaty of April ·26, 1915: the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
1916; the Anglo-French promises to Italy at St. Jean-de-Ma.urlenne in 
1916; the Anglo-Hedjaz treaty of 1917; and the Franco-Russian convention 
of February, 1917, were the actual bases of the Ottoman settlement in 
the minds of the Entente delegates and members of Versailles commissions. 
In discussing "just settlements , "  Entente representatives disposed of 
arguments that independence or self-determination measures were in the 
interests of the people concerned or even in their own interests. 
'Ihe American "experts" on near Eastern affairs were met constant-
ly by the statements, "our treaty obligations come first, of course , "  
and "our traditional policy demands this solution . .. .58 In brief, history 
now reveals the actions of the Entente delegates at the Versailles Peace 
Conference to self-aggrandizement policies. With regard to British 
policy, in lieu of maintaining the composi tion of the Ottoman Empire 
which was no longer possible at the war ' s  tennination, Great Bri tain 
would control the approaches to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf,  
prevent any other European power from approaching Persia on the land 
side, acquire the Mesopotamian and Syrian portion of the Baghdad Railway, 
and substitute herself for Russia in Central Asia, Northern Persia and 
the Caucasus. 
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'lbe open declarations for Arab consumption were always correct 
and equitable, while the agreement with Zionist leaders was that Palestine 
should be transformed. into a Jewish State under Zionist control. Sir 
Hubert Young, a senior official in the Colonial Office, summarized the 
Brltish position in a memorandum on negotiating with the Arab Delegation 
which came to London in the summer of 1921 1 
'!he problem which we have to work out now is one of . tactics, not 
strategy, the general strategic idea as I conceive it, being the 
gradual immigration of Jews into Palestine until that country 
becomes a predominantly Jewish State • • • •  But it i s  questionable 
whether we are in a position to tell the Arabs what our policy 
really means. 59 
'lbe imperialist and colonialist nature of the collaborative 
British-Zionist scheme in Palestine and environs was clearly revealed 
in 1920 by Winston Churchill, who was to become the British Colonial. 
Secretary in 1921 : 
If, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime 
by the tanks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of 
the Briti sh Crown }'lhich might compri se three or four millions of 
Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world which 
would from every point of view be beneficial, and would be especially 
in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire . 60 
Remembering that even before the war possession of Palestine was 
considered necessary for the British Empire, a British Palestine and a 
Zionist Palestine became complementary schemesto the pro-Zioni sts in the 
British Government, the reali zation of which would put a tremendous 
weapon in the Allies' hands and, precisely in so, satisfy a British am­
bition. With the pro-Zioni sts such as Lloyd George and Balfour, the 
prospects of a Zionist scheme for Palestine, which would be used as a 
lever to bring about British control of the country, became much brighter. 
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5.rbe Suez Canal was to the British their imperial lifeline, and 
the Suez base was the hub of her regional defense . Consequently, the 
British grip over the Suez and environs remained virtually unshaken 
until 19.56 . 'lhe British favor of an autonomous Jewish national state 
in Arab Palestine was characterized publicly as a humanitarian gesture 
but was merely a camouflage for their imperialistic, strategic desire 
to fashion the Indian Ocean into a closed English sea; further, the 
establishment of a Bri tish controlled land bridge reaching from Egypt 
to British India via the areas of Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persia (Iraq ) 
and Afghanistan. Hence, Palestine as a so-called "Jewish" State was 
to become a British protectorate which i n  the process of time would 
become dissipated as Jewish strength in Palestine increased to a point 
where Br1 tish imperialism would have its regional political interests 
protected by close collaboration with the Jewish State. In essence, 
the transformation of a modus vivendi into regional military dependence 
mutuall y  collaborative in order to protect each other' s  interests. 
6see, for example , how Britain violated the territorial sovereignty 
of the Ottoman government in Desmond Stewart, 'lheodor Herzl Arti st and 
Politician, op. cit . ,  p .  305; Neville J. Mandel, "Ottoman Practice as 
Regards Jewish Settlement in Palestine: 1881-1908 , "  Middle Eastern 
Studies, January, 1975, pp. 33-46. Turkey shortly upon the outbreak 
of World War I denounced the Capitulations as violations of " the general 
principles of international law . "  See the American Journal of Inter­
national Law, VIII (October, 1914) ,  p .  873. 
?stein, op. cit . ,  p .  514. See the Wei zmann-Rothschild memorandum 
sul::mi tted to Balfour in October 3 ,  1917, for transmi ssion to the full 
British War Cabinet. 
8Historically, Syria, an integral part of the Arab World, stretched 
from the Taurus mountains on the north to Egypt on the south , with no 
intervening lingui sti c ,  natural , or racial boundaries of importance, 
and unbroken, in the nineteenth century, by anynational frontier. The 
sea on the west, the mountains on the north, the desert south and east 
gave i t  unity. But by 1922 this area had been arbitrarily carved up i n  
the acquisitive interests of Western world politics. Palestine was 
one of the fragments of the entity known as Syria. Palestinians con­
sidered themselves "Syrians" and their country as " Southern Syria" for 
at the turn of the present century the economic ,  lingual , cultural 
and ethnogenic background of the Syrians and Palestinians was identical . 
Sir Ronald Storrs wrote at the end of the First World War that, "For 
four centuries the Arabs, Moslem as well as Christian, of Syria and 
Palestine" were "one country though administratively divided into two" 
and that "Owing to the number and delicacy of international problems in 
Jerusalem, the Mutasarref, or Governor of Judea, corresponded directly 
with Constantinople ,  and not through the Vali of Syria, though Palestine 
and Syria were one mili tary command. "  See Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir 
Ronald Storrs (New York: Arno Press, 1972 ) ,  p .  370. 
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When 1 t became evident that England would carry out the Balfour policy 
to make Arab Palestine a "national home" of the Jews, the Palestinian 
people turned politically to Syria and King Fai sal for political as­
sistance . It was only on thi s desire of protection from the Zionist 
national home threat that the Palestinians joined the Syrian indepen­
dence movement w1 th Faisal as its nationalist leader. The Palestinians 
were not slow to collectively express their official disapproval of 
the "Zionist peril , "  as the people of Palestine and Syria called 
Zionism, and the policy of the Balfour Declaration, for soon after the 
meeting of the Peace Conference , Palestinian Arabs fonned a national 
Congress and on December 27, 1919, forwarded to Pari s a strong protest 
against Zionism. Part of their protest was published in the Arabic 
newspaper Mirat-ul-Gharb: " • • •  how can i t  be possible to obliterate 
our sovereignty over this land, which has lasted for 1 , 200 years, and 
while its sons are still masters of it? How can the Zionists go back 
in history two thousand years to prove that by their short sojourn in 
Palestine they have now a right to claim i t  and return to i t  as to a 
Jewish home , thus crushing the nationalism of a million (Palestinian) 
Arabs?" 
9Marvin Lowenthal , ed . ,  The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New Xork z 
Grosset and Dunlap, 1962 ) ,  pp. 139-172. Caution should be exercised 
by the reader because Lowenthal has taken pains to edit out much 
significant information from the diaries of Herzl in order to deflect 
a more historically accurate purview of the founder of "poll tical 
Zionism." See also Ma.xi.me Rodinson, I srael A Colonial-Settler State? 
(New York : Monad Press, 197J), pp. 45-48. 
10see Lowenthal , ibid . ,  pp. l?J-190, 230-275. 
ll'Ihe Capitulations topic is very complex. But generally speaking, 
the Ottoman Empire was an immense structure , governed from Istanbul . 
'!he Sultan resided over a tremendously varied population extending from 
Belgrade and Bucharest to Algeria and the Yemen. His power was sanctified, 
by Islamic religious doctrine. The minority religions, Chri stianity 
and Judaism in particular, were allowed considerable autonomy. The 
various Ottoman provinces were ruled by governors for the Sultan. 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century the preponderance of European 
power began to make i tself felt.  European merchants who had a foothold 
in the Muslim countries enjoyed an increasingly privileged position. 
European ambassadors were now ad.mi tted to the Sul tan ' s  councils and 
even began to dictate Ottoman policies. Over time the French took 
Algeria in 18)0, the British Aden in 1839, thus beginning the movement 
of direct European intervention and colonization. After a pause during 
which the European powers consolidated their indirect but effective hold 
over the whole of the Ottoman Empire, Anglo-French colonial expansion 
moved inexorably forwards: Tunisia in 188 1 ,  Egypt in 1882, the Sudan in 
1899, Libya and Morocco in 1912. At the same time the cultural inf1.uence 
of Europeans grew everywhere stronger. European powers introduced new 
political structures and interventi ons, one of which was the Capitulations. 
'!he European powers imposed restrictions on the Ottoman Empire in that 
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European subjects or nationals living in Ottoman administered provinces 
came under the forceful protective jurisdiction of the local European 
powers. '!he Sublime Porte had no administrative or sovereign jurisdiction 
over nationals of the European nations in the remaining Ottoman Empire 
nor in the Ottoman areas forcefully acquired from the Ottoman Finpire, 
such as in Egypt. 
· 
In an article written on the "Turkish Rule" period for the Encyclopedia 
Br1 tannica, 1973 edition, about Palestine, Professor Wal.id Ahmed Khalidi , 
a Palestinian Arab history scholar, wrote about the Ca.pi tulations: "In 
18J1 his (Viceroy Mohammed Ali ) armies occupied Palestine, and for nine 
years he and his son Ibrahim gave the Holy Land a fairly enlightened 
administration. '!heir tolerant rule opened the country to Western 
influences and enabled Chri stian missionaries to establish many schools 
which proved of "inestimable value in accelerating the process of modern­
ization. Whem in 1840 the British, the Austrians, and the Russians came 
to the aid of the sultan, the Egyptians were forced to withdraw and 
Palestine reverted to the Ottomans. Increased European interest, how­
ever, led to the establishment of consulates and vice-consulates by the 
powers in Jerusalem and in the ports. In the meantime, the "reforms" 
which the powers had induced the sultan to promulgate did not fail to 
improve the lot of minorities. Later the country witnessed a marked 
increase in the inflow of foreign settlements and colonies, French, 
Russian, and German. By far the most important, in spite of their 
1n1 tial numerical insignificance, were the Zionist agricultural settle­
ments which foreshadowed later Zionist endeavours for the the establi sh­
ment of a Jewish national home and still later a Jewish state in �alestine. 
'!he earliest of these settlements was established by Russian Jews i n  
1882. In 1896 Theodor Herzl issued his Der Judenstaat and advocated an 
au tonomous Jewish state • • • •  " (p.  168 ) .  
"'Ihe number of Zionist colonies, mostly subsidized by Baron F.clmond de 
Rothschild, rose from 22 to 47 from 1900 to 1918, but the majority of 
the Jews were town-dwelling, Orthodox ( Challukkah ) Jews • • • •  " (p.  168 ) .  
12Life of Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1951 ) .  Amery was the biographer 
of Chamberlain who was Colonial Secretary from 1895 to 1906 in the British 
Conservative Party government headed by Arthur James Balfour, Prime 
Minister from 1902-1905. 
13Raphael Patai , ed. , '!he Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl ( New York : 
Herzl Press and 'Ihomas Yoseloff ), p.  1361. 
14Amery, op. cit . , p .  256. '!he Rand gold mines in South Africa were 
largely controlled by Jews; on the economic prosperity of the Rand mines 
Chamberlain largely counted for the reconstruction of South Africa. Like 
his Prime Minister, Balfour, Chamberlain was concerned by the numbers 
of immigrant Jews in Britain. A concentration of Jews and Jewish money 
in Sinai or elsewhere , indebted to Britain, would serve Bri tish foreign 
policy interests ( "a Jewish colony in Sinai might prove a useful instru­
ment for extending British i nfluence into Palestine proper, when the time 
came for the inevitable di smembennent of the Ottoman Empire" (p.  261) and 
siphon off immigrants from England . 
1.5rb1.d. • p .  261. 
16In 1878, in return for a political promise of British support 
against the Russians, the Ottoman Sul tan had allowed Brita.in, as a 
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11111 tary-poli tical lase for this purpose, to administer Cyprus, which 
remained in actuality under the legal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire . 
El Ari.sh and the Sinai Peninsula were part of Egypt, whose Khedive, 
Ab'cas II, ruled a vassal state also under the legal terri tori.al 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Government. Hence, in the context of inter­
national law and the colonial willingness to violate it by the British 
Government even at this earlier time (Britain had , since 1882, been in 
illegal mili tary occupation of Egypt), neither Cyprus, Sinai nor Egypt 
was juridically a British possession at this time. By the time the 
Zionists were pressing the major powers for recogni tion of their scheme 
for the colonization of Palestine and environs (1897-1917), the Ottoman 
Empire had experienced a continual violation of its territorial 
sovereignty by the Western nations. 
17Patai , op. ci t. , p.  1361. Herzl ' s  remark to Chamberlain reveals 
his acceptance of political deception and effort to violate internation­
al law to achieve the Zionist result.  
18Amerlcan Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, Report #25, December­
January, 1975-1976, pp. 11-22. Dr Israel Shahak, chairman of the 
Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights and former inmate of the 
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in Nazi Germany, described the State 
of Israel racialist Zionist insti tutions as follows: "'!he State of Israel 
is a raci st state in the full meaning of this term : In this state people 
are di scriminated against, in the most permanent and legal way and in the 
most important areas of life, only because of their origin. This racist 
discrimination began in Zionism and i s  carried out today mainly in 
cooperation with the insti tutions of the Zionistic movement. I will 
prove this • • •  by quoting facts, laws and regulations which have force 
in Israel (and which are known really to anybody) and are enforced by 
the government • • • •  In the State of Israel , one who is not a Jew i s  
discriminated against, only because he is not a Jew • • • •  " 'Ihis citation 
originally appeared in an article wri tten for PI-Ha'aton, a weekly paper 
for the students at the Hebrew University at Jerusalem. 
See also Moshe Menuhin, The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time ( Beirut: 
'!he Institute For Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 502- 3; Israel Zangwill,  
" Mr .  Chamberlain and Zionism: Mr .  Zangwill ' s Work ('!he F.ast African 
Scheme ) , "  The Times, London , July 9 ,  11 , 18, 19141 B.  Shefi , "'!he Jewish 
Religion Abused , "  '!he Middle East International , December, 1971, pp. 31-
)4; Israel Shahak, "Letter to the &ii tor: Israeli Law, " The Middle East 
International , April ,  1976, p.  )4. Early Zioni sm had never been reluc­
tant to employ murder to achieve its national political goals in Palestine. 
'!he anti-Zionist Jew from Palestine Dr de Haan was murdered in 1924 on 
the direct orders of the Zionist Organi zation (Jewish Agency for Palestine ) .  
Dr de Haan was murdered when on the point of visiting London i n  order to 
start there a Jewish-Arab anti-Zionist movement to counter the Zionist 
movement. 
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'lhe Zionist entity in Palestine is racialist because it is  built on the 
extreme Talmudic principle which considers Jews as a super-race above 
all races and peoples. It is  racist and exclusionist because Zionist 
doctrine itself maintains that "Israel" is a state for Jews and in accor­
dance with the defintion of Halacha, that is, strict Jewish religious 
laws. A Jew is  defined as a person born of a Jewish mother or who was 
converted to Judaism in accordance with the strict ID.alacha rules. 
Strict Jewish religious law, while also secularly poll ticized by atheist 
Zionist Jewry to achieve Zionist program goals, underscores Israel ' s  
Law of Return: its legal racial provisions enact the assumption that 
the establishment of "Israel" signifies the fulfillment of a "messianic 
promise" and that the "right of 'return'" is  inherent in a divine law 
that transcends all other realities; historical processes or even the 
passage of time. According to this view, Jews the workd over possess 
a superior claim to the possession of the land of Palestine, and any 
injustice, suffering or violation that is  ca.used by Jewish settlement 
in the Arab country is  of lesser importance than the act of "reclaiming 
the Jewish People' s  'historical inheritance . ' "  The Talmud is  the 
collection of ancient Rabbinic wr1 tings consisting of the Ml.shnah and 
the Gemara, constituting the basis of religious authority for traditional 
Orthodox Judaism. Mishnah refers to the first section of the Talmud, 
comprising a collection of early oral interpretations of the ancient 
scriptures as compiled about A.D. 200. Gemara refers to the second 
part of the Talmud, consisting primarily of commentary on the Mishnah. 
For an excellent review of Israel ' s  Law of Return· and Nationality Law 
see the Middle East International, July, 1973, in which a Jewish critic 
and wr1 ter from Tel Aviv, using the pseudonym David Cohen, wr1 tes a bout 
this law. For racialist Zionist writings see Torah Judaism and the 
State of Israel by Uriel Zimmer, published in London in 1961 , in which 
at page 12 it i s  stated, "The Jewish people, Rabbi Judah Halevy ( the 
famous medieval poet and philosopher) explains in his 'Kuzari , '  constitutes 
a separate entity, a species unique in Creation, differing from nations 
in the same manner as man differs from the beast or the beast from the 
plant." Asher Ginsberg, known as Achad Ha'am, one of the philosophers 
of Zionism, stated in an article in the Gennan magazine Am Scheidewege, 
published in Berlin in 1923, volume two, page 10), the following: 
"'!he steps on the ladder of creation are :  minerals, plants, animals,  
human beings, and, at the very top, Jews. "  '!he Zionist racial philosophy 
goes further than these sample quotes but the writer suggests that those 
interested should consult Zionist writings for themselves. 
19consult 'Iheodor Herzl , L'Etat Juif, French translation (Paris:  
Lipschutz, 1926) .  
201eon Pinsker, Auto-Emancipation, French translation by J. Schul.singer 
(Cairo-Alexandria, 1944), p.  69f, 79f, 92, 94-96,  96. Weizmann insists 
that it was he and his staff who first asked the English to accept a 
protectorate role over the future Jewish State . See Trial and Error 
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will have to go the way of ante-bellum diplomacy. If we do not change 
radically our attitude toward all Asiatic races, the present war i s  
nothing to what i s  coming, and i n  the twentieth century, too . "  See 
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"Zionism To-Day, " The Yale Review, January, 1921, p .  247. 'Iheodor 
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Arabs outside Palestine circumspectly. In Herzl ' s  later draft Charter 
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36wi th regard to the words "national home , "  neither Balfour, his 
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CHAPTER V 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
BALFOUR DECLARATION 
'Ihe Balfour Declaration1 has never possessed any juridical value , 2  
although the Zionist establi shment has employed 1 t as such for the estab-
�l�.llshment of a "national home" (Jewish State) i'n Palestine, despite the 
I 
r tact that analysis of the Zionist negotiations reveals their interpre-
t tation to be in explicit error. Secondly, emanating from the British 
wartime cabinet, which at no historical time possessed any right of or 
. sovereignty over Turki sh Palestine, the declaration, even when we exclude 
its actual negotiative emendations, could not, in the context of modern 
international law, juridically recogni ze a title of sovereignty i n  favor 
of the Zionists. 3  'Ihe secret negotiating hist�ry of the declaration re­
veals that Wei zmann and the other Zionist negotiators promised the British 
Government the political support of the alleged Zionist "national.i ty" 
consti tuency of Jews in return for the political sympathy clause of the 
declaration. Temperly was most succinct and accurate when he wrote that 
the declaration "is a pledge that in return for services to be rendered 
by Jewry the British Government would 'use their best endeavours ' to 
secure the execution of a certain definite policy in Palestine" serving 
both British and Zionist aims. 4 Even though the Zionist phrase "the 
Jewish people" was used, it was clear that Weizmann and his fellow self-
appointed representatives of "the Jewish people" had no authority to 
speak for all the members of Juda.i sm, as the direct political. intercession 
of the anti-Zionist Jews reveal s . 5  Weizmann admitted this fact:  
Certain it was that Montagu' s cpposi tion, coupled with the sustained 
attacks which the tiny anti-Zionist group had been conducting for 
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months--their letters to the press, the pamphlets, some of them 
written pseudonymously by Lucien Wolf, their feverish interviews 
with Government officials--was responsible for the compromi se 
6 formula which the War Cabinet subnitted to us a few days later. 
Subsequently, Weizmann again admitted this fact tens years later 
at Czernowi tz, Roumania when he declared , "'lhe Jews, ( the Br1 tish Govern-
ment) knew, were against us; we (Zionists) stood alone on a little island, 
a tiny group of Jews • • • •  " Thus, as Mallison declared, "the claimed con­
stituency of ' the Jewish people'  was fabrication ... 7 Mallison g1 ves an 
excellent historical and juridical purview of the Zionist interpretation 
of the declaration: 
The Declaration is regarded as providing juridical authority for 
"the Jewi sh people" nationality ·clai!Jls and for the Zionist national 
home enterprise in Palesti ne . The political promise clause has been 
extrapolated concerning the Palestine Arabs as if the first safe­
guard clause did not exist. In the same way, it has been Pxtrapo-
lated as to Jews in any other country than Palestine as if the second safe­
guard clause did not exist. 'lhe foregoing summars is supported by 
an extensive and detailed Zionist interpretation. 
The reader should keep the perjurious Zionist extrapolations in 
perspective as the wrl ter analyzes the various mutational alterations of 
the declaration. An excellent point of departure from an extensive 
historical analysi s of the private negotiations i s  the Zionist prelim-
inary draft of July 12, 1917, recalling importantly that in the original 
Foreign Office draft proposal , the key words were "asylum" arrl "refuge" , 
that is,  the non�acceptance of a Jewish State or Jewish sovereignty over 
Arab Palestine. We must keep in mind that the Zionists interpreted the 
words "national home" to explicitly mean an exclusive Judenstaat over 
the Arab country and ideologically defined "the Jewish people" as pre­
viously explicated in this paper.9 In other word�, though yet in violation 
of international law as pertains to the rights of the Palestinians over 
their aged homeland, the Brl ti sh Government was prepared to arbi trarily 
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create in Arab Palestine "a sanctuary (haven) for Jews"lO who felt they 
could or did not wish to live where they already resided. Contrarily, 
Sokolov disapproved of this British draft because 1 t "would by no means 
meet the (Zionist) case . .. 11 Consequently, the Zionists prepared their 
more explicit draft requesting directly that the British Government 
(Cabinet) accept the Zionist 
• • •  principle of recogriising Palestine as the Nationa] Home of the 
Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up i ts 
national life in ?aiestine under a protection to be established at 
the conclusion of peace following upon the successful i ssue of the 
War. 12 
'Ihi s Zionist preliminary draft i s  also explicit in that i t  called 
for "the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish national! ty in Palestine, 
(and) freedom of immigration for Jews . .. 13 'Ihe Zionist draft proposal of 
July 18, 1917, requested the following concession: 
1. His Majesty's  Government accepts the ·principle that Palestine 
should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish peopl e . 14 
2. His Majesty' s Government will use its best endeavours to secure the 
achievement of this object and will discuss the necessary methods and 
means w1 th the Zionist Organization. 
The wording of this draft i s  very explicit: Arab Palestine was to 
become a Jewish State under Jewish sovereignty. In fact, this draft con-
tains three Zionist political objectives:  
1 . That Arab Palestine be "reconstituted" as the Zionists' Juden­staat without regard to the existing rights of the Palestinian Arab 
people.  
2. That all Jews (the comprehensive Zionist claimed racial entity 
of "the Jewish people" )  be recognized by"'the British governmental 
Zionists as constituting a distinct transnational racial group. 
J. That a relationship or connection be recognized between " the 
National Horne" and "the Jewish people" as a juridical precedent 
confinned in a secretly negotiated agreement. 
Radical departure from the original Zionist object! ves is quickly 
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observable :  contrary to the Zionist drafts of July 12 and July 18, the 
Weizmann-Sykes memorandum of a1:x>ut September 22, 1917 which explicitly 
renounced "a Jewish Republic" and any "other form of State in Palestine or 
any part of Palestine . "  . 'Ibis was a drastic change in the earlier demanded15 
Zionist political endeavour to have Britain ac�ept the Zionist thesis of 
"Palestine being reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people" 
and " secure the achievement of this ( Zionist) object . "  Weizmann wrote in 
his diary the following: 
A comparison of the two texts--the one approved by the Foreign Office 
and the prime minister, and the one adopted on October 4, after 
Montagu' s  attack--shows a painful recession from what the government 
itself was prepared to offer . • • •  We, . on our part, examined and re­
examined the formula (of October 4) ,  comparing the old text with the 
new. We saw the differences only too clearly, but we did not dare 
to occasion further delay by pressing for the original fonnula ,  
which represented. not only our wishes, but the attitude of the members 
of the government . 16 
Here we have Weizmann ' s  own direct admission of the radical difference 
between the earliest Zionist draft proposals and the rescinded government 
offer, which expressly denied Palestine as the contemplated Jewish State • 
. 
'Ihe Balfour draft of August, prepared by James Balfour but adopting 
the phraseology from the earlier Zionist draft of July 18, represented 
in summary the governmental Zionists' acceptance of Zionist political 
objectives, including the comprehensive territorial objective of Wei zmann-
Sokolov-Lord Rothschild in Palestine, that is, Zionist Jewry sovereignty 
over Palestine. The Balfour draft stated the following: 
His Majesty' s  Government accept the principle that Palestine should 
be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people and will 
use their best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object 
and will be ready to consider any suggestio�s on the subject which 
the Zionist Organization may desire to lay before them . lr 
'!his Balfour draft, which was not subnitted to the Cabinet because 
it was thought likely to be rejected, 18 represented Balfour' s  accep-
. . � , 
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'rtance of Zionist objectives requested in their July 18 draft ( that 
'I "Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish 
people" ) ;  in essence, that Palestine would become the Jewish State . 
Analysis reveals that the key words in Balfour' s  draft are taken directly 
from the earlier Zionist draft. Consequently, the Milner governmental 
draft was prepared to replace the non-subni ttea Balfour draft. It read: 
His J1ajesty ' s  Government accepts the principle that every opportunity 
should be afforded for the establi shment of a home for the Jewish 
people i n  Palestine, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any 
suggestions on the subject which the Zionist Organization may desire 
to lay before them .19 
To Milner i s  accredited the remark that, "If the Arabs think that 
Palestine will become an Arab country, they are very much mistaken . .. 2o 
'lbe War Cabinet, according to the minutes ,  met September 3rd to discuss 
the Milner draft declaration. Lloyd George and · Balfour, both Zionist 
sympathizers, were absent from thi s meeting. Even though the Milner draft 
delineated a signif'icant retreat from the Zionist political objectives, i t  
was not the rebuke to them that subsequent developments created for the 
Zionist negotiators. The Milner draft i s  significant for many changes 
from the Balfour and Zionist drafts: 1 )  '!he wording was now "a home" 
rather than "the national home" ; 2) rather than "secure" the achievement 
of "reconstituting" Palestine as "the national home of the Jewish people , "  
Br1 tain would "facilitate" the achievement of simply affording "every 
opportunity" for the "establishment of a home in Palestine" ; J )  The Zionist 
"opportunity should" be afforded "in" Palestine rather than "rt.constituting" 
Palestine as "the national home" of the Jewish people,  thus denying that 
Palestine belonged to the Zionists or to the Jews; 4) the wording "best 
endeavours" was repeated but in the usage of a reduced set of Zionist 
political objectives. On the other hand, the Milner draft did not contain 
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any direct wording to the "non-Jewish" population of Palestine; at this 
point no safeguard clauses ,  either for "the Jews" or Palestinian Arabs, 
were added. We must recall that Lord Milner, Minister without Portfolio 
and a Gentile governmental. Zionist, considered the words "reconstituted" 
and "secure" of the unaccepted Balfour draft much too strong. The Zionists 
were still at this pivotal point not willing ·to accept the Cabine t ' s  re­
treat from their objectives manifested in their own drafts and Balfour ' s  
draft. 
'!he War Cabinet, meeting on September 3 to consider the Milner 
draft, deferred its deci sion because Lloyd George and Balfour were absent, 
because of Montagu 0 s  vehement attack of the pro-Zionist draft, and because 
"It was suggested that a question raising such important issues as to the 
future of Palestine ought, in the first instance, to be discussed with (the) 
Allies, and more particularly with the United .States . , • •  1121 Montagu 
voiced strong objections to any declarations in which i t  was stated that 
Palestine was the "national h?me" of the Jewish peopl e .22 '!he Z.ionists, 
although now hard-pressed by anti-Zionist opposition, after the 'Shelv:lng 
of the Milner draft were not yet prepared to accept defeat of their 
objectives (recall the Zionist drafts of July 12 and 18 and the withdrawn 
"Balfour draft" of August). · Weizmann recognized "the implacability of 
his opposition, 1123 that i s ,  Montagu who "astounded the Cabinet. n24 
Ironically, the posture of the Zioni sts i s  revealed in Weizmann° s "chagrin" 
at the Cabinet for "the attention paid • • •  to a handful of assimilated 
Jews. "2.5 He even castigated the Conjoint Committee of representatives, 
the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the Board of Deputies as consisting of 
"old-fashioned, well-to-do assimilationist Jews. 1126 M:mtagu critically 
attacked the Cabinet members on grounds of their "anti-semi tism" and 
vehemently retorted that the Zionist, Balfour and Milner draft proposal s 
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were not acceptable to the Jews. 27 'lhe key to understanding the political 
pressure techniques crucial to the Zionists in overriding the powerful op-
position of the Montagu group by the pro-Zioni sts in the War Cabinet 
canes from 'Neizmann' s diary: 
I added (in cable to Brandeis on September 19th) that the opposition 
of the assimilationists (Jews) was to be '  expected and that i t  would 
be of great assistance if the text of this declaration ( the Zionist 
draft of July 18th) received the support of President Wilson and of 
Brandeis . 1128 
Secondly, 
At the same time we were doin� our best to counteract the activities 
of the assimilationists (Jews), who were attacking us in • • •  pamphlets, 
in the press, and in person-to-person propaganda, as well as in the 
cabinet.?9 . 
On September 18, Weizmann received a letter from Lord Rothschild 
stating an undesirable ominous to Zionist plans: 
Do you remember I said to you in London, as soon as I saw the announce­
ment in the paper of Montagu's appointment, that I was afraid we were 
done. 0 30 
In planning their poll tical assault against the Montagu group, 
Weizmann and Mark Syke s, th: pro-Zionist Secretary of the War Cabinet, 
collaborated on a memorandum which was di stributed to the Cabinet members 
before the issues involved in a declaration were discussed again .  Before 
that memorandum is reproduced here , we must retain in mind the political 
objective of the Zionist negotiators and their treacherous guile in the 
face of the active anti-Zionist opposition. 31 'lhe first installment of 
explicit Zionist duplicity during the declaration ' s  negotiations occurred 
in the Weizmann-Sykes memorandum of September in which the Zionists 
"specified" what they were and were not asking for 1 
What the Zionists do not want i s 1  
I .  To have any special political hold on the old city o f  Jerusalem 
itself or any control over the Chri stian or Moslem Holy Places. 
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II. To set up a Jewish Republic or other form of State in Palestine 
or any part of Palestine. 
III. To enjoy any special rights not enjoyed by other inhabi tants 
of Palestine. 
On the other hand, the Zionists do want: 
I .  Recogni tion of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine as a national 
unit, federated with [? otherj national uni ts in Palestine. 
II. '!he recognition of [the] right of bo�a fide Jewish settlers to 
be included in the Jewish national unit. in Palestine. 32 
'Ihe retreat from the original Zionist draft proposal is indeed 
perceptively striking; the Zionists renounced "a Jewish Republic" or any 
"fom of (Jewish) State in Palestine or any part of Palestine . "  Weizmann ' s  
object, because of the effective anti-Zionist Montagu group, 33 was to have 
the Cabinet agree to some kind of a declaration. If Weizmann' s  memorandum 
was to reassure Montagu and the other anti-Zionist Jews'.34 to accept a 
' 
pro-Zionist declaration, it was a complete failure as the Milner-Amery 
draft (which replaced the Milner draft) of October 4th will shortl y reveal . 
Another significant aspect of the Weizmann-Sykes memorandum i s  that in 
denying or retreating from the Zionist scheme for Jewish homeland or 
. 
nation (Weizmann' s  exact expression was "Jewish Republic or other form 
of State in Palestine or any part of Palestine" )  in Palestine, Wei zmann 
(Sykes also) was perfidious; for, as Weizmann declared in his diary, 
'Ihe first full-dress conference leading to the Balfour Declaration 
took place at the home of Dr. Gaster on the morning of February 17, 
1917 • • • •  'Ihe discussions touched on several points which were to con­
stitute the heart of the problem in the ensuing months • • • •  Second, 
the term "nation," as applied to the emergent Jewish homeland in 
Palestine , referred to the Jewish homeland alone, and in no wise 
to the relationship of Jews with the lands in which they lived . 
So much was made clear by Herbert Samuel . To this I added that the 
Jews who went to Palestine would go to constitute a Jewish nation, 
not to become Arabs or Druzes or Englishmen.?5 
In essence, regardless of the political and juridical nullities 
proscribing the Judenstaat scheme, Weizmann and Zionism would simply 
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ignore the proscriptions designated in the declaration. '!he Milner-
Amery draft of October 4 reflects the critical impact of Montagu' s 
implacable anti-Zionism and the failure of the Zionists, both Jewish 
and Gentile, to cast aside his objections: 
His Majesty ' s  Government views with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race and will use its 
best endeavours to facili tate the achievement of this object, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may pre­
judice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com­
muni ties in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed 
in· any other country by such Jews who �re fully contented with their 
exi sting nationality and citizenship . 36 
Amery, 37 an assistant secretary of the War Cabinet, has written 
that before the October 4 Cabinet meeting, he was pri va�ely asked by 
Lord Milner, a member of the Cabinet, to draft " something which would 
go a reasonable distance to meeting the objections, both Jewi sh and pro­
Arab, without impairing the substance of the proposed Declaration . .. JB 
Since Amery' s draft included the addition of the two safeguard clauses 
(these not being in the August Milner draft) ,  Mi.lner' s private request 
to Amery was obviously inco�sistent and unintelligible because the Zionist 
demands (of sovereignty in a Jewish State over Palestine) were di chotomous 
to the anti-Zionist and pro-Arab objections of the previous drafts. '!he 
Milner-Amery draft reveals, with the ad.di tion of the two safeguard 
clauses for anti-Zionist Jews and "non-Jewi sh communities in Palestine" 
(that is ,  the majority Palestine ' s  Arab Christian and Muslim people 
along with other minority Palestine groups), an ad.di tional retreat from 
the original. Zionist draft proposal and a failure of the Weizmann-
Rothschild-Sykes memorandum of October 3 that the declaration "would 
be considered in the light of (British) Imperial interests," Stein, 
the English-Zionist (Jewish) historian of the Balfour Declaration said 
of the Milner-Amery draft: 
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The progressive watering down of the formula sul:mitted by Rothschild 
in July, and in substance accepted at the time by Balfour (in the 
Balfour draft), was clearly a response, not only to the pressure of the 
Jewish anti-Zionists, but also to reminders that in dealing with the 
Palestine question there were other claims and inte:irests to be con­
sidered besides those of the Jews . 39 
Weizmann' s  diary appraisal of the Milner-Amery draft i s  caustically 
recorded in his letter of October 7 to Philip Kerr, Lloyd George ' s  
secretary, when he wrote , "�xpressing my chagrin and bewilderment at the 
attenti9n paid by the British government to a handful of assimilated 
Jews. 040 It is precisely because of the Cabinet' s  refusal to accept the 
Zionist claimed constituency of "the Jewish people" or Weizmann' s Zionist 
attitude that assimilated Jewish national� counted for nothing (when 
actually they represented an anti-Zionist majority) that the Cabinet in-
serted the safeguard phrase "it being clearly understood that nothing shall 
be done which may prejudice the • • •  rights and political status enjoyed in 
any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing 
nationality and citizenship."  We must recall that the Zionist negotiators 
arbitrarily spoke and acted in.behalf of the Zionist claimed constituency 
of "the Jewish people" and that the British governmental pro-Zionists 
did not unequivocally curtail his claimed authority as "spokesman" for 
"the Jewish people" until anti-Zionist British Jewry entered into the 
negotiations and made it  vehemently clear that Weizmann lacked authority 
to speak for or represent anti-Zionist Jews. (Despite the specific 
safeguard. clause one of the inane anomalies of Zionism is that it  still 
provides "juridical authority" for "the Jewish people" nationality claims, 
although this was specifically rejected by the Declaration ' s  second safe­
guard clause . )  Weizmann explicitly ad.mi ts, recalling the original 
Zionist draft proposals (and Balfour' s  draft which iterated the Zionist 
drafts), that "the draft adopted on October 4 • • •  shows a painful re­
cession from what the government i tself was· prepared to offer, 041 that 
is, to the Zionists that "Palestine should be reconstituted as the National 
Home of the Jewish people" and that Zionists spoke for all world Jewry. 
'lbe reader should also recall that in the Declaration of the Establish-
ment of the State of Israel (1948) the Zionists! despite the explicit 
denial of their "the Jewish people" claim in ,the second safeguard clause , 
still arrogated to themselves that, "This right eof the Jewish people to 
national rebirth i n  its own-· country� was recognised in the Balfour 
Declaration • • • •  " The Zionist state establi shment Declaration also , des-
pite the denial. i n  the Balfour Declaration phraseology, speciously 
stated that "the Balfour Declaration • • •  gave international sanction to • • •  
the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home . "  Zionists' 
subversions and distortions of th� Balfour Declaration are not really so 
strange. While Weizmann would declare that the Zionist negotiators and 
Organi zation ("We") "examined and reexamined the formula (of October 4) ,  
comparing the old text with the new"42 and that 
. 
We saw the di fferences only too clearly, but . • •  did not dare to occasion 
further delay by pressing fo� the original (Zionist) formula, which represented • • •  our wishes • • • •  3 
while Weizmann would ask as a change i n  the .Milner-Amery draft, 
Instead of the establishment of a Jewi sh National Home, would i t  not 
be more desirable to use the word "re-establishment"? By thi s small 
alteration the historical connection with the ancient tradition would 
be indicatml • • • •  May I also suggest "Jewish people" instead of "Jewish 
Race" , • • • •  
though the Cabinet would deny the change to "re-establi shment , "  and while 
Weizmann intensively shifted Zionist tactics :from the private negotiating 
forum to the poll tical one of Jewish-Zionist pres.sure group tactics45 
on the Cabinet and Foreign Office on October 11 (this political pressure 
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device would also fail) ,  Weizmann would later pacify his "chagrin" of 
failure and disappointment at the Declaration by subsequently developing 
a personal interpretation which satisfied hims "It would mean exactly what 
we would make i t  mean--nei ther more nor less . .. 46 
Relevant to this chapter is the intriguing deception of Leopold 
Amery, whose scandalous official conduct in support of Zionism included 
treasonable acts because they aggravated the difficult and dangerous 
situation of the British army in Palestine which was being subjected to 
incessant assaults from Jewish terrorists. When, on May 11, 1940, the 
Chamberlain government was replaced by Winston Churchill ' s  election, 
the Zionists felt much as they did when. the Asquith government was re-
placed by that of their exponent Lloyd George , for on December 17, 1939, 
before Weizmann left for the United States from Portugal , Churchill agreed 
with Weizmann that after the Second World War a Jewish State of three or 
four million Jews should be created in Arab Palestine,47 another obvious 
violation of the Palestine Mandate· responsibility. Weizmann' s  immediate 
. 
objective was a Jewish army in Palestine. 
A brief review of the pro-Zionist collaboration of important 
British officials in violation of the administration of the Mandate re-
veals the extraordinary behavior normally considered scandalous, improper 
and treasonable.48 Amery was directly active in this role and the role 
of Amery leads us to Orde Wingate, an English Zionist who was assigned 
to an intelligence unit at Haifa, Palestine in the autumn of 1937.49 As 
previously stated, an immediate objective was a Palestine Jewish amy 
which Weizmann had privately discussed with Sir .F.clmund Ironside, Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, Churchill and other select British officials. 
Captain Wingate' s  biographer records that from November of 1939, Wingate ,  
11 1 
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Blanche Dugdale and another prominent English Jewish Zionist, Victor 
Cazalet, Member of Parliament, met frequently at Cazalet' s country home . 
It was Cazalet who introduced Wingate to the Zionist Leopold Amery, 50 
whose close friendship with Churchill can not be disputed through 1940. 51 
Keeping in mind that Amery' s draft proposal of October 4 included the 
two safeguard clauses, one of which protect�d the rights of the Pales­
tinians to their country, 'his role of quietly assisting the Zionists 
becomes, to say the least, intrinsic and furtive. In July, 1940, at a 
meeting of the Middle Ea.st Commi ttee of the British Cabinet, Amery sug­
gested to General Raining, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Sta.ff under 
Sir Edmund Ironside, that Wingate be used in the Middle Ea.st. On July 
15 Weizmann, seeking a Palestine Jewish army and Wingate1s assi stance in 
Palestine, had an interview with Haining, the result of which Haining 
promised to telegraph General Sir A .  P .  Waveii , British Commander-in­
Chief of Middle Ea.st (1939-1941 ) ,  urging him "to get on with the training 
of cadres of Jewish ( Zionist) officers and N .  C .  Os . 052 Mrs. Dugdale '  s 
diary reveals an elated but solemn Weizmann returning from a similarly 
successful mission with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and other 
private parlor meetings with the backstairs pro-Zionists Lewis Namier 
and Wingate�3 Subsequently, the appointment of the new Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill , upset the plans of Weizmann and 
Wingate • .54 Dill felt that Wingate would be of more significant help in 
the war cause in Allied operations against Italian Ea.st Africa; hi s in­
structions also added the stipulation that because of Wingate' s  pro­
Zionism and willingness to violate direct mill ta.ry orders he "was pro­
hibi ted from going to Palestine for any reason whatever, either on duty 
or on leave . "  55 An enraged Wingate asked Weizmann to demand a Jewish 
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army from Churchil l .  Churchill hesitated · to assent immediately to the 
formation of a Jewish army although his consent to recruitment was given 
in September of 1940. 56 Instead, the British armed and trained a force 
of Jewish " special constables" which numbered nearly 16, 000 by 1941 . 
Amery ' s  officious help in the above synopsized proceedings harkens 
back to an earlier period, that is, the Fir�t World War and the Balfour 
Declaration negotiations. 57 Amery ' s  contribution of the so-called safe­
guard ciauses would a�pear to have been sincerely made to protect the 
rights of the Palestinian Arabs in their country. 'Ihis i s  not actually 
the case because he wrote one year later: 
The population of Palestine will consist in the main of two elements: 
Palestinian Arabs and the Jews. The former are closely linked up by 
every sort of affiliation with the Arabs across the Jordan who are 
to form part of the Arab State. It i s  essential for the pGace and 
good government both of Palestine and of the Arab State that Arab 
questions should be handled in the same spirit and on parallel lines 
on both sides of the Jordan. On the other hand the Jewish settle­
ment of Palestine i s  not likely in the long run to be confined to 
Palestine in the narrower sense. It i s  sure to spread not only into 
the trans-Jordan country, but to Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Near 
East generally • • • •  .58 
Although the Bri tish had set up a military ad.ministration i n  
Palestine i n  1918, i t  was not known what decision the victorious Allies 
would enact as to the future status of the country; although the first 
safeguard clause of the declaration, authored by Amery, explicitly stated 
111 t being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice 
the civil and religious rights of the existing (Palestinian Arab) communi-
ties in Palestine , "  Amery furtively backed a Jewish State over Palestine, 
that the Arab State would be formed i n  the " trans-Jordan country" and 
that eventually the Jews would expand into Egypt,: Mesopotamia, the Near 
Fast and Trans-Jordan (Jordan ) thereby expanding the Jewish State in time 
to these ad.di tional areas. Amery i s  obviously incredibly surreptitious 
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because he explicitly understood that the Zionist negotiators, especially 
Weizmann, wanted an exclusive Jewish State over Palestine; moreover, /unery 
speaks of an "Arab State" in Transjordan but suggests that in time Jewish 
settlement in the "Arab State" area would convert i t  into part of the 
expansive Jewish State . Consequently, what becomes of the national , 
"civil and religious rights" of the Arab people i n  the "Arab State" if, as 
N.nery projected, the Zionist goal of an exclusivist and expanded " Jewish" 
State . encroaches into t})e "Arab State" area! 
Weizmann may have expressly recognized that the Milner-/unery 
draft could be interpreted to "cripple" Zionism ' s  actual ceniiral political­
national objective� in Palestine , 59 · but _as both he and A!nery furtively con­
strued, the Zionists would simply ignore and violate the first safeguard 
clause , as the following three decades would vividly reveal . When Weizmann, 
on October 9 , telegraphed the Mi.lner-/unery draft to /unerican Zionist lead-
er Brandeis in /unerica, Brandeis and his Zionist associates disagreed with 
the draft on two points: 1 )  They disliked the phrase " by such Jews who are 
fully contented with their e:X:i.sting nationality and citizenship , "  prefer­
ring "the rights and civil political status enjoyed by Jews i n  any other 
country" ; 60 2) Brandeis suggested the change of " Jewish race" to " Jewish 
peopl e " .  6i These changes were made in the final draft. 
The most significant feature of the final draft was that the 
Zionists failed to receive Cabinet assent to any of their three central 
political objectives in their July draft proposai . 62 Even more signifi-
cantly, the second safeguard clause was to undergo a drastic chang,e i n  
its wording as a result o f  Brandei s '  suggestion ; _  the final draft o f  the 
second safeguard was strengthened by eliminating reference to Jews in 
countries other than Palestine who were "fully contented with 
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their existing nationality, " and making the second safeguard applicabl e ,  
w1 thout exception, to "Jews in any other country" than Palestine . In 
essence , Britain would apply on October )1 , 1917, what the American 
Government belatedly declared in November of 1959 that "other governments 
are fully aware that the United States Government does not condone the 
invol�tary identification of its (Jewish) citizens with a foreign state11 ; 63 
and reaffirmed on April 20, 1964, when the Department of State said i t  
"does- rtot regard the ' Jewish people '  concept as a concept of international 
law • .,64 Another way of expressing the Zionist concept i s  what the final 
second safeguard means and protects against in the ongoing sixty-nine 
year old Zionist ideological objective·: Can a Jewish American, as an 
example, claim the Jewish "nationality" that Zionism contends he possesses 
(even though he does not in fact assert i t ) ,  and at the same time, remain 
compatible with those citizenship obligation& and rights imposed by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States? Zionism maintained that their 
concept of a continuing "Jewish people" throughout the history of mankind 
was implicitly (note, not exi>licitly) recognized in the Declaration. This 
view has ignored the second safeguard provi sion of the Declaration, "It 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice 
the • • •  rights and political status of Jews in any other country • .. 65 'Ihis 
provision was specifically designed to avoid the juridical and political 
cons·aquences of the involuntarily encompassing "Jewish people" nationality 
concept which violates the legal tenets of nationality status in inter­
national law. 66 
Consequently, the Balfour Declaration and later international 
instruments, such as th' Covenant and Mandate for Palestine ( July 24, 1922) 
denied the Zionists juridical authority for "the Jewish people" trans-
12.5 
national nationality claims. 'Ihe safeguard clauses of these instruments 
are so unequivocal that they can only be interpreted as prohibiting the 
Zionist claims.67 Moreover, in tenns of contemporary nationality law 
the Zionist claim to represent a "Jewish nation" in which every Jew is  
and remains a de facto natural citizen until he claims it de jure i s  
unprecedented, without legal foundation in in��rnational law.68 
Consequently, how is it juridically possible that the notion of 
a continuing "Jewish people" throughout the history of mankind, rejected 
in the Declaration, could be,  the Zionists argue, implicitly recqgnized 
in the Declaration? Ironically, this opprobrious Zionist ascription was 
. . 
rejected in the final declaration as aresult of the direct intervention 
of the American Zionists led by Brandeis. Despite Zionism ' s  latter de-
sires to simply ignore the Cabinet' s rejection of their "Jewish people" 
concept in the second safeguard, ironically, · ·it was Weizmann himself who 
accepted this rejection69 by writing to the Cabinet70 after October 4 
(the intent to i ssue the Milner-Amery draft proposal remained after this 
date) ,  that 
in order to avoid any misunderstanding I respectfully suggest that 
the �art of the declaration in question (the safeguard pertaining to 
Jews) be replaced by the following words: ' the rights and political 
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country of which they are loyal 
citizens . ' 71 
Weizmann explicitly agreed to the rejection of "the Jewish people" 
Zionist negotiation objective , 72 Even if Weizmann was attempting a vague 
nuance by adding "of which they {Jews) are loyal citizens" (which was not 
included in the change telegraphed by Brandeis to him), he again failed 
because the Cablnet accepted the unequivocal Brandeis recommendation "the 
rights and civil poll ti cal status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. "  73 
It is  significant to note that Brandeis and Balfour considered {Weizmann 
continued to adhere to Jewish State ulterior motives in violation of the 
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declaration and Mandate) the issuance of the declaration not to be the 
end of Zionism ' s  plot for a Jewish State . 74 American Zionist aims were 
outlined to Balfour during a private session among him, Felix Frankfurter, 75 
Lord Eustace Percy, 76 and Brandeis . 77 Brandeis explicitly stated to Balfour: 
First, that Palestine should be the Jewish homeland and not merely 
that there be a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 'lbat, he assumed, 
is the commitment of the Balfour Declaration and will, of course , 
be confirmed by the Peace Conference . 78 
Brandeis was seriously in error; a Jewish sovereignty over Arab 
Palestine was not the commitment of the declaration. 
Under the direct insistence of anti-Zionist Jews in Britain, 
among other reasons, the framers of the declaration recognized that the 
nationalist aspirations of some Jews could endanger the rights and politcal 
status of anti-Zionist Jewry--those who did not seek an involuntary trans-
formation of their religious commitment into a nationalist political com­
mitment, nor jeopardize their political rights in their respective countrie s .  79 
Chaim Weizmann, the Zionists' leading negotiator, has stated : 
But we have never wanted Palestine for the Zionists; we wanted 
Palestine for the Jews. .'l'he development of Palestine Jewry i s  not 80 a party affair .  'lbe Balfour Declaration i s  addressed to all Jewry. 
By the mere acceptance of the declaration by the Bri tish Cabinet 
and, in 1924, by the United States i n  the Anglo-American Conventi on which 
incorporated the entire declaration, the political Zionist definition of 
"the Jewi sh people" was not introduced into customary international law; 
Zionism simply succeeded in publicly distorting the religi osity of Jewish 
terminology. 81 Not coincidentally, while the language of this concept 
was studiously vague , neither on the British governmental pro-Zionist 
nor on the Zionist side was there any dispositio�, at the time, to probe 
deeply into thP. meaning of "the Jewi sh people"--still less was there any 
agreed interpretation. 82 But the Zionist misuse of the declaration i s  
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typical because Zionism ' s  interpretation intentionally ignores the safe-
guards and deliberately treats the declaration as consisting only of the 
"favour" clause which i s  only a "declarati on of sympathy with Jewish 
Zionist aspirations. "  It should be noted that, despite the Cabine t ' s 
denial and rejection of "the Jewish people" concept--to which the Zionists 
assented in the final draft of the declaration83�-neither the Zionist 
Organization nor the State of Israel , which controls the World Zionist 
Organization, has ever acc�pted any limitation on the Zionist conceptual 
membership in "the Jewish people" .  84 As for example, i n  December, 1961, 
Israel declared : 
'Ibe connection between the Jewi sh people and the State of Israel 
constitutes an integral part of the Law of Nations* • • • •  The Balfour 
Declaration and the Palestine Mandate given by the League of Nati ons 
to Great Bri tain constituted an international recognition of the 
Jewish people • • • •  85 
Between October 4 and November 2,  ensuing Zionist political pres-
sure tactics by Weizmann reveal Zionism ' s  critical concern that the Milner-
Amery draft, without substantial changes and retaining the safeguards, 
would become the final Cabinet declaration. The political pressure tac-
tics failed to produce a statement consistent with Zionist objectives of 
(1) "Palestine being reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish 
people, 1186 (2) recognition of "the Jewi sh people" concept. 87 Weizmann 
understood the distinction between the Balfour draft (which was actually 
the earlier Zionist draft) and the Milner-Amery draft : 
• • •  the one adopted on October 4, after Montagu's attack--shows a pain­
ful recession from what the Government i tself was prepared to offer88 
*concerning the Zionist alleged historic title and right to 
Palestine i t  i s  significant that an Israeli legal writer, Yehuda 
Blum, does not even mention the Balfour Declaration in a book deal­
ing with historic titles :  Historic T.itles in International Law 
( 'Ibe Hague , 1965) .  
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which to the Zionists were demands listed above. Whatever his subsequent 
vacillation, 89 he declared that "we did not dare to occasion further delay 
by pressing for the original (Zionist) formula"; 90 hence, Weizmann did 
accept the declaration with both safeguard clauses and a substantiaJ. 
weakening of the " sympathy" clause in which the Cabinet "view(ed) with 
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people" rather than "accept the principle that Palestine should be recon-
sti tuted· as the national home of the Jewish people . "  At the Cabinet meet-
ing of October J1,  Lord Curzon succinctly stated the difference between 
the original Zionist demands and what they were to get; he 
recognized that some expression of sympathy with Jewish aspirat.ions 
would be a valuable adjunct to our propaganda, though • • •  we should be 
guarded in the language used in giving expressi0n to such sympathy.91 
The actual declaration i tself is prefaced in the Balfour l e tter 
to Lord Rothschild as a "declaration of sympathy, " not a governmental 
"promi se. 1192 'Ihe writer is not splitting a fine hair. There is a world 
of difference between an agreement explicitly specifying a "promi se" and 
one declaring " sympathy" with ·a cause. To promise i s  to pledge; to sym-
pathize i s  to commiserate. The difference is much too obvious; Weizmann 
perceptively understood it as the "painful recession" in which "We saw the 
differences only too clearl y . "  The sympathy expression, i n  contrast t o  the 
more specific desire for a Cabinet principle, commitment, or promise should 
be quickly observable : the sympathy clause promises nothing. 
'!be interesting question remains as to why, if the Zionists' cen-
tral political objectives were rejected by the Cabinet (asswning theoreti-
cally that the Cabinet pro-Zionists empathized wi �h Zionist politi cal de­
sires) the Cabinet issued .a declarati on? The answer i s  quite simple :  The 
British Government in the midst of the world war received some propaganda 
benefits from the declaration93 (except in the Arab lands where every at-
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tempt was made to suppress its publication94), and the Briti sh for -post-
war imperial reasons symbiotically used but subtended the Zionist scheme 
in Palestine . And Zionist leadership used the declaration as a hook on 
which to hold the Middle East policies of successive British Governments . 
'!his debunks the proposition that the British had any sort of altrui stic 
motivation to assist Zionist political goal s .  The Cabinet, in fact, 
after careful consideration of six drafts and both Jewish anti-Zionist 
and Zipnist memorandum , issued a declaration which met Jewish anti-Zionist 
criticisms, including the protection of the rights of the Arab Palestinian 
people, and repudiated Zionist ones. This indicates that the Cabinet, 
. . 
as a result of the intervention of the anti-Zionists, probed far ·too 
deeply from the Zionist standpoint and rejected the Zionist objectives 
with deliberation and preci sion, though some of the Cabinet members may 
have been chagrined, such as Balfour.95 
'Ihe year 1917 was a grave one for the Allies. 'Ihe Russian :revo-
lution weakened and jeopardized the fight against the Central Powers on 
the eastern front, and the Germans were about to transfer divisions from 
the Russian to the western front before the United States sent soldiers 
to France. No·t ignoring the fact of' postwar British imperial aims in 
the eastern Mediterranean, 96 William Ormsby-Gore, 97 Parliamentary Under 
Secretary for the Colonies, wrote a memorandum on the origins of the 
declaration for Churchil l ,  then Secretary of State for the Coloni e s :  
'!he earliest document is a letter dated 24th April 1917 in which a 
certain Mr Hamilton suggested that a Zionist mission should be sent 
to Russia for propaganda purposes. It is clear that at that stage ( Britain) • • •  were mainly concerned with the question of how Russia 
(then in the first stages of revoluti on) was to be kept in the ranks 
of the Allies. At the end of April the Foreign Office were con-
sul ting the British Ambassador at Petrograd as to the possible effect 
in Russia of a declaration by the Entente of sympathy for Jewish 
national aspirations. The idea was that such a declaration might 
counteract Jewish pacifi st propaganda in Russia. 
r 1  
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In the same month (April 1917) Mr. Balfour, then Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, went on his official mission to the Uni ted States [' to scpeme out ways of co-operating with them in prosecuting the 
war' . 1 J 'Ihe Foreign Office note observes that 'during this visit 
the policy of the declaration as a war measure seems to have taken 
more definite shape ' .  It was supposed that American opinion might 
be favourably influenced if (Britain) gave an assurance that the 
return of the Jews to Palestine had become a purpose of British 
policy.98 ( Original document. )  
On June 13, 1917, Sir Ronald Graham, 99 Assistant Under Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, prepared a memorandum to Lord Hardinge , 
permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs : 
We ought therefore to secure all the political advantage we can out 
of our connection with Zionism and there i s  no doubt that thi s 
ad.van�� will be considerable, especially in Russia • • •  I submit 
for consideration that the moment has come when we might meet the 
100 . wishes of the Zionists. . . .  . 
Synopti cally, the minutes of the War Cabinet session of September 
3 report that in consideration of a proposal declaration (another draf't) ,  
Lord Robert Cecil , the Acting Secretary of State · for Foreign Affairs, 
who was replacing Balfour temporarily because the latter was in the United 
States, declared : 
'Ihere was a very strong and 0enthusiastic organization (the Zionists), 
more particularly in the United States ( the Provisional Commission 
for General Zionist Affairs), who were zealous in thi s matter (of a 
declarati on), and his belief was that i t  would be of most substantial 
assistance to the Allies to have the earnestness and enthusiasm of 
these (Zionists) people enlisted on our side . To do nothing was to 
risk a direct break with them • • • •  101 
On October 4 Balfour discussed the need for a declaration with the 
Cabinet members: 
• • •  that the Gennan Government were making great efforts to capture 
the sympathy of the Zionist Movement. 'Ihis Movement • • •  had behind 
it the support of • • •  Jews • • •  in Russia and America, and possibly in 
other countries. 102 
After the October 4 Cabinet session, at which a declaration was 
avoided , Ronald Graham addressed a memorandum to Balfour: 
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regretting the Cabinet' s delay in giving an assurance to the Zionists 
as this delay would throw them into the anns of the Gennans. The 
moment • • •  this assurance i s  granted the Zionist Jews are Pf5Rared to 
start an active pro-Ally propaganda throughout the world. J 
Balfour gave attention to thi s request during the Cabinet session 
of October 3 1 :  
If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal , w e  should 
· be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and 
America. 104 
Lord _ Curzon agreed with Balfour : 
However, he recognized that some expre ssion of sympathy with Jewish 
aspirations would be a valuable adjunct to our propaganda ,  though . . .  
we should be guarded in the language used in giving expression to 
such sympathy. 105 
Firsthand confirmation does not preclude the Zionist historical 
source of Samuel Landman, a leader of the Zionist-Revisionists and secre-
tary of the World Zionist Organization from 1917 to 1922, who stated : 
After an understanding had been arrived at between Sir Mark Sykes and 
Weizmann and Sokolow, i t  was resolved to send a secret message to 
Justice Brandeis that the British Cabinet would help the Jews to gain 
Palestine in return for active Jewish sympathy and for support in the 
U.S.A.  for the Allied cause, so as to bring about a radical pro-Ally 
tendency in the United States. 106 
Secret messages were also sent in cipher through the Foreign 
Office to the Zionist leaders in Russia to obtain their supportfor the 
Allied cause . Messages were also sent to Jewish leaders in neutral 
countries in order to strengthen the pro-Ally sympathies of Jews everywhere. 
The Zionists had accurately foreseen their way to Palestine, an objective 
which they had found impossible "to sunnount by ordinary political means" 
prior to the world war. 107 Herzl ' s  prophecy that the Zionists would get 
Palestine "not from the goodwill but from the jealousy of the Powers, " 108 
was being made to come true in the close wartime collaboration between 
the British officials and the pro-Ally based Zionists in England. Lastly, 
the October J1 session of the Cabinet authorized Balfour not to declare 
Jewish or Zionist· acqui sition of sovereignty over Arab Palestine or the 
/ 
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grant of sovereignty over the land to "the Jews11 109 but to make "the 
following declaration of sympathy with the Zionist aspirations" to Lord 
Rothschild the nominal head of Zionism in England. Early in 1923, the 
Duke of Devonshire, who succeeded Churchill as Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, prepared a ·memorandum on British policy in Palestine from 1917: 
Briefly stated, the object [of the Balfour Declaration] was to enlist 
the sympathies on the Allied side of influential Jews and Jewish 
organisations all over the world • • •  It is arguable that the negotiations 
with the Zionists • • •  did • • •  have considerable effect in advancing the 
date at which the United States Government intervened in the war. 
However that may ·oe ,  it must always be remembered that the Declaration 
was made at a time of extreme peril to the cause of the Allies • • •  
'!he Balfour Declaration was a war measure • • •  desi.gned to secure 
tangi. ble benefits which it was hoped could contribute to the u1 ti-
mate victory of the Allies. 110 
Lord Curzon, who even after its ·issuance did not understand the 
meaning and intention of the Balfour Declaration, except to acknowledge 
that Weizmann was furtive about actual Zionist goals, disclosed in a 
memorandum dated October 26, 1917, Weizmann'.s 
.
. negotiation technique : 111 
He once told me that 2, 000 interviews had gone to the making of the 
Balfour Declaration. With unerring skill he adapted his arguments 
to the special circumstances of each statesman. To the British and 
Americans he could use �blical language and awake a deep emotional 
undertone; to other nationalities he more often talked in terms of 
interest. Mr. Lloyd George was told that Palestine was a little 
mountainous country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour the philo­
sophical background of Zionism could be surveyed; for Lord Cecil 
the problem was placed in the setting of a new world organization; 
while to Lord Mi.lner the extension of imperial power could be vividly 
portrayed. To me, who dealt with these matters as a junior officer 
of the General Staff, he brought from many sources all the evidences 
that could be obtained of the importance of a Jewish national home 
to the strategical position of the British Empire , but he always in­
dicated by a hundred shades and inflections of the voice that he be­
lieved that I could also appreciate better than my superiors other 
more subtle and recondite arguments. This skilful presentation of 
facts would, however, have been useless unless he had convinced all 
with whom he came into contact of the probity of his conduct and 
the reality of his trust in the will and strength of Britain . 112 
Zionist actions clearly reveal , and quite often are stated. 
that the avowed intention of Zionism has always been the establishment 
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of a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine, including its environs 
such as Transjordan. And Balfour clearly understood the meaning of 
the "Jewish national home";  he privately confided to his Prime Minister 
Lloyd George in a letter dated February 19 , 1919, from the Paris Peace 
Conference : 
'!he weak point of our position of course ·is that in the case of 
Palestine we deliberately • . •  decline to accept the principle of 
self-determination. If the present (A.Tab) inhabitants were con­
sulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our 
justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being 
absolutely exceptional • • • •  11J 
Balfour goes on to explicitly ad.mi t the intent of "giving the" 
Zionists Arab Palestine "providing that home can be g1 ven them without 
. . 
114 either dispossessing or oppressing the ·present (Arab) inhabitants . "  
In 1947-1948 Zionist military power would be utili zed to forcefully 
dispossess the majority Arab Palestinian population though Balfour 
never lived to see that moment. And the Ziollist mili tary infrastructure 
would be constructed, w1 th the direct assistance and training of British 
mandatory authorities in direct violation of the Mandate provi sions. 
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Chapter Five 
1'Ihere was no international law authority for the British Government 
to make a promise of Arab terr! tory (which was under Turkish sovereignty) 
to Zioni st territorial aspirations, for even the international law of 
peace and war of the war period juridically di sallowed a British terri­
torial concession to the Zionist nationalists. '!'he Hague Convention No. 
IV entitled "Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, "  in addi tion 
to prohibi ting explicit juridical limitations upop belligerents, in­
cluding juridical limi tations upon states or groups acting as mili tary 
occupants, decrees in its Preamble : "Until a more complete code of the 
laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem i t  
expedient to declare that, i n  cases not included i n  the Regulations 
adopted by .them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the 
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they 
result from the usages establi shed among civilized peoples, from the laws 
of humanity, and the dictates of the :{>Ublic conscience • • • •  " See 36 
Stat. pt. 2, p .  2277 at 2279-80 (1910), 
2Balfour ' s  letter was privately add.res�ed to another Engli sh citizen. 
Zionist propaganda gave it a sacrosanct character and called i t  the 
"Balfour Declaration" to clothe i t  with importance. While Zionists took 
pains to publicize i t  widely, they also took care not to mention the 
safeguard proviso in the letter that guaranteed and protected the rights 
of the Arab people who were referred to as " the non-Jewish communities" 
in Palestine which represent·ed 93 per cent of the· population of Palestine. 
31he same legal consideration applies to the various partitions 
schemes, especially to the partition resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on November 29, 1947 :  legally possessing 
no right of sovereignty over Palestine the United Nations could not 
validly partition the Arab country, nor dispose of i t ,  nor grant any 
right of sovereignty to the Zionist Jews over any part of Palestine. 
International law recognizes only the illegality of depriving indigenous 
people of their natural and imprescripti ble rights of sovereignty 
over their own country. 
4Temperler , ed . ,  A History of the Peace Conference of Paris 
(London, 1924 ) ,  p .  173-74. 
5At the 17th Zioni st Congress i n  Basle, in July of 1931, Weizmann 
declared, " , , • I often asked myself what we, I and my frl ends who were 
speaking for the Jewish peopl e ,  could answer were we asked to ' show our 
credentials' and to prove our right to act as the representatives of 
world Jewry. 'Ihat no such question was ever put i s  perhaps the strongest 
proof of the i'ntui ti ve understanding of those men who spoke with us on 
behalf of Great Bri tain, and who saw us, not as the nominated or elected 
representatives of thi s or that group, but as the spokesmen of a people 
in the making. And this atti tude i s  the more surprising when one re­
members that these so-called 'big Jew' and the official Jews ( such as 
Montagu ' s  group) ,  were than very strongly opposed to Zionist ideals and 
1J5 
aspirations . "  Quote i s  from Elmer Berger, "Disenchantment of a Zionist, " 
f tddle East Forum (Beirut: American University, April 1962) • 
. 
6Trial and Error, p .  259. 'Ihe words "Compromise formula" refer to 
the denial of the primary Zionist objective which was that "Palestine 
should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people, " 
which was emenda ted by the I·alner-Amery draft. 
70Claims To Constitute • The Jewish People·• , "  John Norton Moore , ed . ,  
The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: Prinqeton University Press, 1974), 
Vol. I, p. 107. '!he Mallison study i s  an excellent legal explication 
of the Zionist "the Jewish people" nationality concept. 
ff Ibid . ,  p .  108. 
9rn 1947, the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency publicly interpreted 
the phraseology of the Balfour Declaration: "The phrase ' Jewish Zionist 
aspirations' • • •  referred to the age-old hope of Jews the · world over 
that Palestine shall be restored to its· ancient role as the ' Land of 
Israel . '  These aspirati ons were formulated. as a concrete aim at the 
first World Zionist Congress at Basle, Switzerland , in 1897, under the 
leadership of Dr. Theodore Herzl, in these words: ' Zi onism alias to 
create a publicly secured, legally assured home for the Jewish people 
in Palestine . • "  'Ihe same Zionist source prov:lded the Zionist inte rpre­
tation of the words "national home for the Jewish people" : "The phrase 
'the establishment i n  Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish peopl e '  
was intended and understood. by all concerned to mean a t  the time of the 
Balfour Declaration that Palestine would ultimately become a ' Jewi sh 
Commonwealth' or a ' Jewish State , ' i f  only Jews came and settled there 
in sufficient numbers. "  'Ihe�e statements are quoted from Jewish Agency 
for Palestine, Book of Documents Submitted to the General Assembl of 
the United Nations, ed . ,  Abraham 'l'ulin, New York, 1947 , p .  1 and 5.  
'Ihe inaccuracy of the Zionist statement that the alleged meaning 0£ an 
ultimate "Jewish State" was "intended and understood by all concerned" 
is historically obvious, al though i t  i s  kind of the Zionists to reveal 
their actual illegal aims i n  Palestine both before and after the Balfour 
Decaration. I would specifically direct criti cs to the Zionist memorandum 
of a bout September 22, 1917, which declared, "What the Zionists do not 
want i s :  ( I I )  To set up a Jewish Republic or other form of State in 
Palestine or any part of Palestine . "  This Weizmann-Mark Sykes memor-
andum explicitly refutes the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency 
interpretation of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration made i n  1947. 
Additionally, Sokolov, president of the World Zionist Organi zation in 
1917, wrote in 1918 : "It has been said, and i s  still being obstinately 
repeated by anti-Zi onists again and again, that Zionism aims at the cre­
ationof an independent ' Jewish state . '  But this i s  wholly fallacious. 
'Ihe 'Jewish state' was never a part of the Zionist programme • " See 
Nahum Sokolov, History of Zionism, 1600-1918 (London, 1919 ) ,  Vol . I,  
pp. xxiv-xxv. Sokolov is Gimply being atrociously deceptive because 
in the Zioni st draft proposal of July 18, 1917, Sokolov (1861-1936) 
stated explicitly that he wanted Britain to "accept(s) the principle 
that Palestine should be reconsti tuted as the national home of the 
Jewish people , "  and in the Zionist draft of July 12, 1917, Sokolov 
along with other Zionist officials wanted the British to accept the 
"principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the 
Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up 1 ts 
national life in Palestine" under the protection of a Western power. 
10stein, The Balfour Declaration, p. 468. 
11Ibid. 
12 Ibid . , p .  468-69 . Note the specific Zionist conceptual phrase-
ology in the words "recongnising, " " the National Home , "  " the Jewish 
people ;  ff "national life , '·' all of which means the creation of the 
Zionist Jud.enstaat over Arab Palestine. 
13Ibid. , p. 469. Note the specific reference to " the Jewish people" 
and the "Jewish nationality" which depict the Zionist conception of a 
transnational nationality racial entity� Difficult interpretive problems 
concerning the scope and meaning of these phrases were never explicated 
by the British governmental Zionists and the Zionists Jewish negotiators 
were certainly not voluntarily providing any clear definitions of these 
ideologi cal-philosophical words. As Sir Harold Nicolson declared in 
reference to the Bri tish Foreign Office preliminary draft and the 
protesting Zionists' preliminary drafts of July 12 and 18, "We believed 
that we were founding a refuge for the di sabled (Jews) and did not 
foresee that 1 t would become a nest of hornet s . "  See Stein, op. ci t . ,  
p. 468, n .  24. 
14The use of the term " National Home" in this Zionist draft was a 
continuation of the euphemism0 deliberately adopted since the First 
Zionist Congress i n  1897, when the term "Heims ta tte" was employed 
instead of Herzl • s "Judenstaat" term meaning "Jewish State . "  As has 
been shown, Nord.au, the inventor of the term "Heimstatte , "  coined i t  
"to deceive by its mildness" until such time as " there was no reason 
to dissimulate our real aim , "  which was an exclusive Jewish State . 
See Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue : On the basi s of Nordau' s  manuscript 
"The Prosperi ty of His Servant, "  p .  160, footnote 1 .  
1.5weizmann makes specific reference to the British Government invoking 
"favorable action on our demands" which to the Zionists meant a 
"reconstituted" Jewish State over Palestine. See Chaim Weizmann, "'Ihe 
Balfour Declaration , "  N. Gordon Levin, Jr. , ed. ,  The Zionist Movement 
in Palestine and World Politics, 1880-1918 (Lexington, �11..ss. : D .  C.  
Heath and Company, 1974), p. 191. Significantly, Sykes, as Weizmann 
detailed, "understood entirely what was meant by ( Jewish) ' nationality"' 
and "the idea of a Jewish Palestine . "  
2.5J:b1.d. 
26Ibid . ,  p .  200, 
, . 
1J8 
27It would have been .impossible for even such committed Zioni sts as 
Lloyd George and Balfour to represent a declaration as having support 
from Jews following the resignation of the only member of the Cabinet 
in protest. 
28Levin, op. cit. , pp;· 194-9 5 .  Actually, the Zionist draft to which 
Wei�ann refers had already been rejected by its replacement with the 
Milner draft of August, which was not cabled to Brandeis. Obviously, 
Weizmann' s  omission was intentional . 
29Ibid . ,  P• 195. 
JOibid . ,  p .  194. 
31�olitical Zionism emphasized the importance and need of � politically 
independent Jewish State over Arab Pal esti ne . Relevant to the desire 
of a territory by poli tical Zionism i s  the premeditated policy of 
"gradualism" first developed by Chaim Weizmann and inherited by subsequent 
leaders, even at the present day. In accepting the Balfour Declaration, 
the Churchill White Paper, and the partition plan of the Peel Commission, 
Weizmann did not really agree to their terms or intend to abide by them . 
'Ihroughout his tenure as the recogni zed leader of organized Zioni sm ,  he 
tried ceaselessly to circumvent the restrictions of official British 
policy without openly challenging their legality until the 1940 s .  
Emphatically, the limitations h e  sought to overcome were directly related 
to the Zionist Jewish State scheme. A disturbing problem to Zionist 
"gradualism" is the ongoing vivid discrepancy between its statement and 
its scheme , a dichotomy that led to a format based on expedient equivoca­
tion and quiet duplicity. Zionist design and intent were concealed by 
equivocation of statement and purpose after the Milner draft proposal 
of the Balfour Declaration which radically denied acceptance of Zionist 
objectives over Palestine. 
32stein, The Balfour Declaration, p. 512 . Material in brackets supplied by Stein. 
33This group included such important Bri Ush Jews as Lucien Wolf, 
Claude Montefiore and 3ir Mathew Nathan . Nei zmann suggested to Brandeis 
in the United States via cable that anti-Zionist opposition had to be 
overcome; that it would "greatly help i f  President Wilson andyourself 
support the text (wired to Brandeis September 19 ) .  Matter most urgent." 
Weizmann also sent a telegram to two leading New York Zioni sts, asking 
them to "see Brandeis and Frankfurter immediately discuss my last two 
telegrams with them , "  adding that i t  might be necessary for him to come 
to the United States himself. On October 9 Wei zmann cabled Brandeis 
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again stating difficulties from the "assimilants" opposition : "They 
have found an excellent champion • • •  in Mr. Edwin Montagu who i s  a 
member of the Government and has certainly made use of his position 
to injure the Zionist cause . "  
34'Ihe Jews of Britain in 1917 totalled about )00, 000 of whom only 
8 , 000 were Zioni sts. See Stein, op. cit . ,  p .  66. 
3.5i.evin, op. cit . ,  p .  186. Emphasis in the quote i s  from the 
original diary entry of Weizmann. 
36stein, op. ci t. , p .  521. '!he last t�o words in the draft were 
added two days later (ibid. , pp. 524, 525, n .  31 ) .  Note the· Zioni st 
rac�al doctrine i n  th� phrase "the Jewish race . "  
37Amery, a professed Zionist, along with W .  G. Ormsby-Gore and 
Winston Churchill, Amery' s  school friend at Harrow , had dominated 
almost the entire decade between 1919-1929 of British-Palestine rela­
tions. In the fight against the 1939 Passfield White .Paper ( whi. ch 
announced the British Government ' s  intention to suspend Jewish immi­
gration, restric t  Zionist-Jewish land purchases, and reduce the ir­
regula.r power of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which was a shadow 
Zionist government )  the Zionists were strongl y backed by such important 
Zionist non-Jewish indi vidua.ls as Stanley Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain .  
General Smuts, Sir John Simon and Amery. Lord Passfield was the Bri tish 
Colonial Secretary and author of the White ·Paper. For an example of 
the fashion i n  which Jewish constituent votes are effectively used 
to suppress anti-Zionist policies, see Alan Bullock, The Life and 
Times of Ernest Bevin :  Trade Union Leader 1881-1940 ,  Vol . I (London: 
Heinemann, 1960), chapter entitled "The Second Labour Government, 
1929-1931 , "  in which placating the English-Jewish vote took the form 
of, on November 4, 19J1, of Bevin i ssuing a statement declaring that 
his Labour Government had no intention of stopping Jewish immigration 
into Palestine nor of setting liml ts to the expansion of the "Jewish 
National Home" in Palestine . Facts concerning the Zionist shadow 
government i n  Palestine are included i n  the Anglo-American Commi ttee 
of Inquiry, Report to the United States Government and His Majesty' s 
Government in the Uni ted Kingdom : " There thus exists a virtual Jewish 
nonterritorial State Q:-hrough the Jewish Agency] with its own executive 
and legi slative organs ,  parallel in many respects to the Mandatory 
Admini stration, and serving as the concrete symbol of the Jewish National 
Home. This Jewish shadow Government has ceased to cooperate with the 
(British) Administration in the maintenance of the law and order, and i n  
the suppression o f  terrorism. " (p.  39 ) 
38Quoted in Stein, op. cit . ,  p .  520. The words "pro-Arab" does not 
mean that any Arabs had any role in the private negotiations; in fact, 
the Arabs did not even know of the private discussions which would lead 
to the i ssuance of the Ilalfour Declaration. So extensive was the in­
fluence of the Jewish community at Whitehall that the Cabinet paid more 
attention to expressions of opposition to Zionism when they came from 
Jews than when they came from Arabs, whose land the Cabinet was illegally 
bartering away in the style of nineteenth century imperial diplomacy. 
One decision of the War Cabinet declared, "Before coming to a decision 
(the Cabinet) should hear the views of representative Zionists as well 
as of those who held the opposite opinion, and that meanwhile the 
declaration, as read by Lord Milner, should be submitted confidentially 
to a) President Wilson, b) leaders of the Zionist Movement, c )  repre­
sentative persons in Anglo-Jewry opposed to Zionism . .. See PRO CAB 23/4. The Cabinet simply ignored the Arabs whose land they were arbi tarily 
giving to the Zionists as their "national home. "  
39stein, op. cit. , p. 522. 
40 Levin, op. cit. , p .  196. 
41-Ibid. ,  p .  197. 
42Ibid . ,  P• 198. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. The suggestion of 0Jewish people" actually came from 
Brandeis in the United States. 
45The Council of the English Zionist Federation with Weizmann pre­
siding decided on Jewish pressure group tactics on October 1 1 .  Weizmann 
attempted in a letter to Herbert Samuel of October 18 ( the day Montagu 
sailed for India) to reach a 0satisfactory arrangement" with anti­
Zionists Sir Phillip Nagnus and Sir Stuart Samuel but this also failed. 
46 Weizmann, Trial and Err'or, p. 242. The First World War had en-abled the Zionist movement to illegally extract the Balfour Declaration 
with its ambiguous "Jewish national home0 idea. The intended ambiguity 
of the Balfour Declaration (and the Palestine Mandate ) had served the 
Zionist purpose. It would still take the Second World War to bring 
the opportunity for the exclusive Judenstaat which was the Zioni st 
goal . As for example,  on April 28, 1944, Weizmann, contrary to his 
officious denials of Palestine becoming a Jewish State during the dec­
laration' s  negotiations (along with Sokolov' s  public denial ) ,  while 
dining with :Dri ti sh Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, a member of the 
British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and Chief Political 
Officer in Palestine and Syria 1919-20, disclosed his desire for the 
whole of Palestine as a Jewish State. See Meinertzhagen, Middle East 
Diary 1917-1956, pp. 191-92. When Weizmann was asked why he had 
favored partition under the Peel Plan of 1937, he declared that he had 
done so because "he knew that war was inevitable and he thought that 
if there was only a small Jewish Palestine, the Jews might have gained 
by conquest what they wanted in a general world ·war."  Yet, conversely, 
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he would cunningly declare a few years later to the United Nations 
Specia;J. Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) "With regard to Zionism employing 
organized Jewish terrorism in Palestine often under Jewish Agency 
direction in order to forcefully di�ve out the mandatory administra­
tion in direct violation of the Palestine Mandate and international 
law, "I hang my head in shame when I have to speak of this fact before 
you. ti See 'Ihe Guardian, November 23, 1974, p.  16, Weizmann was 
President of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency for 
Pa} 0st1ne from 1921 to 1931 and again from 1935 to 1946. 
47weizmann, Trial and Error, p .  419. 
48Ex:cellent reading selections are : David Ben-Gurion, tlBri tain • s 
Contribution to Arming the Hagana, ti Jewish Observer and the Middle 
East · Review, Septem�r · 20, 1963, pp. 13-14. As chairman of the Jewish 
Agency for Palestine, 1935-48, he wrote, tl'Ihe most successful and com­
plete cooperation between the Jews and the British was achieved with 
the establishment of Special Night Squads by a distinguished British 
Officer, Captain Charles Orde Wingate. This was a practical step to­
wards the establishment of a Jewish military force within the frame­
work of the British Army. ti See Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes to War 
(London: Arthur Barker Ltd. , 1955) ,  Chapter 4, 110rde Wingate and 
Moshe Dayan 1938, ti who wrote tl'Ihe first occasion Wingate chose to take 
the Jews into action against the Arabs caused one of the biggest rows 
in the history of the Palestine Mandate , and nearly got him sacked on 
the spot. t1 See David Ben-Gurion, t1Qur Friend: What Wingate Did For 
Us, "  Jewish Observer and Mi.ddle East Review, · September 27, 1963, 
pp. 15-16. Ben-Gurion wrote : "The disturbance in Palestine brought 
(Wingate) back to the East. In the autumn of 1937, Wingate was posted 
to an intelligence unit at Haifa. He sought contact with the Jews, 
and met Emanuel Wilenski, head of the Hagana' s  Intelligence Service • • • •  
A short time later, Wingate ·met Dr. Weizmann, myself, Shertok (later 
renamed Sharett) and Eliahu Golomb (a founder of the Haganah and mem­
ber of its High Command) .  He told us of his plans for the establish­
ment of a Jewish Army • • •  ," The Hagana' s  Special Night Squads were 
broken up as World War II approached although the Jewish Agency still 
used these uni ts as part of the overall Jewish underground army assaults 
against the British administration in Palestine from 1939-1948 and 
against the Palestinian Arab population. 
49wingate ' s  superior officers of the Palestine Mandate administra­
tion recorded in his service file, t1Qrde Wingate , D . S . O .  A good sol­
dier, but as far as Palestine i s  concerned he i s  a security risk, and 
not to be trusted. Places the interests of the Jews before the interests 
of his own country. Not to be permitted to enter Palestine again. "  
See Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, September 27, 1963, p .  16. 
Ben-Gurion, who collaborated with Wingate in the latter 1930' s, wrote 
of Wingate' s  military assistance to the Hagana, . tl'Ihe Hagana' s  best 
officers were trained in the special Night Squads, and Wingate ' s  doc-
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trines were taken over by the Israel Defense Forces, which were estab­
lished twelve days after the birth of the Jewi sh State" ( i bid . ,  p .  16 ) .  
Wingate, chief trainer of Hagana' s  young officers who were chosen from 
all districts in Palestine and convened at Ei n  Hared on September 13, 
1938, declared at a parting meeting with the Hagana elite, "I am being 
sent away because we are too good friends. '!hey want to strike at me 
and at you. But I promise you I will come ta.ck, and i f  I cannot do i t  
in the regular way, I will come ta.ck as an illegal immigrant" (ibid . , 
P• 16) . 
-
50At this time Amery was Secretary of St:ate for India. On Septem­
ber 29, 1938, Wingate was ordered home to England from Ein Hared; he 
departed Palestine on October 12 and returned in December of 1938 
but was not penni tted t.o return to his chief training functions at Eln Hared .  
51see Martin Gilbert, Winston s. Churchil l ,  Vol . III : 'Ihe Challenge 
of War 191�1916 ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co . ,  1971 ) .  
)�on-Commissioned Officers. See Robert John and Sarni Hadawi , 
'!he Palestine Diar 1 14-194 , Vol . I :  Bri tai n ' s  Involvement (New York : 
New World Press, 1970 , p .  335. Haining personally disagreed with 
the appointment of Wingate ' s role, but w1 th Prime Ninister Winston 
Churchill ' s  support ( Churchill agreed with Wei zmann ' s  Jewish Anny and 
Jewish State proposi tion at their private me�ting on December 17, 1939 
when he was still not elected to lead the British Governmen t ) ,  Haining 
went along with the training project. 
53At thi s time Weizmann was president of the World Zionist Organi­
zation and Palestine Jewish �gency • 
.54Dill was appointed C . I . G. S .  in May, 1940. 
55rbid . ,  P •  335· 
56while Weizmann presented a memorandum to Churchill for Sir John 
Dill, C . I . G. S . ,  at their meeting at Brendan Bracken, the Bri tish Colo­
nial Office insi sted that there should be approximate pari ty i n  the 
number of Jews and Arabs recruited for uni ts i n  Palestine. Weizmann 
despaired because according to his memorandum he wanted the following: 
(a) recruitment of the greatest possible number of Jews in Palestine 
for the fighting services, to be formed into Je�sh battalions or larger 
formations; ( b )  officer cadres ,  sufficient for a Jewish division in the 
first instance, to be picked immediately from Jews in Palestine, and 
trained in Egypt; ( c )  the formation of a Jewish "desert uni t" ; ( d )  the 
recruitment of Jewish refugees i n  England ( for the Jewish uni ts in the 
�[ddle East) .  The codicil to this request was that the Jewicll units 
be exclusively Jewish and totally separated from Palestine Arab military 
units. Interestingly, to the Jewish Stern terrori st group, which had 
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the quiet support of the Palestine Jewish Agency officials, military 
cooperation td th the British was absurd . Stern, their leader, directly 
stated that his group would fight not only the British in Palestine 
but Dri ti sh imperialism everywhere . By now i t  i s  well known that their 
methods were terrori stic as well against the Palestinian Arabs because 
the Sternists did not mince words about their desire for a "Jewish" 
State over Palestine . For them, there was a war only between Jews 
and goyim (non-Jews which included Arabs) .  
57AJnery' s  pro-Zionism predates 1914, though that phase i s  not dis­
cussed in this paper • 
.58Public Records Offi�e ,  Foreign Offi ce, 371/3384. Amery, while 
in the Cablnet Secretariat, submitted a memorandum in January, 1917, 
which argued that Bri tain should do all in her powers to obtain "a 
continuity of territory or of control both i n  East Africa and between 
Egypt and India."  
59
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62w. Thomas Mallison, Jr. ,  " 'Ihe Bal.four Declaration: An Appraisal 
in International Law , "  Ibrahim Abu-Lughod , ed . ,  '!he Transfonnation of 
Palestine ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p .  84. 
6�etter to the American· Council for Judaism from Parker T. Hart, 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
United States Department of State, on November 12, 1959 ·  Hart was 
speci fying " the status of American citizens of the Jewish fai th0 because 
Israel was still attempting to involuntarily impose the "Jewish people" 
Zionist concept upon Americans of the Jewish religion. 
64i.etter from the Uni ted States Department of State to the American 
Council for Judaism dated April 20, 1964, and addressed to Rabbi El�er 
Berger ( then executive vice president of the American Council for Judai sm ) 
by Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Tal bot. See Whiteman, Digest of 
International Law, VIII, (1967 ) ,  p .  35. This letter was drafted for 
Talbot by the Legal Adviser' s office. 
65A decision of mandatory powers including the United States was made 
on April 25, 1920, "to accept the tenns of the mandates' articles as 
given below with reference to Palestine on the .understanding that there 
was inserted in the proces-verbal an undertaking by the mandatory powers 
that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed 
by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. H 
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66 For American constitutional law prohibi tions against religious 
discrimination, see Cantwell v .  Connecticut, J10 U . S .  296 (1940 ) ;  
Hackworth, Dige::;t of International Law, Vol . III (Washington, D . C . : 
U.S.  Dept. of State , 1942), p .  J52; Adler and Margali th, With Firmness 
in the Ri ht: American Di lomatic Action Affectin Jews 1840-1 4 
1946 , pp. 249 , 250, 251; ·..r . Thomas Mallison, Jr. , "Zionist-Israel 
Claims on ' The Jewish People '  Are Unconstitutional , "  Issues (publi shed 
by the American Council for Judaism ) ,  Winter, 1962-196J, pp. 1-16, 1 2 ;  
Lurie v .  Uni ted States, 2J1 U . S .  9 (191 J ) ;  M .  Cherif Bassiouni and Eugene 
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Insight Into Its Future From the Lessons of the Past , "  St. Johns Law 
Review, January, 1970, pp. 41 5-424, 415; M. Panhuys, 'Ihe Role of Nationality 
in International Law (19 59 ) .  Axiomatic knowledge o f  the American 
constitutional system declares that the Government has the legal obligation 
to protect the citizen ' s  undivided citizenship/nationality status, and 
that the citizen has the right and duty of undivided national attachment 
to the United States sovereignty. The only recognized exception to the 
undivlded nationali ty/ci tizenship status of the Uni ted States citizen 
is the legal status of dual nationality (jure sanguini s )  in which case 
the Unt ted St.a.+.es recognizes the legal status of dual nationality with 
certain juridical limitations and qualifications . 'Ihe Zioni st-Israel 
claimed system of transnational legal "rights" and "obligations0 to be 
arrogated upon and arbitrarily exacted from United States citizens of 
Jewish religion has nothing in common with the recognized le�l exception 
of dual nationality. 
671ord Curzon, at the War Cabinet meeting of October 4, "urged strong 
objections upon practical grounds" to the Milner draft proposal and the 
Milner-Amery redraft proposal . 'Ihe minutes of the meeting show that 
Curzon asked, 0How was 1 t proposed to get rid of the existing majority 
of Mussulman (Palestinian Arab peopl e )  inhabi tants and to introduce the 
Jews i n  their place? • • •  To secure for the Jews already in Palestine equal 
civil and religious rights seemed to him a better policy than to aim 
at repatriation on a large scale ( i . e . ,  a Jewish State over Palestine ) .  
He regarded ( the Jewish State Zionist scheme ) • • •  as sentimental idealism, 
which would never be realized, and that ( Britain) • • •  should have nothing 
to do w1 th i t . "  Incidentally, two weeks after the 1918 Armi stice Lord 
Curzon, a member of the War Cabinet who succeeded Balfour as British 
Foreign Secretary, stated categorically: '"Ihe Palestine situation i s  
this .  If we deal wi th our commitments, there i s  first the general 
pledge to Hussain in October, 1915, under which Palestine was included 
in the areas to which Britain pledged itself that they should be Arab 
and independent in the future . "  See Public Records Office document 
CAB 27/24. 
68For an excellent legal explication of this contemporary international 
law doctrine see Bassiouni and Fisher, i bid . , pp. 415-424. Also see 
Elmer Berger, The Jewish Dilemma (New York : The. Devin-Adair Co . ,  1946 ) ,  
"Part I :  The Myth of ' a  Jewh;h People . "' The Zionist concept of a 
subjective "Jewish nation, 0 existing through more than 20 centuries 
without tarritory, government, or poitical continuity, and imposing 
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limitations and obligations upon all adherents of the Jewish religious 
faith, regardl ss of ethnic origin, choice of nationality or time of 
conversion to Judaism (or for that matter continued adherence to Judai sm), 
has no foundation or precedent i n  any recognized legal doctrine ; more­
over, as early as 1917 , in the second safeguard claune of the Balfour Declaration, the British Government denied its acceptance as ei ther 
a legal or political d�ctrine. 
69weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 261. See also the Zionist draft 
proposal herein .  
70weizmann was agreeing t o  the change suggested by Louis ::Bran.deis. 
71weizmann, op. ci t . , p .  261. Emphasi s mine. 
72Ma.llison, 'Ihe Balfour Declaration, op. cit . ,  p. 9 3 .  
7Jwi th the exc�ption o f  the sirigula_r word "civil . "  
7�feizmann, op. cit . ,  p .  301. Also see Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, 
p .  1139· Balfour was still the Foreign Secretary at thi s ti;;ie . 
75president Wilson' s Consultant at the Paris Peace Conference i n  1919. 
76British diplomat, later Conservative Member of Parliament, 1921-1937 . 
??Chairman of Provisional Commission for General Zionist Affairs, 
United States, 1914-1916 and Associate Justi ce , Supreme Court of United 
States, 1916-1939 . 
78Public Records Office,  Foreign Offi ce 800/217. For the full 
Frankfurter memorandum of the meeting see Walid Khalid! , ed . ,  From Haven 
to Conquest (Beirut: '!he Institute For Palestine Studies, 1971), pp. 
195-200. 
79see &1.win Montagu' s memorandum entitled "The Anti-Semitism of the 
Present Government , "  Public Records Office, Cabinet No. 24/24 (August 
23, 1917 ) .  
80Paul Goodman, ed . ,  Chaim Weizmann (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd . ,  
1945) ,  p .  203. One of the principal purposes of the iterated claims 
to "the Jewi sh people" i s  to obtain the assent of governments other 
than the Government of Israel through the implied processes of agreement 
of customary in.ternational law even though such other governments have 
never over the past seven decades given express international agreement 
to the Zionist entity of "the Jewish people . "  
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81'1he harshest martial forms of nationalism and ethnocentrism are 
to be found i n  the early history of Judaism. Israel ' s  fundamental 
laws are "based upon classic Zionist ideology. Zionism proceeds from 
the social experiences of those Jewish inhabitants (by religion) of 
Russia and Poland whose unassimilated condition (which was as much 
desired ) ,  great numbers and dense aggregation had given them the im­
pression of being a separate nationality. Hence, they responded i n­
stinctively to the two political impulses of the European world of the 
nineteenth century, nationalism and expansion by colonization. '!he 
case was in no way altered by the recognized fact that the Jewish 
nationalists exploited Jewish religious sentiment about Zion and 
"Israel" in the same way that the promoters of the crusades had once 
exploited Christian feelings about the tomb of the Redeemer and other 
Chri stian symbolisms in Jerusalem and the Holy Land. 
· 82'1he anti-Zionist Jewish interventioni sts did extrapolate "the 
Jewish people" Zionist concept without the willingness of the Zionist 
negotiators to lend cooperative appraisal to Zionist jargon. 
83weizmann de�lared, "It i s  one of
. 
the ' i fs' of history whether we 
should have been intransigent, and stood by our guns. Should we then 
have obtained a better statement? • • •  Our judgment was to accept, to 
press for rati fication , "  See Trial and Error, p .  261. 
84see W. Thomas Mallison, Jr. , "Zionist..:.rsrael Claims On ' 'lbe Jewish 
People '  Are Unconstitutional , "  Issues, Winter, 1962-1963, pp. 1-16. 
An interesting picture of Zionist support among anti or pro-Zionist 
Jews i s  given by Herbert Adams Gibbons ("Zionism and the World Peace , "  
'lbe Century Illustrated I·�onthly Magazine, January, 1919) who covered 
the Pari s Peace Conference< " • • •  Jewish friends have been urging me for 
a year to write for publication what I have said i n  private conversation 
about the danger to the world from the erection of a Zionist state in 
Palestine. When the idea of a Zioni st state i n  Palestine is broached, 
I have found opinions strongly pro and strongly contra among American 
Jews, mostly pro among British Jews, and mo stly contra among French 
Jews. Prominent Jews in the i ntellectual and business and commercial 
world, whose names and statements appear i n  Zionist publications i n  favor 
of the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour letter, have assured me 
privately that they view the whole ( Zionist) movement with the gravest 
misgivings, and that they openly sponsor the project simply because at 
the present moment no Jew can without injury to himself throw cold water 
on Zionism" ( p .  J70) .  'lbe "Zionist interpretation of the Balfour letter" 
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declaration of the Rritsh Government according to its clear wording. 
From the day of its publication they have l ooked upon the letter • • •  as 
official British sanction to the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine by means of wholesale immigration and buyi ng up of the land. 
'Ibey consider it as a recognition of Jewish nationality in the sense 
of separate political and civil status for the Jew from the international 
point of view" (p. J69 ) .  Gibbons also states: "The Grand Rabbi of France 
stated a few months ago that there are only a hundred thousand Zionists i n  
the world outside of America, that most of the Zionists i n  li ... rance are of 
Russian or Rumanian origin • • • •  " (p. 371 ) .  
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85see Criminal Case No. 40/61 (Di strict Court Jerusalem, Israe l ,  
December 11-12, 196 1 ) ,  aff ' d ,  Criminal App. N o .  J36/61 ( Supreme Court, 
Israel, May 29, 1962 ) .  I t  has already been shown that the British 
Cabinet rejected the Zionist claim. 
86weizmann, Trial and Error, p .  260. 
8911It i s  one of the ' ifs' of history whether we should have been 
intransigent, and stood by our guns. Should we then have obtained 
a better statement? • • •  Our judgment was to accept, to press for 
ratification." Ibid . , p .  261. 
90 Ibid. , p .  207. 
9 1  8 Ingrams, op. cit . ,  p .  17-1 • 
92The writer has no idea where the phrase "political proml se clause" 
ori ginated and ls not particularly concerned w1 th its derivation because 
the historical explication of the evolution of the Declaration reveals 
that "His Majesty' s  Government view with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" is not a promise. 
93Klaus J .  Herrmann, "Poli ti cal Response to the P,alfour Declaration 
in Imperial Germany: German Judai sm, "  The Middle East Journal , Summer, 
1965, pp. 303-320. See the section of the article subti tled Counter­
acting the Balfour Declaration, pp. 313-320. 
94Ronald Storrs , The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (New York: Arno 
Press, 1972) ,  p .  358; Doreen Ingrams, op. cit . ,  p. 20, 22; Public Records 
Office,  CAB. 27/23. 
95nalfour was prepared to concede the Zionist-sought "principle" of 
the reconstitution of Palestine as the national home of the Jews; when 
thi s failed he was privately prepared, regardless of the Balfour 
Declaration, to furtively assist Zionism in Palestine . Interestingly, 
Herbert Samuel , himself a leading Zionist and one of the first to insist 
that the British Cabinet favor Zionism, interpreted the Declaration i n  
a speech i n  the House of Lords April 23, 1947, a s  not agreeing t o  the 
creation of a Jewish State over Palesti ne. Samuel stated , "The Jewish 
State • • •  i s  not contained in the Balfour Declaration . • • .  'nlere was no 
promise of a Jewish State . What was promi sed was that the British 
Government would favour the creation of a Jewish National Home--the 
term was most carefully chosen--in Palestine . 'Ihe Declarati on did not 
say that Palestine should be the Jewish National Home , but that i t  favoured 
a Jewish National Home in Palestine, without prejudice to the civil and 
religious rights of the Arab population. " This quote l s  taken from 
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Viscount Samuel ' s  speech in the Palestine Debate i n  the House of Lords, 
April 23, 1947. Samuel was appointed British High Commissioner to 
Palestine under the Mandate from 1920 to 1925. 
96see Elie Kedourie ,  "Sir Ma.rk Sykes and Palestine 1915-16, "  
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol . 6, No. J, pp. )40-)45. 
97onnsby-Gore was not ooing candid because he ignored his own role 
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April 24, 1917. 
98Public Record.s Office, Cal::d.net Papers, 24/158. 
99Graham is privately descriood by Weizmann as "of considerable 
help in bringing about the Balfour Declaration . "  See Trial and Error, 
page 231 . Graham was in the confidence of Sir Mark Sykes and was 
of unfailing help to the Zionists. 
100 Ingrams, op. cit . ,  p .  8 .  Zionists drafted their versions of the 
declaration in July. 
101Public Records Office, Cabinet Papers, 23/4. 
l02Ibid. 
' 
103public Records Office, Foreign Office, 371/3054. 
104Public Records Office, Cabinet Papers, 23/4. Lord Curzon agreed 
with Balfour by stating " that he admi tted the force of the diplomatic 
arguments in favour of expressing sympathy" with the Zionists' aims. 
105Ibid. 
106Rooort John and Sarni Hadawi , 'Ihe Palestine Diary 1914-1945, 
Vol . I (New York: New World Press, 1970 ), p .  72. The approach to the 
Zioni st movement by Mark Sykes, as representative of the Bri tish 
Government, began as early as four days after Britain' s declaration 
of war on Turkey in Novemoor of 1914. The informal committee of Zionists 
and Ma.rk Sykes met privately on February 7, 1917, at the house of .Moses 
Gaster, the ( Roumanian) Chief Rabbi of the Sephard.ic (Spanish and 
Portuguese) congregations in England . Gaster opened the meeting with 
a statement that stressed Zionist support for British strategic i nterests 
in Palestine which were to be an integral part of the agreement between 
them . Sykes, Balfour, Lloyd George and Churchill , as claimed in their 
subsequent statements, were of the opinion that proclaimed Allied sup­
port for Zionist aims would especially inf1.uence the United Gtates to 
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political repercussion i n  Russia and with the Central Powers of Germany 
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108stein, 1he Balfour Declaration, p .  25. 
109see for example ,  Norman Bentwich, Palestine of the Jews (London, 
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the office of Attorney General of Palestine guring the Mandate, 
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was no part of the "Jewish national home" i n  Palestine. 
110Public Records Office, Cabinet Papers, 24/159 . For an academic 
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op. ci t . ,  pp. 303-320. 1here is no doubt that the declaration had 
substantial propaganda value to Britain and the Allies. Balfour re­
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Propaganda reasons are referred to i n . the ESCO Study at page 1 1 7 :  
"1he essential reason, accounts agree , ·was strategic a nd  had t o  do 
with the need of strengthening :Sri tain' s 11-feline to the East. "  And 
at page 118 : "Through the Balfour Declaration Great Erl tain ultimately 
strengthened and extended her position in the whole Near Eas t . "  
The Lasswell study, Propaganda Technique in the ':1orld War (1927 ) ,  
declares at page 176: "General Ludendorff regarded the Balfour 
Declaration as the cleverest thing done by ·the Allies in the nature 
of war propaganda and lamented the fact that Germany had not thought 
of i t  first . "  See Stein, op. cit. , pp. 533-542 concerning Zionist 
contacts with the German Government during the war . A cautious German 
Government wartime statement concerning Zionists and Palestine, i ssued 
on January 8, 1918, i s  quotsd. i n  Stein at pages 602-603 • 
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111eurzon asked : " ( a )  What i s  the meaning of the phrase ' a  national 
home for the Jewish race i n  Palestine ' ,  and what i s  the nature of the 
obligation that we shall assume i f  we accept this as a principle of 
British policy?" Strangely, Curzon, the anti-Zionist opponent of the 
Balfour Declaration and the Jewish State scheme in Palestine, and who 
had vetoed a knighthood for Weizmann in 1920, declared to the Cabinet 
in 1923 that i t  would be impossible for any Brl ti sh Government to with­
draw from the pro-Zionist policy "wi thout a substantial sacrifice of 
consistency and self-respect if not of honour . "  Ironically, Curzon 
added to Zionist allurements: "1hose of us who have disliked the policy 
are not prepared to make that sacrifice. ti Quotes are taken from Bernard 
Wasserstein, "A Vision of Mount Zion, ti The Guardian, November 23, 1974, 
p .  15. For Curzon' s  criticisms of the Zionist Palestine scheme see 
Ingrams, op. cit. 
112Taylor, Prelude to I::;rae.l , p .  24. It was c·. P .  Scott, the 
publisher of The t·lanchester Guardian who opened the doors of Downi ng 
Street to Weizmann. In December, 1914, Scott introduced Wei zmann to 
Lloyd George . That was only the beginning of Scott' s help. He advised 
Weizmann how to play hi8 cards in the hlgh level poll tics of the Bri tish 
Government. Scott told him, for instance, how Lloyd George i�nored 
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in the hands of his officials. Scott personally lobbied his important 
friends in the Cabinet on behalf of the Jewish national home in 
Palestine. 
113 Ingrams, op. ci t . , p .  61.  We must recall that this private de-
claration of British intention came after the issuance of the Balfour 
Declaration. 
CHAPTER V I  
THE MANDATES SYSTEM 
In the Autumn of 1921 I returned to London where I was called 
to supervise the drafting of the covenant of the· British Man­
date in Palestine .  The rough draft should have been submi tted 
to the League of Nations in order that i t  might adopt a reso­
lution upon it. Afterwards the Conference of St. Remo approved 
the very idea of the Mandate . 1  
--Chaim Wei zmann 
'J.he mandate specifically aims at an independent and eventually 
self-governing Palestinian state or ' commonwealth' . • • •  2 
--Sir Eric Graham Forbes Adam 
I feel there are no further observations that I can usefully 
o:ffer on this oft-redrafted ( the Palestine Mandate) document. 
All that now remains is,  i f  your Lordship approves, to submit 
i t  to the Cabinet, after first showing it to the Zioni sts. ) 
--Lord Robert Gilbert Vansittart 
The hi story of Palestine from the insti tution of the mandate 
until 1939 was the history of an Arab people in almost continuous re-
bellion as they saw themselves gradually subjugated by piecemeal Zionist 
. 
conquest which became full mili tary conquest in 1947-48. Over the period 
from 1920 to 1948 the Palestinian people observed their right to self-
determination being systematically denied by British deference to world 
Zionism and minority status imposed upon them through the mandatory' s  
military occupati on. Remembering the natural and legal rights of the 
Palestinian Arab people even in the juridical context of the Covenant, 
Article 5 of the Palestine Mandate legally assured the native inhabitants 
that "The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine 
territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under control 
. · 
of, the Government of any foreign Power. " Through the incremental Zionist 
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faits accomplis under British administration during the mandate period, 
the Zionists began gradually to translate the idea of "a national home" 
in the Balfour Declaration into an exclusivist sovereign Jewish state ; 
in 1947, the Zionists accepted the principle of a "Jewish" state but kept 
silent on its extent and boundaries, and shortly before the Bri tish Man-
date arbitrarily tenninated, the Zioni sts began to expel the Palestinians 
. 
and made an all-out effort to grab the whole of Palestine and face the 
world with an illegal fai t accompli . But the fai ts accomplis of I srael 
still do not constitute a norm for international law. With this cognizance 
in mind we can proceed to analyze the legal interpretation of the mandates 
system because the modern problem of Palestine involves certain legal 
i ssues which it is essential to decide authoritatively before any solution 
consi stent w1 th international law and justice can be reached. 4 
Brierly asserts that there are certain modes of acquiring ter-
ritory, the most important modes being categori zed as occupation, cession, 
conquest, prescription, and accretion. 5  But, at Versailles, the Entente 
Powers implemented a new political facade for acquiring territories, the 
mandates system . 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century the colonizing 
states of Europe introduced fo:ms of staking out their claims in terri-
tories where for one reason or another they were for the time being un-
able or unwilling to make an effective physical occupation. Among these 
devices, besides colonial protectorates ,  spheres of influence, and leases, 
came the mandates. But Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations created a new status for terri tories surrendered by Ge:many and 
Turkey to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, these wartime 
Powers being the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. 
ii 
'lhe guiding principle of the new institution was declared to be that the 
•::· well-being of these peoples formed a "sacred trust of civilization" ;  and 
It this trust was to be carried out by placing them under the "tutelage" of ll'· 
�'.·,' . . . different members of the League as "mandatories on behalf of the League . "  ·; 
Of the thirteen mandates, divided into three classes known as A, B and C, 
the British mandate over Palestine (which included the a.rea known as Trans-
. 
jordan) was in the A class. 6 These A class mandate countries were described 
in ·the Covenant, not very ingenuously, as "independent nations", but 
"subject to the rendering of admini strative advice and assistance until 
such time as they are able to stand alone . "  The mandatory state, unlike 
a protecting state , was in theory disinterested, and 1 t assumed obligations 
both to the population under mandate and to the League . '!be Palestine man-
date became anomalous in that the party i ssuing the very poll tical Balfour 
Declaration was not selected as the mandatory state by the Palestinian 
people and Bri tain unilaterally imposed the establishment therein of a 
"Jewish national home" ,  a policy which the mandatory power confUsingly 
had to reconcile w1 th 1 ts more important and obviously preeminent legal 
obligation to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine . 
The mandatory system was supposedl y inst! tuted as an attempt to 
deal w1 th one of the most difficult of world pro bl.ems in the post-war 
period; namely, how to interrupt the Powers' competition for Turkish and 
Gennan terri torial war spoils while still imparting some sort of agreed 
entrenous for acquiring administrative control in the fonner enemy ter-
ri tortes, The mandatory system had some curious dichotomies; for example,  
the Covenant provided that the wishes of the communities were to be the 
principal consideration in the selection of Class A mandatories, but 
actual selection was made by the Allied Powers alone. Moreover, if the 
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system was considered to be a good one or legally impartial why was i t  
limited to ex-Gennan and Turkish terri tortes? Another interesting failure, 
as i f  intended , was that the League had strangely no power to coerce a 
mandatory power or to verify its reports by direct investigation; i t  had 
to rely on public opinion and the spirit of willing cooperation to make 
its criticisms effective. Thus Bri tain was knowingly left to administer 
. 
the Palestine Mandate in anyway i t  so detennined. 
On the mandate system there had been much discussion of the 
question of sovereignty over mandated territori es; for example the cy-
clical argument goes "did i t  reside in the League?" But the League did 
not appoint the mandatory powers, hence i t  cannot revoke the mandates, 
or at any rate it cannot do so at discretion, and it exercised no govern-
ing powers in the terri tori.es or over the mandatory powers. But the man-
datory must account for its actions, the te?:ritories were not annexed to 
mandatory dominions, and the populations did not take the mandatory' s  
nationality. It would appear that the powers exercised by the mandatory 
states were supposedly inconsistent with any eventual solution to the 
tennination of mandates. ActUally, the mandates were quite clear in 
tenns of the eventual self-detennination of the people in the territories. 
But this clarl ty came only from the International Courts of both the League 
and United Nations era although we may include the treaty obligation pro-
posed by the Pennanent Mandates Commi ssion, adopted by the League Council 
and accepted juridically by all the League members. 
'!'he League of Nations was an association of states which, while 
retaining their respective sovereignty, agreed . wi th one another to pursue 
a certain juridical line of conduct on the international mandates system 
as laid down in the Covenant Article 22: this instrument became the legal 
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international convention ( treaty) through which the indigenous occupants 
of all the mandated areas occupied a new position in international law 
and received a new international legal status, this being adopted by the 
Council in April 1923.7 'Ihe Council accepted with slight modifications 
the following draft resulution of the Permanent Mandates Commission: 
The Council of the League of Nations, 
Having considered the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on 
the national status of the inhabitants of territories under B and C 
mandates. 
I� accordance with the principles laid down in Article 22 of the 
Covenant : Resolves as follows: 
( 1 )  The status of the native inhabitants of a mandated territory i s  
distinct from that of the nationals of the Mandatory Power and can­
not be identified therewith by any process having general application. 
(2)  The native inhabitants of a mandated territory are not invested 
with the· nationality of the Mandatory Power by reason of the pro-
tection extended. to them. 
(3) It is not inconsistent with ( 1 )  and (2) above that individual 
inhabitants of the mandated territory should voluntarily obtain 
naturalization from the Mandatory Power in accordance wi �h arrange­
ments which it  i s  open to such Power to make, with this object under 
its own law. 
(4) It is desirable that native inhabitants who receive the protection 
of the Mandatory Power should in each case be designated by some form 
of descriptive title which will specify their status under the mandate .a  
The members of the League accepted this resolution and inasmuch 
as A terri torles by Article 22 were provisionally recognized as indepen-
dent nations, the international legal principle adopted in this resolution 
applied to the Palestine Mandate.9 Its relevancy to the A mandates was 
not discussed by the Council and Permanent Mandates Commission because 
it  was already presumed that A mandated territories approximated indepen­
dent states. 10 With regard to Palestine, the juridical precedent explicit-
ly establishing the precise position of the B and C mandated territories 
in the juridical principle on the question of the occupants' legal status 
was later applied to the Palestinian people .  
The :British legal code for administering the Palestine Mandate 
was called the Palestine Order-in-Council instituted in 1922. Legal 
citizenship qualifications were created under the Palestinian Citi zenship 
Order-in-Council , 1925: the provisions of this Order were based upon the 
Treaty of Lausanne and Arti cle 7 of the Palestine Mandate which declared 
that "The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting 
a nationality law. '!here shall be included in this law provisions framed 
so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestine citi zenship by Jews who 
take up their pennanent residence in Paledtine . .. 1 1 This article is un-
equiv0cal that the nationality is the Palestinian nationality, and that 
the Jews who took up their pennanent residence in Palestine--even against 
the collective will of the Palestinian inhabitants--could take up this 
nationality. 12 Explicitly, Article t �f the Palestinian Citizenship 
Order, 1925, declares that 
Turki sh subj ects habitually resident in the territory of Palestine 
upon the 1st day of August, 1925, shall become Palestinian .citizens. 1 J 
The extent of the open violation of the Palestine citi zenship 
laws by immigrant Jews is revealed by the fact that, al though Brl tain in 
1922 and 1939 specifically _rejected the notion that Jewish immigration 
could be allowed against the will of the Arab inhabitants when i t  reached 
such proportions as to change the Arab character of Palestine, 14 i t  i s  
estimated that over one-half of the 700 , 000 persons of Jewish faith pre-
sent in Palestine in 1947 who were estimated to consti tute some 45 per 
cent of the entire population of Palestine were not Palestinian nationals . 15 
Palestinian nationality did not exist and was so recorded on official doc-
uments including passports , which were issued only to Palestine ' s  nationals.  
Noting that the Palestine nationality entity was juridically implemented 
and recognized by the international community through the League and 
United Nations as well as other non-member states and assuming, therefore, 
� l. i1 
I " 
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the validity of the estimate that only one-half or approximately 350, 000 
persons of the Jewish faith were Palestinian nationals ( this estimate in-
eludes those who completed immigration requirements and were eligible for 
Palestinian nationality) , less than one-third of the entire population 
dictated ( and by armed force ) the outcome of. .the future of Palestine 
against the express will of two-thirds of ·the remaining legitimate na-
tionals. This is not considered in international law a valid expression 
of self-determination ( even less justi ft.able i s  the terrl tori.al appor-
tionment of 56 per cent of Palestine to a "Jewish" state which would 
have included a 50 per cent Arab population with the Jews owning less 
. . 
than 10 per cent of the total land area where they were to be established 
as the ruling body--a settlement which no self-respecting iri.1.igenous people 
could accept from an alien immigrant population) . By denying the Palestinian 
Arabs, who fonned over two-thirds majority of the country--actually a 
larger majority percentage when the number of illegal and non-national 
Jewish faction i s  consider�d--the right to decide the question of self­
detennination, the Uni ted Nations had violated its own Charter. 16 In 
international law, the de facto presence of illegal occupants who are non-
nationals cannot be given de jure recogni tion neither by the United Nations 
in a parti tion plan predicated on the basi s of a semblance of application 
of a right of self-determination nor under the indigenous circumstances 
of municipal naturali zation/citizenship legal provisions, especially in 
the case of Palestine where the nationality statutes were invoked by the 
international conv ention of the Palestine Mandate. In effect, and in 
violation of international law, the United Nati ons nullified the 
Palestinians' right to implement self-detennination by including in the 
category of people eligible to vote persons (nonnationals ) who did not 
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prefer nor qualify under the Palestinian nationality legal criterion. 
Another often overlooked violation of international law which 
illegally impaired the legitimate right to the exercise of self-detenni-
nation to the indigenous Arab population of Palestine previous to the 
radical Zionist mill tacy demographic transfomation in 1947-48 lies in 
the violation of the international mandates system and its successor 
the Uni ted Nations trusteeship system. 'lhese systems did not juridically 
envi sion, nor did they in legal theory pennit, a trust terri tory to be so 
irregularly administered by a mandatory as to allow an imposed or force-
ful demographic transfomation designed to radically and irreparably 
alter the indigenous character of that terri tory and change its population 
for aliens. To allow a trustee to inject aliens into the population of 
trust territories against the will of the original native people and to 
subsequently recogni ze in these aliens the ·same rights as in the original 
native people i s  a flagrant violation of the mandate and trusteeship 
system . For the United Nations to then act on the basis of these illegally 
imposed cond.1 tions is in gravest manifest derogation of its international 
juridical obligations to the original indigenous population and their legit­
imate rights already insti tuted by the international convention ( treaty) , 
which were to be guarded as a "sacred trust. "  To be i n  accoroance with 
legitimate criteria determined by the juridical rights and obligations 
stemming from the trusteeship system and its international stated purposes 
to which i t  was morally and legally bound the right of self-detennination 
in the case of Palestine should have been considered by the Uni ted Nations 
when i t  politically opted for terrl tortal parti tion. 
The question of the legal definition and purpose of the inter-










priate juridical interpretations by the international courts of justice . 
In the South-West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v .  South Africa; Liberia v .  South 
Africa) the International Court of Justice, in its judgment of July 18 ,  
1966, unquestionably clarified the meaning of the mandates system . 1? 
When the juridical decision was made with regard to the future of these 
territories which as a consequence of the war of 1914-1918 had ceased to 
be under the sovereignty of the states whi ch fonnerly governed them, and 
which "were inhabited by peoples considered "not yet able" to assume a full 
measure of self-government, two principles were considered to be of para-
mount importance: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that 
the well being and development of such. peoples fonned "a sacred trust of 
civilization . "  With a view to giving practical effect to these principles, 
an international supervision, the mandates system was created by Article 
22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations• A "tutelage" was to be es-
tablished for these peoples and this tutelage was to be entrusted to cer-
tain "advanced" nations and exercised by them "as mandatories on behalf 
. 
of the League. "  A legal review of the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the case of the status of South-West Africa, July 1 1 ,  
1950, iterates the two principles of "non-annexation" and "sacred trust of 
civili zation. "  
'nle decision of the Court of July 18,  1966 in the South-West Africa 
Cases should be given careful explication because the Court was very care-
ful to analyze the intent of the Mandates System and in the legal· context 
at the time the system originated. The writer has been careful to include 
only the more significant provisions of the Court ' s  advisements and has 
underscored certain passages to add emphasis. 
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16. It is i n  their capacity as former members of the League of 
Nations that the Applicants appear before the Court; and the rights 
they claim are those that the members of the League are said to have 
been invested w1 th i n  the time of the League. Accordingly, in order 
to determine what the rights and obligations of the Parties relative 
to the Mandate were and are ( supposing i t  still to be i n  force, but 
without prejudi ce to that questi on ) ;  and in particular whether (as 
regards the Applicants) these include any right individually to call 
for the due execution of the ' conduct' provisions, and ( for the 
Respondent) an obligation to be answerable to the Applicants i n  
respect o f  i t s  administration of the Mandate, the Court must place 
i tself at the point in time when the mandates system was being 
instituted, and when the instruments of mandate were being framed. 
The Court must have regard to the situation as i t  was at that time, 
which was the critical one, and to the intentions of those concerned 
as they appear to have existed, or are reasonably to be inferred , in 
the light of that situation. Intentions that might have been formed 
i f  the Mandate had been framed at a much later date, and in the know­
ledge of circumstances, such as the eventual dissolution of the 
League and its aftermath, that . could never originally have been 
foreseen, are not relevant. Only .on this basi s can . a correct 
appreciation of the legal rights of the Parties be arrived at. 
'Ibis view is supported by a previous finding of the Court ( Rights of 
United States Nationals in Morocco, I . C. J .  Reports 1952, at p .  189 ) ,  
the effect of which i s  that the meaning of a juridical notion in a 
historical context, must be sought by reference to the way in which 
that notion was understood in that context. 
17. It follows that any enquiry into the rights and obligations of 
the Parties in the present case must proceed principally on the basis 
of considering, in the setting of their period, the texts of the 
instruments and parti cUl,ar provi sions intended to give jµridical 
expression to the notion of the ' sacred trust of civilization' by 
insti tuting a mandates system • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
19 . As is well known, the mandates system originated in the decision 
taken at the Peace Conference following upon the world war of 1914-1918 ,  
that the colonial terri tories over which, by Article 1 19 of the Treaty 
of Versailles, Germany renounced 'all her rights and titles' i n  favour 
of the then Principal Allied and Associated Powers, should not be 
annexed by those Powers or by any country affiliated to them, but 
should be placed under an international regime, in the application to 
the peoples of those terri tories, deemed ' not yet able to stand by 
themselves ' , of the principle ,  declared by Article 22 of the League 
Covenant ,  that their ' well-being and development' should form a ' sacred 
trust of civili zation ' .  
;' 20. '!be type of regime specified by Article 22 of the Covenant as con-
stituting the ' best method of giving practical effect to this principl e '  
was that ' the tutelage o f  such peoples should be entrusted to advanced 
nati ons • • •  who are willing to accept i t ' , --and here i t  was specifically 
added that i t  was to be ' on behalf of the League' that ' this tutelage 
should be exercised by those nations as Mandatories' . It was not pro­
vided that the mandates should, either additionally or i n  the alternativ� 
r 
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be exercised on behalf of the members of the League in their individual 
capacities. The mandatories were to be the agents of, or trustees for 
the League , --and not of, or for, each and every member of it individ­
ually. 
21 • . • .  the Mandatory, in agreeing to accept the Mandate, had under­
taken ' to exercise i t  on behalf of the League of Nations' • • . •  The 
effect of this recital , as the Court sees i t ,  was to register an 
implied recognition • • •  ( b )  on the part of both the Mandatory and the 
Council of the League , of the character of the Mandates as a Juridical 
r�gime set within the framework of the League as an i nstitution • • . •  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
49. '!he Court must now tum to certain questions of a wider character • 
. 'lbroughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly, 
that humanitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to 
generate legal rights and obligations, and that the Court can and 
should proceed accordingly. The Court does not think so . It i s  a 
court of law, and can take account o f  moral princples only in so far 
as these are given a suffi cient expression in legal fonn. Law exists, 
it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for that reason it 
can do so only through and within the limits of its own discipline. 
Otherwise, i t  is not a legal service that would be rendered . 
50. Humani tarian considerati ons may constitute the ins?ira.tional 
basis for rules of law, just as, for instance, the preambular parts 
of the United Nations Charter constitute the moral and political 
basis for the specific legal provi sions· thereafter set out. Such 
considerations do not, however, in themselves amount to rules of law. 
All States are interested--have an interest--in such matters. But 
the existence of an 'interest' does not of i tself entail that this 
interest i s  specifically juridical in character. 
51 . It i s  in the light of these considerations that the Court must 
examine what i s  perhaps the most important contention of a general 
character that has been advanced in connection with this aspect of the 
case, namely the contention by which it i s  sought to derive a legal 
right or i nterest in the conduct of the mandate from the simple 
existence, or principle, of the ' sacred trust' • • • .  in order that this 
interest may take on a speci fically legal character, the sacred trust 
1 tself must be or become something more than a moral or humani tarian 
ideal . In order to generate legal rights and obligations, i t  must be 
given juridical expression and be clothed in legal fonn. One such 
fonn might be the United Nations trusteeship system , --another, as 
contained in Chapter XI of the Charter • • • •  
52. In the present case, the principle of the sacred trust has as 
its sole juridical expression the mandates system . As such, it 
constitutes a moral ideal given fom as a juridical regime in the 
shape of that system . But i t  i s  necessary not to confuse the moral 
ideal with the legal rules intended to g1. ve it effect. For the 
purpose of realizing the aims of the trust- in the particular form of 
any given mandate , its legal rights and obligations were those, and 
those alone, which resulted from the relevant instruments creating 
the system , and the mandate itself, within the framework of the 





53. 'Ihus it i s  that paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Covenant, in 
the same breath that it postulates the principle of the sacred trust, 
specifies in terms that, in order to give ' effect to this princple ' ,  
the tutelage of the peoples of the mandated territories should be 
entrusted to certain nations, 'and that this tutelage should be 
exercised by them ' as mandatories 'on behalf of the League • .  I t  
was from this that flowed all the legal consequences already noticed. 
54. To sum up, the principle of the sacred trust has no residual 
juridical. content which could, so far as any particular mandate i s  
concerned, operate per s e  to give rise to legal. rights and obligati ons 
outside the system as a whole: and, within the system equally, such 
rights and obligations exist only in 'so far as there i s  actual. 
provision for them . Once the expression to be given to an idea 
has been accepted in the form of a particular regime or system, its 
legal incidents are those of the regime or system. I t  i s  not per­
missible to import new ones by a process of appeal to the ori ginating 
idea--a process that would, ex hypothesi, have no natural limit. 
Hence, although , as has constantly been reiterated , the members of 
League had an interest in seeing that the obligations entailed by 
the mandates system were respected, this was an interest whi ch, 
according to the very nature of the system itself, they could 
exercise only through the appropriate League organs, and not individ­
ually • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . 
93. • • .  , it so happens that there i s  in fact one test that can be 
applied, namely by enquiring what the .States who were members of the 
League when the mandates system was instituted did when, as Members 
of the United Nations, they joined in setting up the trusteeship 
system that was to replace the mandates system. I n  effect, as regards 
structure , they did exactly the same as had been done before, with 
only one though significant difference • • • .  , the Trusteeship Council 
was to play the same sort of role as the Permanent Mandates Commission 
had done, and the General Assembl y (or Securi ty Council in the case 
of strategic trusteeships) was to play the role of the League Council;  
and it was to these bodies that the various administering a.uthori ties 
became answerable • • • •  
As was said i n  the separate opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender i n  
Certain Expenses o f  the United Nations (Article 17,  paragraph 2, o f  the 
Charter) : 
' A  general rule i s  that words used in a treaty should be read as having 
the meaning they bore therein when i t  came into existence • • • •  this 18 meaning must be consistent with the purposes sought to be achieved • • • •  • 
Since World War I and the implementation of the mandates system 
it has been the duty for a mandatory to prepare the peoples of the mandates 
to stand by themselves in the context of their own self-determination. 
There can be no question that Britain failed its international legal 
obligations to the Pal estinian people .  The evidence has been their 
destruction as a national people i n  their own indigenous territory. 
J Earlier, in its advisory opinion of July 11 , 1950, International '! 
·1 Status of South-West Africa, the Court made the following observations 
regarding the legal nature of the Mandates System, a situration in which 
the ' Union of South Africa maintained that the mandate over South-West 
Africa had lapsed and that it could annex the terrl tory to the Union 
Government : 
I t  i s  now contended on behalf of the Union Government that this Mandate 
has lapsed , because the League has ceased to exist. 'nlis contention i s  
based o n  a misconception of the legal situation created by Article 22 
of the Covenant and by the Mandate itself. The League ·:as not, as 
alleged by that Government, a ' mandator' in the sense in which this 
term is used in the national law of certain States. I t  had only 
assumed an international function of supervision and control . The 
' Mandate' had only the name i n  common with the several notions of 
mandate in national law. The object of the Mandate regulated by inter­
national rules far exceeded that of contractual relations regulated 
by national law. The Mandate was created, in the interest of the 
inhabitants of the terol'i. tory, and o f  humanity in general , as an inter­
national institution with an international object--a sacred trust of 
civilization. It is therefore not possible to draw any conclusion 
by analogy from the notions of mandate in national law or from any 
other legal conception of that law. The i nternational rules regu­
lating the Mandate constituted an international status for the 
Territory recogni zed by all the Members of the League of Nations 
including the Union of South Africa. 19 
I n  this same decision a detailed analysis appears i n  the separate 
legal opinion, to which the Court concurred, o f  Judge Sir Arnold McNair 
in thi s same proceeding: 
2. '!be objective character o f  Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations 
From time to time i t  happens that a group of great Powers, or a 
large number o f  States both great and small, assume a power to create 
by a multipartite treaty some new international regime or status, 
which soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durability extending 
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beyond the limits of the actual contracting partie s ,  and giving i t  
an objective existence. This power i s  used when some public inter­
est i s  involved, and its exercise often occurs i n  the course of the 
peace settlement at the end of a great war . In 1920 the Council 
of the League had to deal with a di spute between Finland and Sweden, 
which, inter alia, involved an examination of the exi sting condi tion 
of a Convention dated March JO, 1856, between France and Great 
Britain on the one hand and Russia on the other, whereby Russia, in 
compliance with the ·desire of the other two States, declared ' that 
the Aaland Islands shall not be fortified, and that no mili tary or 
naval base shall be maintained or created there ' . 20 
. 
Judge McNair proceeded to explain the juridical precedents im-
parted· by the Commission in the Aaland I slands case, transferring the 
Commission ' s  legal interpretations to the mandates system : 
It may seem a far cry from the Aaland Islands to South-West Africa, 
but reference to this case i s  demanded by the high standing of the 
members of the Commission and by the relevance of their reasoning 
to the present problems. I may also refer to the statement by the 
Pennanent Court in the SS. Wimbledon case • • •  that as a resul t of 
Article )80 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 the Kiel Canal ' has 
become an international waterway intended to provide under treaty 
guarantee ·easier access to the Baltic for the benefit of all nations 
of the world' --which was referred to as .'its new r�gime' • 
The Mandates System seems to me to be an a fortiori case • • • •  A large 
part o f  the civilized world concurred in opening a new chapter in 
the life of between fifteen and twenty millions of people ,  and this 
article (22) was the instrument adopted to give effect to their 
, desire. In my Opinion, the new regime established in pursuance 
of this ' principle'  has more than a purely contractual basi s ,  and 
the territories subjected to i t  are impressed with a special legal 
status, designed to last until modified in the manner indicated by 
Article 22 . The dissolution of the League has produced certain 
di fficul ties, but, as • . •  they are mechanical difficul ties, and the 
policy and principles of the new insti tu ti on have survived the im­
pact of the events of 1939-1946, and have indeed been reincarnated 
by the Charter under the name of the ' International Trusteeship 
System ' ,  with a new lease of life , 21 
But·, significantly, McNair analyzed the underlying policy and 
Principles of Article 22 and of the mandates system : 
Any Engli sh lawyer who was instructed to prepare the legal instru­
ments required to give effect to the policy of Arti cle 22 would in­
evitably be reminded of, and influenced by, the trust of English 
and American law, though he would soon realize the need of much 
adaptation for the purposes of the new international institution. 
Professor Brierly' s opinion, stated in the British Year Book of 
International Law, 1929, pages 217-219, that the governing principle 






of the Mandates System is to be found in the trust, and his quotation 
from an article by M. Lepaulle, are· here very much in point, and i t  
is worth noting that the historical basis of the legal enforcement 
of the English trust is that it was something which was binding upon 
the conscience of the trustee; that is wy i t  was legally enforced. 
It also seems probable that the conception of the Mandates System 
owes something to the French tutelle • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
'!here are three general principles whi ch are common to all these 
institutions: . 
{a) that the control of the trustee ,  tuteur or curateur over the 
property is limited in one way or another; he is not in the position 
of the nonnal complete owner, who can do what he likes w1 th his own, 
because he is precluded from administering the property for his own 
· personal benefit:  
(b) that the trustee, tuteur or cura.teur i s  under some Y.ind of legal 
obligation, based on confidence and consci ence, to carry out the 
trust or mission confided to him for the benefit of some other 
person or for some public purpose ; 
(c} tha.t any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property 
entrusted to him into his own patrimony would be illegal and would 
be prevented by the law. 
'lhese are some of the general pri nciples of private law which throw 
light upon this new institution, and I am convinced tha� in its 
future development the law governing the trust is a source from 
which much can be derived. 'Ihe importance of the Mandates System 
is marked by the fact that, after the· experi ence of a quarter of a 
century, the Charter of the United Nati ons made provision for an 
'Internati onal Trusteeship System ' ,  which was described by a Reso­
lution of the Assembly of the League of April 18th , 1946, as embody­
ing ' principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the Leagu�• . 22 
Another author! ty on the subject of the le·ga:J. nature and definition 
of the mandates explicitly declared : 
'!he terri tori.es or entities for which mandates have been conferred 
and accepted are not States, although they may be States in the mak­
ing. They are populated. areas which the Principal Allied Powers have, 
in consequence of their control thereof, and with the approval of the 
Council of the League of Nations, placed under the administration of 
designated mandatories on conditions set forth in the terms of the 
particular mandates, and in pursuance of the requirements of the 
Covenant. Those tenns and conditions indicate the measure of author­
ity of the mandatories, and emphasize the obligation of each to accept 
the cooperation and oversight of the League, and to make annual re­
ports to the Council. The mandatory is not free to deal with the 
territory or people assigned. to it as though either were its own: 
the relationship sharply differs from that existing, in an inter­
national sense, between the Uni ted States and its colonial possessions 
such as the Philippine I slands. A territory or entity under mandate 
is thus to be distinguished from the colonial possession which, in 
I i � I � 
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international contemplation, i s  a part of the State to which i t  belongs. 
'!he outstanding, and perhaps novel , feature of the mandatory system 
is  the international obligation imposed upon and accepted by the 
mandatory to administer a terri torial area not its own, and not 
constituting a State, under the supervision of an international 
agency. 23 
In the final League of Nations study on the mandates system 
� : there appears the following authoritative expli cation of the main char-
' � 




'lhe aim of the institution is to ensure the well-being and develop­
ment of the peoples inhabi ting the territories in questi on. 
The method of attaining this aim consists in entrusting the tutelage 
of these peoples to certain advanced nati ons. The acceptance by a 
nation of this mission carries with it certain obligations and 
responsibilities established by law. Like guardians in civil law, 
they must exercise their authority in the interests of thelr wards--
· that is  to say, of the peoples which are regarded as minors--and 
must maintain an entirely disinterested attitude in their dealings 
with them. '!be territories with the admini stration of which they 
are entrusted must not be exploited by them for their own profit. 
Again, the phrase 'peoples not yet able to stand by themselves' i s  
used.. It follows from this and from the very conception of tutelage 
that this mission i s  not, in principle �  intended to be prolonged 
indefinitely, but only until the peoples under tutelage are capable 
of managing their own affairs. 24 
• e I I • I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
In a first group-- ' A '  Mandates ( Syria and Lebanon ,  Palestine and 
Transjordan, and Iraq)--the nation is provisionally recognized as 
independent, but receives the advice and assistance of a .Mandatory 
in i ts administration until such time as i t  i s  able to stand alone . 25 
' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
'!be 'A '  Mandates differ appreciably from those of the other two 
categories. In the countri es to whi ch they apply, the inhabitants 
had reached a more advanced stage of development and their indepen­
dence could, in principle, be recoP,n.ised by the Covenant itself, 
subject to the condi tions which have been mentioned above. The 
mission of the Mandatories in these countries has therefore consisted 
mainly in developing their capacity to govern themselves, and in 
establishing their economic systems and social and other institutions 
on a more secure footing i n  order to fit them to take their position 
as independent nations. 26 
· 
� Succinctly stated, thi s authoritative League study described the 
Purpose of the mandates system as "to fit (all .the mandated territories) 
to take their position as independent nations. 11 This author! ta ti ve source 




,f ;fl" �: 
for the indigenous Palestinian Arab population. This same study unques-
t1onably confirmed Palestine as an eventual independent state by i terating 
that "A nationali ty law is to be enacted containing provisions framed so 
as to facilitate the aequisition of Palestinian citi zenship by Jews who 
take up their permanent residence in Palestine . .. 27 This provision clear-
. 
ly depicts that Palestine was never to become, as Zionism maintains, a 
"Je�;:;h State", that � s ,  the Zionist "Judenstaat" envisioned by Herzl 
and successive Zionist leaders over the past eighty years. 
Consequently. in the legal opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on the juridical status of So�th-West Africa of July 11,  1950, · 
the Court specified international legal rules regulating the mandate trust 
and expl1ci tly declared all mandated terri tori.es "are impressed with a 
special legal status, designed to last" until native independence was 
achieved . Regardless of the collusive Zionist-British perfidy through 
1939 the mandate system was predicated on the existence of a Palestinian 
national entity, which unde� the i nternational law was to develop into 
complete independence as a nation. '!he right of self-determination was 
reserved for the indigenous population, However, to provide the eventual 
creation of a "Jewish national home"--and we should recall that the Br1 ti sh 
understood the Zionist Judenstaat scheme regardless of what they were public-
ly assuring--the history of the Palestine Mandate reveals that stringent 
restrictions upon the right of self-determination were imposed by the 
Brl ti sh who autocratically controlled the Palestinian people under coloni­
alist ad.mini strati ve policies, more often in op�n violation of its legal 
mandatory responsibilities . 28 Significantly, to the extent that the British 
placed greater restrictions and roadblocks upon the right of self-determin� 
ation, tile establishment of the "Jewish national home" conflicted with 
the more preeminent principle of the right of self-detennination and 
mandatory juridical obligations to prepare Palestine for independence. 
In essence, the legal doctrine failed juridical implementation because 
the British failed in its international trusteeship responsibility. 
'lhe principle of international law specifically applying the mandates 
system ' s  doctrine of self-determination was, in the case of the 
Palestinian people, unfortunately but grievously violated. 
.i 
Chapter Six 
1 1chaim Weizmann was Russian by birth, British by naturalization before 
I! 
the First World War, and in 1914 a lecturer in chemistry at Manchester 
University, a seat acquired at the time of his first meeting with Balfour 
in 1906. Wei zmann was one of the leading Zionist negotiators whose 
efforts led to the issuance of the Ba.lfour Declaration. 
2Doreen Ingrams ( comp . ) ,  Palestine Paners 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict 
(New York : Braziller, 1973), p. 95. Thi s quote is taken from official 
British Government documents. Sir Eri c (1888-1925) served in the Bri tish 
Diplomatic Service and attended the Pari s Peace Conference 1918-1919 and 
the San Remo Conference in 1920. 
3Brltish Public Records Office, Forei gn Office, 371/5245: ci ted in 
Ingrams, ibid . ,  p. 97. From 1920 to 1924 Lord Vansittart was private 
secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, who 
became British Foreign Secretary in 1919. 'lbe quote i s. from a letter 
Vansittart sent Curzon on August 2, 1920, pertaining to a new revised draft 
of the proposed British version of the Palestine Mandate. 
4To have taken the Bri tish Government thirty years to find out that 
the Mandate for Palestine was "unworkable" and Britai n ' s  legal obligations 
thereunder "irreconciliable" after having created the problem in 1917 
through the Balfour Declaration where none erlsted before, and after 
flooding the country illegally with Jewish immigrants who were mainly 
Zionists until the Palestine Jewish community became strong enough to 
wrest the country mill tartly from its original Arab inhabi tants, and 
then to wash its hands at the later hour of May 1948 and declare its 
unwillingness to enforce a solution "not accepted by both parties" under 
the pretext of "conscience , "  does not speak well of either the British 
conscience or intelligence. The fact is that it is a very shameful re­
action. In the context of international law it should be known that the 
Palestine Arabs were--and still are--the victims of an aged Zionist plan 
to wrest the area from its Arab inhabi tants; and when the time came, 
Muslims and Christians were forcibly expelled and dispossessed on racial 
and religious grounds by aliens who established themselves, in violation 
of international law, as the government. 
5J . L .  Brierly, The Law of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 
19J6 ) ,  pp. 120-1)4. 
6rn actual fact, also in definite violation of its mandatory 
obligations, the British arbitrarily split off the territory of Trans­
jordan; it  was set up as a separate mandated territory although earlier 
included in the Palestine Mandate. 
?officially accepted by the Council at i ts meeting of April 23, 1923. 
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81eague of Nations Official Journal, 1923, 4 : 604. It should be 
noted that the distinct status which the United States accorded the 
indigenous national s of the Philippines was referred to as a prece­
dent for the proposed status of inhabi tants in the mandated terri­
tories. See Ibid. , 41569. The phrase "with this object under its 
own law" refers to the municipal naturalization laws of the manda­
tory state. At the time this resolution was adopted there existed 
the problem of the ci tfzenship status of the large German colonial 
population in the territory of South-West Af:rlca. 
9It is interesting to note that even �fore the League estab­
lished the legal status of the inhabitants of mandated terri tories 
the Supreme Court of the Union of South Africa in the case of 
Christian v.  Rex, South African Law Reports ( 1924 ) ,  Appellate Divi­
sion, pp. 101 ,  1 12, declared that "Article 22 [of the Covenant] de­
scribes the administration of the terri tories and peoples with which 
it deals as a tutelage to be exercised by the governing Power as man­
datory on behalf of the League. 'Ihose terms were probably employed, 
not in their stri ct legal sense, but as indicating the policy which 
the governin'g authori ty should pursue. The relationship between the 
League and the mandatory could not with any legal accuracy be de­
scribed as that of principal and agent." The Court declared that the 
residents of South-West Africa did not have the nationality of South 
Africa. 
10The phrase of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations -- "Certain comrnuni ties fomerly belonging to the 'furkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as 
independent nations can be provi sionally recognized • • • •  " -- did not 
apply to B and C mandated territories. 
1 1'Ihis article alone should have made it legally clear that Arab 
Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State against the will 
of the Arab population of the country. Moreover, officially clari­
fying the Balfour Declaration in 1922, Winston Churchill ( then Bri tish 
Colonial Secretary) stated that "the terms of the Declaration do not 
contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a 
Jewish National Home but that such a Home should be founded in 
falesti ne . "  By this phrase, he said, was meant "not the imposition of 
a Jewish nati onality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but 
the further development of the exi sting Jewish com.munity • • •  in order 
that i t  might become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may 
take . • •  an interest and pride . "  See the Churchill Memorandum, Cmd. 1700, 
Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist 
Organi zation, 1922. 
i 
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1 
12It should be noted that on the question of Palestine before 
the United Hations in 1947-48, the General Assembly through the 
' politics of the Western nations, turned down the only reasonable 
suggestions, i . e . ,  a referendum in Palestine and submission of the 
legal problems to the International Court of Justice. The Arab 
delegations requested that legal aspects of the Palestine-Zionist 
question be referred to the International Court of Justice as the 
recourse provided by Article 36 of the United Nations Charter and 
by Article 26 of the Mandate whi ch provided: "The Mandatory agrees 
that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory 
and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the inter­
pretation or the application of the provi'sions of the mandate , such 
dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice • • • •  " When requests 
fo� legal adjudication was voted on, the count was 20 for, 21 
against. Also noted, that by denying the Palestinian Arabs, who 
fonned the two-thirds majority of the country, the right to decide 
for themselves, the United Nations had violated its own Charter. 
'Ibe action of the United Nations was also contrary to the legal 
principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter of August 12, 1941, 
which specified that Britain and the United States "desire to · see 
no terrl torial changes that do not accord w1 th the freely expressed 
wishes of the people concerned."  It added that the two Powers 
"respect the right of all peoples to choose the fonn of gov1:.:rrunent 
under which they w111 11 ve. "  
13sir }nchael McDonnell, ed. , The Law· Reports of Palestine 
(London: Waterlow and Sons Ltd. , 19)4), p. 215. 
14woodward and Butler, eds. ,  Great Brita.in Foreign Office, 
Documents on Briti sh Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (1946). At that time, 
the British stated that the Balfour Declaration did not contemplate 
the disappearance or subordination of the Arable population, language 
or customs in Palestine or the imposition of the "Jewish nationality" 
upon Palestinian Arabs. 
151t is estimated that, alone, in the seven years after 1939 
250;000 Jews entered Palestine illegally. 
16H .  Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950); M. Shukrl , The 
Concept of Self-Detennination in the United Nations (1965); Bowett, 
"Self-Detennination and Poli ti cal Rights in Developing Countries," 1966 
Proceedings American Society of International Law, 129. The subsequent 
history of the United Nations corroborates the proposition that i t  i s  more 
than a recognized concept and has become a general principle of interna­
tional law. See, e.g. , the General Assembly's request of the Commission 
on Human Rights to study ways and means "which would ensure the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination . "  G.A. Res. 421 , 5 U .N .  GAOR 
Supp. 20, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) .  At its Seventh Session the 
General Assembly stated that "all peoples shall have the right of self- · · 
detennination."  G.A.  Res • .545, 7 U.N.  GAOR Supp. 20, at--,  U.N. Doc. A/2361 
(1952).  The Commission on Human Rights prepared several resolutions on 
the matter that were adopted by the General Assembly, G.A.  Res. 837, 9 
U.N.  GAOR Supp. 21, at 21, U.N. Doc . A/2890 (19.54); G.A. Res. 9 U.N. GAOR 
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Supp. 21, at 20, U . N .  Doc. A/2890 ( 19.54) :  G . A .  Res. 7J8, 8 U . N .  G�OR 
Supp. 17, at 18, U . N .  Doc. A/2630 ( 195�) :  G.A.  Res. 612, 7 U . N .  GAOR 
Supp . 20, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/2361 ( 1952 :
. 
G.A.  Res. 6 1 1 ,  7 U . N .  GAOR 
Supp. 20, at 5, U . N .  Doc. A/2361 ( 1952 : G . A .  Res, 648, 7 U . N .  GAOR 
Supp . 20, at 33, U . N .  Doc . A/2361 (1952 ) ; G . A .  Res. 637, 7 U . N .  GAOR 
Supp. 20, at 26, U . N .  Doc. A/2361 (1952 ) : see also Colonial Resolution, 
G . A .  Res. 1514, 1 5  U . N .  GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U . N .  Doc. A/L. 323 (1960). 
At its Tenth Session the General Assembly examined the draft articles 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were subsequently adopted 
on Dec. 16, 1966. G . A .  Res. 2200, 21 U . N  • . GAOR Supp. 1 6 ,  at 49, U . N .  
Doc. A/6:;+6 (1966 ) .  See also Eagleton, Self-Determinati on i n  the 
United Nations, 47 Am .  J .  INT'L.L. 88 ( 1953). 
17 · The terri tory of South-West Africa was one of the German overseas 
possessions in respect of which Germany by Arti cle 119 of the Treaty of 
Versailles renounced all her rights and titles in favor of the Principal 
Allied and Associated Powers. Judge Jessup, in a 119-page di ssenting 
opinion i n  the South-West Africa Cases ,  di sagreed with his colleagues. 
Today, South-West Africa is the territory called Nami·bia . While South 
Africa has sought to annex it, the International Court of Justice and 
the United Nations have respectfully advised and determined that the 
"Namibian" people shall receive self-detennination and that South Africa 
i s  to desist from terrl tori.al incursions having annexationi st designs. 
18rnternational Court of Justice Reports 1962, 186, p . 151 . 
19International Court of Justice Reports 1950, 128, p .  132. Today 
South-West Africa i s  commonly referred to as Namibia and i s  frequently 
mentioned in the news as the ongoing cor.t1.ict between South Africa and 
the Namibian people contigues. 
20 Ibid. , 128, p .  153, The Aaland Islands are a strategic i sland 
group at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, controlled by Finland 
since 1921. This Convention became an integral part of the General 
Treaty of Peace between seven States in 18,56 which brought the Crimean 
War to an end. Sweden claimed that this status of demili tari za ti on was 
still in force in 1920 in spite of many intervening events, and that she ,  
though not a party to the Convention or Peace Treaty, was entitled to 
the benefit of i t :  her claim was based on the allegation of an inter­
national servitude. As the Permanent Court of International Justice had 
not then come into existence, the Council of the League set up a 
Commi ssion of Jurists, Professor F. Larnaude (Presiden t ) ,  Professor 
A .  Struycken and Professor Max Huber, and referred certain legal questions 
to them . They received written statements and heard oral arguments 
on behalf of Finland and Sweden. '!be Jurists rejected the argument 
based on an alleged servitude and reported that the provisions of the 
Convention and Treaty of 18_56 for demilitarization were still in force . :  
"These provi sions were laid down i n  European interests. They constituted 
L " 
l 
I ' '  
a special international status, relating to military considerations, 
for the Aaland Islands. It follows that until these provisions are 
duly replaced by others, every State interested (including Sweden: 
which was not a party] has the right to insist upon compliance with 
them. I t  also follows that any State in possession of the Islands 
must conform to the obligations binding upon it,  arising out of the 
system of demilitari zation established by these provi sions. t1 
21Ibid. ' p I 154. 
22Ibid . , 128 , pp. 148-150. McNair added : "Nearly every legal 
system possesses some insti tution whereby the property (and sometimes 
the persons) of those who are not sui juri s,  such as a minor or a 
luna�ic ,  can be entrusted to some responsible person as a trustee or 
tuteur or curateur. The Anglo-American trust serves this purpose , and 
another purpose even more closely akin to the Mandates System, namely, 
the vesting of property in trustees, and its management by them in 
order that the public or some class of the public may derive benefit 
or that some public purpose may be served . The trust has frequently 
been used to protect the weak and the dependent, in cases where there 
is  ' great might on the one side and unmight on the other' ,  and the 
English courts have for many centuri es pursued a vigorous policy in the 
admini stration and enforcement of trusts . "  
23I .  Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by 
the United States (1945), pp. 102-J.  . . .  
24 League of Nations, 'nle Mandates System, Origin, Principles, 
Application ( 1945), Vol . I ,  A .  1 ,  pp. 23-24. 
25Ibid . ,  p.  24. 
26Ibid. ' p .  27. 
27Ibid . '  p.  30. 
28vincent Sheean, Personal History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1969 ) ,  p .  )8 1 .  Vincent Sheean reported from Palestine in 
1929 after a lengthy residence that the Palestinian Arabs "had no 
political rights of any kind, no parliament or council or legi slature , 
and were governed by ukase. '!be law was whatever the (British ) high 
comroi ssi oner wanted it to be . ti 
CHAPTER VII 
'lliE QUESTION OF LEGAL TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
'Ihe wea.k point of our position of course i s  that in the case of 
Palestine we ( the British Government) deli berately and rightly 
decline to accept the principle of self-determination . 1  
--Arthur Balfour 
So far as Palestine i s  concerned the Powers had made no 
declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have 
not always intented to violate , 2  
--Arthur Balfour 
The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the 
policy of the Allies i s  even more flagrant in the case of the 
"independent nation" of Palestine than in that of the "indepen­
dent nation" of Syria . For in Palestine we ( the Allies) do not 
propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of 
the present (Palestinian) inhabitants of the country, though 
the American Commission has been going through the form of ask­
ing what they are . 3  
--Arthur Balfour 
Dr Weizmann took the view that • • •  i t  was desirable that the 
(Zionist) commi ssion should sttri.ve to produce certain definite 
fai ts accomplis, such as • • •  the organisation of the Jewish com­
munity in Palestine . • .  on an autonomous basi s ,  so that when the 
time comes for the Peace Conference certain definite steps will 
have been taken which will give the Zionists some right to be 
heard at the Peace Conference. 4 
--Ormsby-Gore 
'Ihe problem which we have to work out now i s  one of tactics, not 
strategy, the general strategic idea as I conceive i t ,  being the 
gradual immigration of Jews into Palestine until that country 
becomes a predominantly Jewish State • • •  , :But it i s  questionable 
whether we are in a position to tell the Arabs what our policy 
really mean s . 5  
--Sir Hubert Young 
'Ihi s chapter can necessarily give only a brief but hopefully 
concise interpretation of the question of legal sovereignty in the the 
case of Palestine. President Woodrow Wilson particularly contributed 
to the juridical concept of self-determination of peoples and to the 
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of legal sovereignty6 : 
People are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another 
by an in"tternational conference or an understanding between rivals 
a.nd antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples 
may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 
"Self-determination" i s  not a mere phrase . It is an imperative 
principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at 
their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking, or 
by the mere arrangements of a peace conference . It cannot be 
pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful 
states. 7  
·Lty 'Ihe creation of the League of Nations provided the first oppor-for a sustained effort for both the development and codification 
of international law. 8 Regarding the i ssue of legal sovereignty, in its 
Ii Advisory Opinion of July 1 1 ,  1950, International Status of South-West 
·!  
'" 
Africa, the International Court of Justice made the following observat-
ions regarding the legal naiiure of the Mandates System9 : 
It i s  now contended on behalf of the Union Government that this 
Mandate has lapsed, because the League has ceased to exist. '!his 
contention is based on a mi sconception of the legal situation created 
by Article 22 of the Covenant and by the Mandate itself. The League 
was not, as alleged by that Government, a "mandator" in the sense in 
which this term is used in the national law of certain States. It 
had only asswned an international function of supervi sion, and 
control . 'Ihe "Mandate" had only the name in common with the several 
notions of mandate in national law. The object of the Mandate reg­
ulated by international rules far exceeded that of contractual rela­
tions regulated by national law. 'Ihe Mandate was created , in the 
interest of the inhabi. tants of the territory, and of humanity in 
general , as an international institution with an international object-­
a sacred trust of civilization. It is therefore not possible to draw 
any conclusion by analogy from the notions of mandate in national law 
or from any other legal conception of that law. 'Ihe international 
rules regulating the Mandate constituted an international status for 
the Territory recogni zed by all the Members of the League of Nations, 
including the Union of South Africa. 10 
'Ihe legal nature of the Mandates System appeared in the separate 
opinion of Judge Sir Arnold McNair in this same proceeding. He stipulated 
the legal objective of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations: 
From time to time it happens that a group of . great Powers, or a large 
number of States both great and small , assume a power to create by 





soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durabili�y extending beyond 
the limits of the actual contracting parti e s ,  and giving i t  an ob­
jective exi stence . '!hi s power is used when some public interest i s  
involved, • • • •  11  
I · 1 McNair referred to the creation of "true objective law1112 and 
[ , •special legal status" instituted by Article 22 of the Covenant :  
� • •  Article 2 2  proclaimed the principle that the well-being and devel­
opment of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that 
securities for the performance o f  this trust should be embodied in 
the Covenant" . A large part of the civilized world concurred in 
opening a n�w chapter in the life of between fifteen and twenty 
millions of peoples, and this article was the instrument adopted 
to give effect to their desire . In my opinion, the new regime 
establi shed in pursuance of thi s "principle" has more than a purely 
contractual basis, and the terri tories subjected to i t  are impressed 
with a special legal status, designed to last until modified in the 
manner indicated by Article 22. The di ssolution of the League has 
produced certain difficulties, but , as I shall explain, they are 
mechanical difficulties,  and the policy and principles of the new 
institution have survived the impact of the events of 1939 to 1946, 
and have indeed been reincarnated by the Charter under the name of 
the "International Trustee ship System" , with a new lease of life .13 
On July 24, 1922, the Palestine Mandate was approved by the Council 
of the League of Nations; i t  was to become effective officially on December 
22, 1923. It is interesting to observe the attempt by the Vati can to stop 
its approval because Cardinal Gasparri , the Papal Secretary of State , 
subnitted a critical memorandum dated May 1 5 ,  1922, attacking the Mandate 
provision pertaining to the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration; Cardinal 
Gasparri declared, inter alia, that this proposed article was incompatible 
with the Covenant of the League . It is extremely interesting to notehow 
the British Goverrunent answered this attack because Britain was compelled 
to expli citly define its mandatory policy in Palestine, though i t  as yet 
was to receive the Mandate for Palestine . Britain issued a special Command 
Paper answering Gasparri ' s  severe critici sms :  
His Majesty' s  Government fully share the opinion expressed by Cardinal 
Gasparri that article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
would be incompatible with a mandate that proved to be an instrument 
for the subjection of the native populations for the benefit of another 
" ,, 
nationality. H.M.G.  contemplate that the status of all citizens 
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of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and that 
it has never been intended that they or any sect of them should 
possess any other juridical status. Regarding Cardinal Gasparri ' s  
allusion to article 11 of the draft mandate in support of his con­
tention that "the Jews are to be given a privileged and· preponder­
ating position as against other nationalities and creeds" , this was 
answered by the assertion that "the Jewi sh people • • .  are ready and 
willing to contribute by their resources and effo�ts to develop the 
country for the good of all its inhabitants" . . •  , 14 
In the final League of Nations study on the Mandates System there 
appears the fol�owing account of the main legal characteristics established 
by the provi sions of Article 22 of the Covenant: 
Without going into controversial questions regarding the legal nature 
of the mandates, i t  may be said that the followi ng main principles 
emerge from these provi sions : . • • •  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Again, the phrase "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves" i s  
used. It follows from this and from the very conception of tutelage 
that this mission i s  not, in principle ,  intended to be prolonged 
indefinitely, but only until the peoples under tutelage are capable 
of managing their own affairs. 15 
'Il1is same study of the Mandates System declares:  
In a first group--"A" Mandates (Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and 
Transjordan, and Iraq)--the nation is provisi onally recognized as 
independent, but receives the advice and assistance of a Mandatory 6 
in its administration until such time as it i s  able to stand alone . 1 
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The "A" Mandates differ appreciably from those of the other two 
categories. In the countri es to which they apply, the inhabitants 
had reached a more advanced stage of development and their indepen­
dence could, in principle ,  be recognized by the Covenant i tself, 
subject to the conditions which have been mentioned alx>ve. The 
mission of the Mandatories in these countri es has therefore consi sted 
mainly in developing their capacity to govern themselves, and in 
establishing their economic systems and social and other institutions 
on a more secure footing in order to fit them to take their position 
as independent nations. I? 
Article 22 of the Covenant, the legal charter of the 119.ndates 
System, clearly enumerates that Palestine was to become an independent 
state . As regards the termination of the Mandate, Article 2818 stipulated 
that this could only come about by the establishment in Palestine of an 
independent government. The terms of the mandates did not involve any 
. i 
1 i. 1 r,· H 
t , I  
i 'ession of territory or transfer of sovereignty to the mandatory. 
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The 
ntemational Court of Justice has confirmed this principle with regard 
the mandate for South-West Africa: 
I ·  
.i '.. 
'!he terms of this Mandate, as well as the provi sion s of Article 22 
of the Covenant and the principles embodied therein, show that the 
creation of this new international institution [1 . e . , the mandat� 
did not involve any cession of territory or transfer of sovereignty 
to the Union of South Africa. The Union Government was to exercise 
an international function of administration on behalf of the League, 
with the object of promoting the well-being and development of the 
inhabi tants . 19 




' Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter20 of the Uni ted Nations 
legally incorporates the trusteeship system, the direct successor of the 
League ' s  mandates system . 21 The legal emphasi s of the trusteeship i s  
also clear i n  that the promotion of 
the politi cal , economic, social and educational advancement of the 
inhabitants of the Trust Territori es and their progressive develop­
ment toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate 
to the particular circumstances of each Territory and its peoples 
and the freely expressed wi shes of the peoples concerned, and as 
may be provided by the terms of each Trusteeship Agreement .22 
Cattan observes that 
In all the instances where the sovereignty of a nation was revived 
or restored on its territory, notwithstanding its conquest and 
annexation, the conquerorv s annexation was fully effective, and 
despite its effectiveness the legitimate title was restored. 23 
• • •  under international practice,  the relationship between sovereignty 
and property has served to determine the legitimacy of title of a 
State to the terri tory that i t  occupies. Although in its political 
aspect sovereignty means the supreme power of a State over a certain 
territory and its people regardless of the legitimacy of its origin, 
in its legal aspect sovereignty involves a broader and more fundamen­
tal concept: the legal and inalienable title of a king or a nation 
to a territory. 24 
The same broad concept of legitimacy of title also explains the 
survival of Austria' s  sovereignty during the period of its forced 
union with Germany in 1938 until its formal re-establi shment in 1945,  
the restoration of Czechoslovakia ' s  personality and territory after 
its occupation and dismemberment by Germany in 1938, and the restoration 
of Albania' s sovereignty after its invasion and annexation by Italy 
in 1939 . All these States were restored despite their complete annex­





Tilese various cases of restoration of States and their territories 
can be considered as constituting applications of the modern principle 
that conquest i s  not a source of titl e .  In the past the fait accompli , 
such as conquest or annexation, i f  successfully maintained, constituted 
a source of title to territory under international law. This situation 
has now changed . 25 
Van Kleffens, Fauchile, Ha11, 26 Donati27 and Grotius28 affirm 
cattan, that in legal theory and in actual international practice the 
relationship between sovereignty and property ( territory) has been juridi-
cally applied : 
Under the influence of Roman law sovereignty with regard to territory 
was long regarded and interpreted in terms of property • . •  In modern 
times 1 t still has had i t s  votaries in various countries. 29 
Le territoire d ' une nation est sa proprie"t� exclusive. Seule, cette 
nation a le droit d ' en user.30 
Brierly declares that " territorial sovereignty refers not to a 
* relation of persons to persons, nor to the independence of the State 
itself, ' but to the nature of rights over territory • • •  Terri torial sovereign­
ty bears an obvious resemblance to ownership in private law • 3 1 . 1132 
Lauterpacht confirms Brierly: 
'lhere is, in fact ,  no ground for assuming that the science of inter­
national law will di scard the analogy between territorial sovereignty 
and property in private law, even if i t  does not go the length of 
identifying the two conceptions.33 
As regards Zioni sm-Israel pretension to legal sovereignty over 
the Arab country of Palestine , the principle of no acquisition of territory 
by war, states Quincy Wright: 
i s  implicit in the international law of t�e 19th century which held 
that military occupation of the territory of a recogni zed state gave 
no title to the occupied .territory. I t  was affirmed in the Pan-
*Thi s i s  the Zioni st ideologi cal prescription to "rights" in Palestine. 
It is based upon the fallacious "the Jewish people" concept, a Zionist 
political doctrine not accepted as international law. 
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American Conference of 1890 and in the Bogota Charter of the Organiza­
tion of American States in 1948 as a principle of American inter­
national law, that territory could not be acquired by conquest; in 
the League of Nations Covenant which guaranteed the territorial 
integrity and political independence of its Members against external 
aggression; and in the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 by which 
the partie s  renounced war as an instrument of national policy applied 
in the Manchurian situation by the Stimson Doctrine of 1932 .  '!he 
Atlantic Charter opposing territorial acqui sitions in World War II, 
the Nuremberg Charter and Trial punishing the crime agai nst peace 
on the bases of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, also affirmed this principl e . 34 
Another question regarding violation of international law trustee-
ship obligations i s :  Can the League or United Nations partition a trust 
territory under any circumstances? Professor of international law, M. 
Cherif Bassiourd )5, maintains : 
'nle • . .  answer i s  "no , "  unless the "people" (of the territory) so choose, 
which again demonstrates that we invariably revert to the right of 
self-determination. What then of the • • •  population unable to coexist 
with the remaining (population) . . . ? '!he answer to this is that it i s  
purely an internal question subject only to the secure guarantees 
of the human rights of the minority under the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the various covenants. In 
no event can the situation give rise to an internationally cognizable 
right of cessation and the imposed e stablishment of a new state popu­
lated with nationals from a multi tude of other states to the exclusion 
of the original nationals of the existing state . 36 
Lauterpacht states that "title by conquest has been abolished . n37 
Ca.ttan writes: 
In several resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conf1.ict and 
Israel ' s  annexation of Jerusalem after the war of 5 June 1967 , both 
the Security Council and the General Assembly have proclaimed "the 
inadmi ssibility of the acquisition of terri tory by war" or "by military 
conquest" . In other words, conquest cannot give title and thi s rggard­less of whether a conquest is or i s  not by itself an aggression . 3  
Referring to the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acqui sition of 
terri. tory by war" laid down in Security Council resolution 242 of November 
22, 1967, Q.uincy Wright states: 
'Ihe principle goes beyond the principle "no frui ts of aggression" . 
It says there shall be no territorial fruits from war, uslng the latter 
tenn in the material sense of a considerable use of armed force . 
Its application, therefore , does not depend on determining who was the 
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"aggressor" i n  the 1967 hostilities, a difficult question to answer .  
'!here can be no doubt that ,  whether or not Israel was the aggressor, 
its occupations of territory were achieved by the use of armed force . 39 
Says Lauterpacht, "International law" 
will not recogni ze acquisition of territory accomplished in di sregard 
of the accepted forms. Not every acquisition i s  a lawful one. The 
di ctum ".Besi tzstand g1eicht Rechtszustand" (possession i s  law) has 
no valid.i ty in international law. Mere force unaccompanied by a 
legally recognized form of acqui sition does not confer a legal titl e .40 
Cattan again observes :  
'lhe general principle o f  law is that a right cannot ari se from a 
wrong. Hence , all the cases of revived or survival of State sovereign­
ty despite conquest and annexation can also be explained by the maxim 
ex i njuria jus non ori tur. A claim to a territorial title which 
originates in an illegal act is invalid. 41 
'lhe Covenant of the League of Nations, approved by the Paris Peace 
Conference on 28 April 1919, and incorporated into the Treaty of 
Versailles on 28 June 1919, also discarded any idea of annexation 
of the territories sei zed from Turkey during the First World War. 
Article 22 of the Covenant envisaged a new status under international 
law for the Arab communities detached from the Turkish Empire and, 
i t  i s  important to note, declared that "tlleir existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recogni zed . "  2 
The legal effect under international law of the detachment of Palestine 
from the Turkish Empire and of the recognition of its people as an 
independent nation was to make of thi s country a separate . and indepen­
dent State in
4
which was vested legal sovereignty over the territory 
of Pale stine . 3 
Erlich declares that the legal meaning of the words "provisionally 
recognized" in Arti cle 22 of the Covenant i s  as follows: 
Obviously, thi s does not mean that the existence as a nation, or 
relative independence which i s  expressly recognized, will be condition­
al ; on the contrary, the inferior situation of a mandated territory 
constitutes a transitory phase in the development of peoples under 
tutelage towards real independence . '!his appears clearly from the 
last words of iJ_he sentence : "until such time as they are able to stand alone" . 
Regarding Arti cle 22 Duncan Hall points out: 
Underl ying Article 22 was the assumption of independent national 
sovereignty for mandates .  The drafters of the Covenant took as their 
starting-point the general notions of "no annexation" and "self­
deterrnina ti on" . 45 
,jJf 
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In the case concerning the International Status of South-West 
ca in 1950 the International Court held that Article 22 postulated 
, , , two principles were considered to be of paramount importance; the 
principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being 
46 and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization. 
Consequently, the indigenous inhabitants of the mandated ter-
' tori.es were the beneficiaries of this trust. 47 Van Rees, Vice-President 
f the Pennanent Mandates Commission, held the view that sovereignty over 
terri.tory resided in its original indigenous people : 
'11 -:;i- Enfin, un dernier groupe d '  auteurs--di vise en deux fractions--le seul 
groupe qui a tenu compte du principe de non-annexion adopte par la 
Conference de la Paix, soutient que les auteurs du Pacte ont voulu 
tenir en suspens ou bien la souverainete elle-meme sur les territoires 
sous mandat poui une periode equivalente a la duree des mandats 
respectifs (Lee D .  Campbell, The Mandate for Mesopotamia and the 
rinci le of trusteeshi in En lish law, p .  19; A .  Mendelssohn 
Bartholdi , Les mandats africains traduction), Archiv fii.r Politik und 
Geschichte, Hamburg, 1925) ou bien l 'exercice des pouvoirs souverains 
dont furent provisoirement charg�es certaines nations en qualite de 
tuteurs .  D ' apres ce dernier point de vue la souverainete elle-meme 
serait detenue, depuis la renonciation des anciens Empires, par les 
communautes et les populations autochtones des differents territoires. 
En d ' autres termes ,  les anciens Empires ayant renonce a leurs droits et 
titres sur les territoires en question sans qu'il y ait eu transfert 
de ces droits et titres a d ' autres Puissances, la souverainete, qui 
appartient a ces divers peuples et communautes jusqu9au noment de 
leur soumission a l 'Allemagne et a la Turquie,  rena.'.tt automatiquement 
du fait de la renonciation susdite. (Paul Pie, Le r�gime des mandats 
d ' apres le Traite de Versailles, RGDIP , Paris ,  1923, p .  14; Albert 
Millot, Les Mandats internationaux, Paris ,  1924, pp. 114-118; J. 
Stoyanovski , La theorie generale des mandats internationaux , Paris, 
pp. 83 and 86.)48 
Van Rees also pointed out that the legal postulate which held 
that legal sovereignty resides in the indigenous people (not colonizing 
aliens) of the mandated territory 
• • •  i s  the only one which at least takes into account the principle of 
non-annexation unanimously adopted by the Peace Conference .49 
In its resolution adopted in 1931 the Instftute of International Law 
described the mandated territories as subjects of international law.50 
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In the case of Palestine Quincy Wright observed : 
Mandates were classified into three types:  "A", ''B" and "C" . This 
classification was made in a "descending order of political indi vidu­
ali ty" according to their international status and the degree of 
authority given to the Mandatory. '!be "A" mandates applied to Iraq, 
Palestine, Syria and Leb:l.non • •  , .It i s  to be remarked that only in 
the case of "A" mandates were the communities concerned recognized 
by Article 22 of the Covenant as independent nations. 51 
/ 
Pelichet has observed that the international personality of man-
dated territories,  recognized by the Covenant Arti cle 22 was accepted as 
a "principle of international law • .. 52 '!be F.a.rl of Birkenhead , in referring 
to Palestine in particular, declared : 
'Ihe position of Palestine and Syria i s  that they were integral por­
tions of the Turki sh Empire (which has renounced all right or title 
to them : Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne , 1923) , they have 
become , administratively, partially dependent now upon an appointed 
mandatory State, but they are acknowledged--in the terms of Article 
22 of the Covenant--to be entitled to provisional recognition of 
independence . • •  'lbe status of Palestine and Syria resembles very 
closely that of States under suzerainty . 53 
'Ihe principle that sovereignty lies in the people of the mandated 
territory itself was recently applied to territories held under trusteeship 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Mandates and trustee-
ships possess the same legal affiliation. In the case of Societ� A . B . C .  
v .  Fontana and Della Rocca, the Italian Court of Cassation held that 
sovereignty over the territory of Somaliland i s  vested in its popula­
tion, although , under Article 2 of the Trusteeship Agreement (of the 
United Nations) ,  the ad.ministration of the territory, for the period 
specified in the Agreement, has been entrusted to Italy • .54 
Oppenheim expressed the same legal view as the F.a.rl of Birkenhead : 
In considering the question of sovereignty over trust territories • • •  the 
di stinction must be borne in mind betReen sovereignty as such (or what 
may be descril:>ed as residuary sovereignty) and the exerci se of sovereign­
ty. 'Ihe latter is clearly vested with the trustee powers subject to 
supervi sion by and accountability to the United Nations.55 
Cattan has declared that in regard to Palestine in particular and 
mandated terri. tori.es in general : 
1 1 
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• • •  the grant by the Council of the League of Nations of a mandate to 
the British Government to admini ster Palestine did not deprive its 
people of their sovereignty, nor the State of Palestine of its own 
entity. The legal status of Palestine under international law during 
the British mandate and upon its termination on 15 May 1948 can, 
therefore, be sununari zed as follow s :  during the currency of the man-
date the people of Palestine enjoyed an independent international 
status and possessed sovereignty over their land; Palestine possessed 
its own statehood. as well as its own identity, which were di stinct 
from those of the mandatory Power; its admini stration was theoreti-
cally its own though , in fact ,  it was exercised by the Manda-t.ory; . • . .  
however, the full exerci se of sovereignty by the people of Palestine 
was restricted by the powers of administration entrusted to the 
mandatory Power; upon the termination of the mandate the Mandatory ' s  
powers of administration came to an end and, as a result, the 
restrictions upon exercise of full sovereignty by the people of 
Palestine ceased, so that by virtue of thi s right, as well as by 
virtue of their right of self-determination, they became entitled 
to rule themselves and to determine their future in accordance with 
normal democratic principles and procedures .  'Ihe first and funda-
mental rule in any democracy i s  the rule of the majority. 'Ihi s rule, 
however, was not respected by the General Assembly of the United Nati ons, 
which di sregarded the will of the majority and recommended in 1947, 
in circumstances and under political pressures already mentioned, the 
partition of the country between Arab and Jewish States .  The events 
which followed and the emergence of Israel have prevented the Palestini�n 
people from exercising their right of sovereignty over their own land. 56 
Notwithstanding the prolific history of both League , United Nations, 57 
and International Court of Justice advi sory opinions58 that uphold and 
implement the principle of self-determinati on, international law specialist 
L .  Sohn agrees with Cattan : 
With regard to the principle of self-determination, although inter­
national recognition was extended to thi s  principle at the end of 
the First World War and it was adhered to wi th regard to the other 
Arab terri tori.es, at the time of the creation of the "A" Mandates, 
it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention 
to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there . 
Actually, i t  may well be said that the Jewish National Home and 
the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principl e . 59 
Firsthand support of Cattan' s  theme that political decisions have 
been substituted for legal ones concerning Palestine comes from , among 
many sources ,  Ambassador Loy W .  Henderson , who in 1947 as director of the 
Office of Near F.astern and African Affairs in the United States Department 
of State , wrote a then top-secret memorandum to the American Secretary of 
State dated September 22, 1947. Henderson wrote : 
'Ihese proposals [Qf the majority of the Uni ted Nati ons Special 
Committee on PalestinB , . • •  , ignore such principles as self­
determination and majority rule , 60 
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Stoyanovsky agreed that the people of a mandated area are not 
deprived of the right of sovereignty but are deprived only temporarily 
of its exerci se. 'Ihe right o f  sovereignty belongs to the inhabitants 
of the mandated territory "by virtue of the principles of nationality 
and self-de termination which are the foundation of modern international 
law. 1161 Recently released Vatican documents dating back to 1943 and re-
lating to the Palestine-Zi oni st issue succinctly commented on the Zionist 
Jewish State scheme in Palestine; in one document, a leading advisor-
aide to the Pope, Cardinal Luigi Magli one , critically added: 
What criterion could be adopted for bringing
6
a people back to a 
territory where they lived 19 centuri es ago? 2 
'Ihe King-Crane Commi ssion report underscored the Zionist violation 
of the principle of self-determinatio n :  
To subject a (Palestinian) people • . •  to unlimited Jewish immigration, 
and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, 
would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted,
6
and of the 
peoples' rights , though it kept within the forms of law. 3 
'Ihe Commission also recognized the legal inconsi stenci es between 
the Zioni st territorial objectives in Palestine and both the Balfour 
Declaration and the Covenant of the League : 
No British officer, consulted by the Commi ssioners, believed that the 
Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The 
officers generally thought that force of not less than fi fty thousand 
soldiers would be required even to initiate the program . That of it­
self is evidence of a strong sense of the i n�ustice of the Zionist 
program, on the part of the non-Jewish ( Arab) populations of Palestine 
and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes 
necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the 
interests of a serious injustice . For the initial claim, often sub-
mi tted by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine 
eased on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seri­
ously considered . 64 
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Professor Berriedale Keith averred : 
Moreover ,  i t  is impossible not to recognise the gravity of the 
difficulty created for the mandatory by the fact that the adoption 
of the �rinciple of a Jewish national home (in Palestine) runs 
directly counter to the doctrine of the right of each people to 
self-determination . 65 
"' 
There i s  authority concering the legal interpretation of an 
agreement i n  which a beneficiary, like the Palestinians in the Balfour 
Declaration, has no negotiating or decisional role .  In the famous Cayuga 
Indians Case (Great Britain v .  Uni ted States)66 the legal situation in-
volved an agreement in which the covenantees, the Indian claimants, had 
no parti ci pant role • The court of justice, sit ting as a tribunal , re­
ferred to "universally ad.mi tted principles of justice and right dealing1167 
as being the applicable criteria in interpreting the agreement in favor 
of the Indians. Significantly, the opinion emphasized the unaccepted 
method of "the harsh operation of the legal terminology of a covenant (or 
agreement) which the covenantees ( the Cayuga Indians) had no part in 
framing . .. 68 International law professors Oppenheim and Lauterpacht, while 
acknowledging that "many treaties stipulating immoral obligations have 
been concluded and executed , "  declared that " this does not alter the fact 
that such treaties were legally not binding upon the contracting parties . 1169 
'Ihese international law scholars enunciated the legal doctrine applying 
to "immoral obligations" in the following very clear terms : 
It i s  a customarily recognized rule of the Law of Nations that im­
moral obligations cannot be the object of an international treaty . 70 
'Ihe most succinct and telling legal objection to Zionism ' s  fai t 
accompli in Palestine i s  impli cit in the words of Secretary-General U 
'Ihant i n  his Annual Report to the 22nd Session of the United Nations: 
People everywhere , and this certainly applies to the Palestinian refu­
gees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future . 71 
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The fai ts accomplis of Zionism have always been illegal from the 
beglnning. In thi s context American author Alfred Lilienthal wrote: 
'Ihe United Nations dealt a severe blow to the prestige of inter­
national law and organi zation by its hasty, frivolous, and arrogant 
treatment of the Palestine question. '!he General Assembly turned 
down the only reasonable suggestions--a referendum in Palestine and 
subnission of the legal problems to the International Court of 
Justice . 72 
Article 22 embodied the legal acquisition of independent national 
sovereignty for those areas coming under the jurisdiction of the mandates 
system . '!he drafters of the Covenant applied the principle of "no annexa-
tion" and " self-determination . "  The indigenous people of the mandated 
terri tories were the beneficiaries of these two legal principles. The 
legal criterion under international law of the Palestine Mandate , regard-
less of the Allied-Zionist political deception, was to make the country a 
separate and independent State in which was vested legal sovereignty over 
the terri tory of Palestine . According to the principle of self-determina-
tion, or legal sovereignty, which are accepted principles of international 
law, the affairs of a country must be governed by the wishes of the majority 
of indigenous inhabitants, not by immigrant nor by illegal strangers to the 
land. Any attempt to suppress the wishes of an indigenous majority is 
illegal . 
In the context of internati onal law Israel could not and did not 
acquire legal sovereignty over the territory of Palestine. The forceful 
emergence of Israel and its alien Jewish demographic occupation in 1948 
and 1949 of various areas of the territory of Arab Palestine did not de-
prive the Palestinians of their legal sovereignty. Consequently, the 
illegitimacy of Israel ' s  claim to the timeless Arab country is without 
question. Zionism ' s  violent acquisition of the counilry of Palestine73 
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of the nonns of modern international law and the juristic 
, doctrine of the mandates system, which was superceded by the same legal 
i doctrine applicable to areas under the United Nations international trust-
• 
eeship system, which encompassed Palestine. The juristic principle that 
I 
. legal sovereignty lies in the people of the mandated territory itself 
was transfonned even more explicitly to terr1. tori.es held under trustee-
ship in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. As regards 
Zionist usurpation of Arab Palestine through force and illegal immigration, 
Cattan iterates Oppenheim and succinctly clarifies the Jewish violations: 
Neither can Israel der1.ve any title by occupation. In accordance with 
accepted principles of international law, occupation as a means of ac­
quir1.ng territory can only be conducted or conceived in the case of 
a res nullius. Palestine was at no time terra nullius, so that it 
was not open for occupation nor capable of acquisition by any State 
or any group of alien settlers. 74 
Moreover, any indigenous majority or minority inhabitants force-
fully dispossessed out of a country does not derogate, in international 
law, from their full rights to their homeland and property; 75 and most 
certainly does it not confer on an external invader, usurper, or aggressor 
any juridical rights seized by force of arms. 76 Both the League and 
United Nations prescribe to the international law principle that the 
acquisition of territory by force of arms is inadmissible; and this 
principle ,  though not always subscribed to, has been confirmed inviolable. 
Israel has invoked the 1947 partition resolution to justify its 
occupation of Palestine territory. Israel' s  occupation of Palestine ter-
ritory under the Armistice Agreements i s  not and cannot, in international 
law, be a legal source of title to the land of Palestinian people . 77 In 
fact, the Armistice Agreements specifically provided that 
• • .  the armistice lines are not to be construed as political or terri­
torial boundaries and are delineated without prejudice to the ultimate 
settlement of the Palestine Question. 78 
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it, :  f � ; · Cattan analyzed the international law problem between Zionism 
and Palestine as follows: 
In conclusion it can be said that Israel did not and could not gain 
title to the terri tories which it  seized in 1948 and ·l949 whether 
within or in excess of the boundaries of the partition resolution. 
Neither did Israel acquire title to the territories which it seized 
in 1967 . Its legal status in  both cases i s  identical : it i s  the 
status of a belligerent occupier. And it is  immaterial whether 
Israel i s  considered a belligerent occupier or a conqueror. In 
neither case can i t  acquire sovereignty. 79 
"Israel , "  says Hedley V. Cooke , 
alone among all the countries of the world , possesses not a single 
square i nch of territory which she could assuredly proclaim to be 
her own in perpetuity. 80 
Kissinger supports Cattan and Cooke . The Zionist State of Israel , 
besides being an anomaly in the Middle East area, is there without any 
legitimacy which has not been claimed by force . At a news conference on 
January 19,  Secretary of State Henry Kissinger--for the first time 
publicly--raised the question of Israel ' s  need for "legitimacy" as the 
only alternative to escalating armaments and military confrontations. 
Kissinger answered a newsman ' s  question with the following: 
The problem in the Middle East is to balance physical security 
against legitimacy. There is no question that Israel ' s  physical 
security is best guaranteed by the widest extension of its frontier 
and at no other point are they as physically secure as at the maximum 
point of their extension. On the other hand, politically and in the 
long term they may be militarily even less secure if they don q t  
achieve legitimacy.81 (Emphasis mine) 
What Kissinger did not say, of course , is that in this equation 
of "legi. timacy" versus on-going warfare , it is the Arab League sta tes82 
(or "the Arabs" ) who are the principal judges of "legitimacy" precisely 
because it has been Zionist usurpation of Arab rights (Egypt ' s  legal 
sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula, Syria' s  legal sovereignty over the 
Golan Heights, the Palestinians' legal sovereignty over Palestine ) which 
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constitutes the essence of the history of . Zioni st/Israel ' s illegitimacy. 
And the Zionist State--for all its professions of peace--persists in 
expanding,occupying and colonizing Arab territory acquired by offensive 
war and in denying the rights of the Palestinians to self-detennination. 
The legal title of the Palestinians to their natural homeland 
remains unaltered . One of the strangest features of the Palestine 
Question is that it should be necessary to demonstrate that the Palesti nian 
Arab people have both a moral and legal case against Zionism in Palestine . 
The actions of Britain after World War I in forcing or inflicting upon 
the overwhelming but powerless Arab majority in Palestine a political 
situation they were vehemently opposed to; 83 of the United States govern-
ment after World War II in assisting the World Zionist movement to achl. eve 
84 its aggre ssive "Jewish State" goals in Palestine; of the League of 
Nations (and United Nations) in denying the Arab majority its right to a 
plebi scite or in refusing to refer the matter to the court of International 
Justice for an expression of legal opinion before the League arbitrarily 
assumed the mandate administration (or for that matter, recommending 
partition in 1947; and of the Zionist Movement obtruding i tself against 
the wishes of the Arab people of Palestine, and forcefully evicting the 
Arab majority in 1948 ) , 85 all these acts constitute grave violations of 
international law concepts. 
What should become starkly evident i s  that the present situation 
in Palestine is the result of an extraordinary accumulation of injustices, 
illegalities and violations--violations of international law and violations 
of ordinary human rights and freedoms .  The number of wrongs is appalling: 
the Balfour Declaration; a mass Jewish inunigration forced upon the original 
• 
Arab inhabitants; the inequity of illegal parti tion; the usurpation of four-
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: ;fifths of the territory of Palestine by an alien minority; the forcible 
displacement of i ts indigenous population and the plunder and coloni zation 
of their lands and homes. 
The crowning indignity was the creation of an illegal state. 
Cattan , for example, demonstrates first of all that Israel 0 s "historical 
claim" to Palestine i s  l:ased on 1X>th "legal and historical nonsense , "  
and then deals with the validity and legality of the other claims of 
Israel ' s  statehood--the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate agreement, 
the 1947 United Nations resolution on Palestine , diplomatic recognition 
of Israel by other states, military occupation of territories beyond 
those designated in the Partition Plan, and the alleged "sovereignty 
vacuum" in Palestine. In each case, the Zionist State of Israel claims 
are invalid and illegal, both within and without the 1X>undari e s  of the 
1947 Partition Plan . Thus, the existence of the State of Israel has 
simply no msi s in international law; instead, i t  i s  l:ased on the strange 
principle that "wrong compounded constitutes right. 1186 
1noreen Ingrams, Palestine Pa ers 1 17-1 22: Seeds of Conflict 
New York : Braziller, 1973 , p .  61. The extract is from Balfour ' s  
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va te letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George dated February 19, 1919 , 
2Great Britain, Public Records Office, Foreign Office, 371/4185.  
i , !! ' 
J 3woodward and Butler, ed . ,  First Series of Docum.ents on Bri tish 
(:4roreign Policy, IV (HMSO, 1952) ,  p .  340. 'Ihi s extract i s  taken from a 
lpr.i.vate letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George dated August 11 , 1919.  
4Public Rec.ords Office, Foreign Office, 406/40. Anti-Zionist 
I indigenous Arab Jews of Palestine, the Sephardim .group, abhorred Zionism � : as much as the Pal estinian Arab population. But Zionism also formulated 
·: the pretense of speaking for them. At this time (1918) Ormsby-Gore, a 
··: pro-Zioni st, was British Liaison to the Zionist delegation at the Pari s 
Peace Conference .  The date of this extract i s  August 1918. 
5rngrams, op. cit. , p .  140. Thi s extract from Sir Hubert Young, a 
senior offi cial in the British Colonial Office, summarizes the British 
deception in a private memorandum on negotiations with the Arab Delegation 
which came to London in the summer of 1921. 
6'Ihe di stinction between legal and political sovereignty i s  of direct 
bearing on the territorial and political changes brought about by force 
by the Jews in Palestine since 1948. It provides the gauge for apprai sing 
the legal character of such changes .  "Sovereignty combines politi cal 
and legal connotations relating to right and power, "  Cattan observes in 
Palestine and International Law (1973) ,  p .  59 , Brierly declares in The 
Law of Nations (1963), p .  13, that "One result of identifying sovereignty 
with might instead of legal right was to remove it from the sphere of 
jurisprudence, where i t  had its origin and where it properly belongs, 
and to import i t  into political science , where i t  has ever since been a 
source of confusion . "  For the difference between legal sovereignty 
(de jure soverei gnty) and political sovereignty, see Ian Brownlie, Inter­
national Law, ( Oxford : Clarendon Pre ss, 1966) ,  pp. 100, 102. Professor 
Schwarzenberger expressed the di stinction between legal and political 
sovereignty as, "The last word is still not with law, but power. On such 
a level , the counterpart to legal sovereignty i s  political sovereignty. "  
See G .  Schwarzen'r..erger, "The Fundamental Principles of Internati onal Law, " 
Hague Recueil, (1955) ,  p. 215. Professor Gaston Jeze, Etude Th�origue et 
Pratique sur l ' Occupation, (Pari s, 1896), pp. 44-46, points out that a 
belligerent occupier does not acquire sovereignty in law: "Cette pri se 
de possession, qui repose exclusivement sur. la force, n ' entr�ne pas 
au profit du vainqueur l ' acquisition du territoire occupe' . . •  Supposons 
d ' abord que l ' Etat donte le terri toire est envahi se refuse a trai ter, 
et que le vainqueur maintienne son occupation. La domination de l ' Etat 
victorieux scra une souverainete' de fait et non de droi t • • •  Tant que des 
protestations se feront entendre , il y aura bi.en une domination de fait, 
mai s non un e'ta t de droi t . "  
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See also Ian Brownlie ,  Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford, 
1966) ,  who refers to the continued exi stence of legal personality under 
international law despite the fact that the process of government in an 
area falls i nto the hands of another State , pp. 100-102. 
7u. s .  Department of .State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1 18, I (Washington ,  D . C . : U . S .  Govenunent Printing 
Office, 1933 , Supplement 1 ,  p .  110. 
8For a synopsized view of the contributions of the League of Nations 
to the development of international law, see Leo Gross, "'Ihe Development 
of International law Prior to the United Nations, " James Barros, ed . ,  
'!be United Nations: Past, Present, and Future (New York : 'Ihe Free Press, 
1972), pp . 1 72-176. The modern opposi tion to territorial conquests and 
annexations and to the use abroad of colored colonial troops, together 
with the modern practice of condominium, the ideal of self-determination, 
and the policy of the open door in colonial territory, as embodied in the 
Roosevelt-Root mandate plan for Morocco under the Act of Algeciras of 
1906, converged, through the writings of the Round Table group in England 
in 1915-1917 (especially Hobson) ,  in the mind of General Smuts in 1917-
1918, were then and there reenforced by the Wilson principles for the 
peace settlement, cast intothe teminology of the mandate and formulated 
in the Smuts "Suggestions" on December 16, 1918. From here they were 
taken up by President Wilson, and, by decisions of the Supreme Council, 
the Commission on the League of Nations, and the Peace Conference itself, 
were wri tten into Article XXII of the Covenant of the League and the 
Treaty of Versailles. See, for example ,  Pi tnam B. Potter, "Origin of the 
System of Mandates· Under the League of Nations , "  'Ihe American Political 
Science Review, XVI ( November, 1922), pp. 563-583. 
9
0n July 20, 1922 the League approved the Mandate for Palestine , which 
was an international legaJ. instrument defining the degree of authority, 
control and administration to be exercised by the Mandatory Power, in 
accordance with Article 22, paragraph 8 ,  of the Covenant. 
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16Ibid. ,  p .  24. 
l 7Ibid. , p .  27. 
194 
18'Ihe text of the Mandate for Palestine i s  included in the Appendix. 
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their inhabi tants regarding the post-war settlement of their terri tori e s .  
The King-Crane Commi ssion reported that 1 , 350 petitions, compri sing 72 
per cent of the total received from the whole of Syria, were anti-Zionist 
and that Zionist spokesmen contemplated the dispossession of the Arabs. 
They recommended a serious modification of the "extreme Zionist program . "  
Also generally consult Ingrams, op. cit. ; and Robert John and Sarni Hadawi , 
The Palestine Diar 1914-194 : Britain ' s  Involvement, Vol . I of The 
Palestine Diary New York: New World Press, 1970 • 
84Richard Stevens, Ameri can Zionism and U . S .  Forei 
(Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studi es, 1970 . 
85see, for example, Menachem Bei in, The Revolt :  Sto of the Ir un 
(New York : Henry Schwnan , 1951 ; Jon Kimch e ,  The Seven Fallen Pillars 
(New York: F .  A .  Praeger, 1953 ) ;  Dov Joseph, The Fai thful City: The Seige 
of Jerusalem 1948 (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1960); Edgar O ' Ballance ,  
The Arab-Is:rr:aeli War 1948 (New York : F. A .  Praeger, 1957 ) ;  Sir John Ba.got 
Gl�bb, A Solddier with the Arabs (New York: Harper & Bros . ,  1957 ) ;  
Felicia Langer, " Israeli Violations of Human Rights i n  the Occupied Arab 
Terri tori e s , " Americans for Middle East Understanding (AMEU), Palaces of 
Injustices (New York : AMEU, 1976 ) ,  pp. 22-26; Erskine B. Childers, "The 
Other Exodus , "  The Spectator, May 1 2 ,  1961, pp. 672-675; Jacques de Reynier, 
"Deir Yasin , "  Khalidi , ed . ,  op. cit . , pp. 761-766 . de Reynier was head 
of the delegation i n  Palestine of the International Red Cross throughout 
the period of hostilities, 1948. See also Great Bri tain, The Anglo­
American Committee of Enquiry regarding the Problems of European Jewry 
and Palestine , Lausanne, 20th April 1946, Report 1946, Command 6808 
(London: HMSO, 1946 ) ,  pp. 39-42; Jiryis, op. cit. 
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86 . I t  should be noted that the United States Department of State in 
1948 acknowledged the de facto usurpatious acquisitions of Palestine 
territory : " • • •  we must consider the role of the remaining Principal 
Allied and Associated Powers. It was these Powers whi ch allocated the 
Palestine mandate to Great Britain after World War I . "  See the Legal 
Advi ser ( Gross) to the Under-Secretary of State (Lovett) , memorandum , 
"Recognition of Successor States in Palestine , "  May 13,  1948, MS .  Depart­
ment of State, file FW 86?N. 01/5-1048 . 
American Jewish writer Thomas Kiernan (The Arabs, pp. 253-4) write s :  "The 
Jews had no legal claim , The Zionists were European . There was abso­
lutely no biological and anthropological connection between the pro­
genitors of European Jewry-the Khazars-and the ancient Hebrew tribe s  • • •  
The UN9 s  establishment of a Zionist Jewish nation on Arab soil and in 
the midst of an overwhelming majority of Arab people • • •  was a clear 
violation o f  the UN' s  principles on the self-determination of peoples 
indigenous to specific lands. " Incidentally, it should be knownthat 
the UN withdrew its contemplation of Palestine ' s  partiti on. This idea 






CONCLUSION : THE INVALIDITY OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION 
Is the Balfou:i;- Declaration valid in public i nternational law? 
Is it consistent wi th the preeminent international law principle of 
the self-determinati on of peoples? Where did England, the military 
occupier of Palestine, 1 derive the legal authority to open up the 
Palestinian country to permanent settlement by another foreign people , 
a group that Balfour knew methodically sought political sovereignty 
in that land?2 Did �·/eizmann3 really believe the Zionists had a legal 
claim to Palestine? Because , he did write to a friend in 1914: 
Don ' t  you think that the chance for the Jewish people i s  now 
within the limits of di scucsion at last? I realise, of course, 
that we cannot "claim" anything, we are much too atomized for 
it;  but we can reasonably say that should Palestine fall with-
in the British sphere of influence ,  and should Britain encourage 
a Jewi sh settlement there, as a Bri tish dependency, t·;e could have 
in twenty to thirty years a million Jews out there, perhaps more ; 
they would develop the country, bring back civiliza4ion to i t  and form a very effective guard for the Suez Canal . 
Amos Elon writes that in 1923, Arthur Ruppin5 turned against 
what Ruppin called the "imperialist approach" of "political Zioni sm" : 
At first, like most of his (Arthur Ruppin) colleague s ,  he over­
looked the national aspirations of the Arabs. He assumed that they. 
could be appeased through economic benefits . Eut earlier than most 
he realised the shortsightedness of this approach . By 1921 he was 
already bitterly reproaching his fellow (Zionist) settlers for 
wrongly aiming at the establishment of a nation-state ( "another 
Montenegro" ) while at the same time ignoring the existence of an 
Arab p
�
oblem. 1he Balfour Declaration, he felt, was a paper priv­
ilege . 
In i t s  own proclamation of statehood of Viay 14, 1948, Israel 
invoked three provi sions to justify its legitimacy: 'Ihe Balfour Declar­
ationZ the Mandate of the League of Nations� and the 1947 Parti tion 
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Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations . None of 
� these provi sions abided by the international law concept of the self-
determination of an indigenous peopl e ;  on the contrary, all three violated 
the doctrine of self-detennination which gained recognition as a principle 
of international law after World War r . 9  Ironically, the mandate system 
was supposedly justified as a means of aiding the establishment of self-
governing institutions in the mandate countri es. 
As pertains to the Ealfour Declaration Sol Linowitz has written: 
The most significant and incontrovertible fact in, however, that by 
i tself the ( Balfour) �eclaration was legally impotent .  For Great 
Bri tain had no sovereign rights over Palestine ; i t  had no proprietary 
intere st; i t  had no authori ty to di spose of the land. The Declaration 
was merely a statement of British intentions and no more . 10 
• t I I t t t t I t I t t t I t I I I I t I I t I I I • I I t I I I I I • I I I t t I I I I I I I t I I I I I t I t I I I I I I I I I I I 
Generally overlooked in the refined search for intentions, however, 
i s  the paramount and all-important fact that at the time in question 
England had ab::;olutely no right of dispod tion and no legal or 
proprietary interest in Pal estine , which was then a Turkish province. 
Regardless, of what commitment England might have made , she was 
neither sovereign over Palestine herself nor was her action ratified 
ei ther by Turkey ( the then legal sovereign) or the League of Nations 
( the later sovereign) . 11 
Significantly, Linowi tz declared that in "an ohjecti ve and infonned 
decision with respect to legal rights involved in the creation of Israel 
by the United Nations, " the "point of· departure for a legal analysis" of 
the Palestine-Zionist conflict "i s the Da.lfour Declaration. 1112 The 
mandatory scheme may have been proposed with a high ideal and an altrui ctic 
end in view, but i t  was adopted, however, only after the statesmen against 
whom Woodrow �nlson was pitted had agreed that they would not have to 
observe ei ther the spirit or the letter of the Mandatory clauses in the 
Covenant . 13 l·�reover, Zionist consent to the inclusion::; of the Balfour 
Declaration was requested--and received--before the Nandate was confirmed. 
And the meaning of the declaration was authoritatively explained in the 
British White Paper in 1922, which sta.ted: 
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Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the pur­
pose i n  view i s  to create a wholly Jewish Palestine . Phrases have 
been used such as that Palestine i s  to become "as Jewish as England 
ls English" . His Majesty ' s  Government • • •  have no such aim in view. 
Nor have they at any time contemplated . • •  the disappearance or the 
subordination of the Arabic population, language or cul ture in 
Palestine . 14 
· 
For all the distorted and mythologi zed political rhetoric the 
Zioni sts have accredited to the declaration as a "legal title" to Arab 
Palestine, very few have perceived that Zionist agreement to this official 
interpretation was requested--and received--before the mandate was con-
finned. Said another way, before the Eriti sh would incorporate the 
declaration in the mandate for Palestine, Britain wanted the Zioni st 
Organi zation to be very clear about the meaning of the declaration in 
that it did not mean that Palestine would become a Jewish State as the 
Zionists desired . '!he Zionist Organi zation clearly understood thi s mean-
ing because '.ilei zmann , their president, accepted the White Pa.per: 
It was made clear to us that confirmation of the Mandate would be 
condi tioned on our acceptance of the policy as interpreted in the 
White Paper, and my colleagues and I therefore had to accept i t ,  
which we did, though not without some qualms . 15 
From a juridical standpoint the Zionists themselves have mooted 
the declaration ' s  invalidity as legal title to Palestine by hi storically 
acknowledging in 1922 the clear meaning of the declaration before the 
British would enter i t s  provi sions in the mandate text for Palestine . 
Consequently, how could Zionism and "Israel" invoke in its own proclama-
ti on of J•ia.y 14, 1948, the League ' s mandate as a 1 egal instrument for 
justification of their Judenstaat scheme in Palestine? In 1922, Churchil l ,  
the Colonial Secretary, declared in the House of Commons, with reference 
to the Balfour Declaration: 
At the same time that this pledge was made to the Zioni sts, an 
equally important promise was made to the Arab inhabitants in 
Palestine--that their civil and religious rights would be effective-
t 




ly safeguarded. and that they should ijOt be turned out to make room 
for the newcomers ( Jewish settlers) . 1 6 
Herbert Samuel , himself a leading Zionist and the first to tackle 
the British �far Cabinet i n  favor of the Zionist scheme in Palestine, 
similarly declared the Balfour Declaration as not involving the creation 
of a Jewi sh State i n  the Arab country. For he stated in 1947 : 
The Jewish State has been the aspiration of the Jewish people for 
centuri e s .  It is an aspiration which at the present day cannot 
be realized. It is not contained in the Balfour Declaration • • .  
There was no promi se of a Jewish State. What was promised was that 
the British Government would favour the creation of a Je'.d sh National 
Home--the tenn was most carefully chosen--in Palestine. 'Ihe Declara­
tion did not say that Palestine should be the Jewish National Home, 
but that it favoured a Jewish National Home in Palestine, '.d thout 
prejudice to the civil and relie;ious rights of the Arab population.17 
All of the official public declarations of the Bri tish Government 
declare that Palestine was never to come under the sovereignty of Jews 
in that land, that the declaration conveyed no territorial rights to the 
Jews. Additional confirmation of this fact emanates from the 3ritish 
Government ' s  Statement of Policy issued · in October of 1930 which d.eals 
at length with the meaning i t  attributed to the " Jewish national home" ; 
Eut this statement (British Command Paper of 1922) has not removed 
(Zionists) doubts, and Hi s  Majesty' s  Government therefore now declare 
unequivocally that it i s  not part of their policy that Palestine 
should become a Jev.1. sh State . They would indeed regard i t  as con­
trary to their obligations to the Arabs under the ;·landate, as well 
as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people i n  
the past, that the Arab population o f  Palestine should be made the 
subjects of a Jewi sh State against their wil1 . 18 
Even though the Ea.lfour Declaration can 'be viewed as having en-
visioned something less than a Je•nsh State, its greatest significance 
lies in its political support for Jewish Zionist aspirations in Arab 
Palestine which was an illegal interference with, and an atrocious 
extraterritorial trespass upon. the natural rightG of the Palestinian 
Arabs i n  their own homeland. Even the committee set up to analyze the 
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McMahon-Hussein Correspondence (1915-1916),  the Anglo-Aral!: Conference 
of London in 1939, concluded that Britain had violated the natural self-
determination rights of the people of Palestine : 
His Majesty' s Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without 
regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine . 19 
Even the Uni ted States Government, for as much as 1 t has shielded and 
supported Zionism, has privately admitted its own illegal actions. In 
a then top-secret memorandum to the Secretary of State of September 22, 
1947, Ambassador Loy �L Henderson, then serving as the director of the 
Office of Near Ea.stern and African Affairs in the Department of State, 
stated : 
1hese propo�al � [pf the majority of the United Nations Special Corn­
rni ttee on Palestin� , for instance, ignore such principles as self­
determina tion and majority rule.  'Ihey recognize the principles of 
a theocratic racial state and even go so far in several instances 
as to di scriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons 
outside of Palestine . 20 
Jules P.asdevant, formerly President of the International Court 
of Justice, has juridically postulated : 
No state has the right to extend at will i ts mrn competence at the 
expense of other States and other peoples. International law does 
not recognize the �ritish State as having competence other than over 
its own terri tories and over its O'tm subjects and nationals . 21 
Professor Alan R .  Taylor of the School of International Service 
at the American University in :·Jashington, D . C . , whose publications on 
vari ous aspects of the Palestine confli ct have established his reputation 
as a scholar, declares:  
1he Declaration was actually only an ambiguously worded expression 
of sympathy for Zioni st aspirations addresr.;ed indirectly to the Zionist 
Organization and without substance in international law.22 
Significantly, no less a Zionist leader than Nahum Goldman himself 
has pointed out that : 
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'!he Zionist movement should never have lost sight of the fact that 
i t  represented an exception to the universally valid rule that a 
territory belongs to the majority of the population that lives there . 23 
In 1939 ,  the British Government was much more explicit: it totally 
rejected and repudiated the Zionist contention that Palestine was to 
become the Jewish State. While i terating i ts official public mandate 
policy previously clarified for the Zionists in the Command Paper of 1922, 
Britain officially declared that the "terms of the (Balfour) Declaration • . •  
do not contemplate that Palestine • • •  should be converted into a Jewish 
National Horne" ( " • • •  but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine . " ) ,  
that "His Majesty' s Government now declare unequivocally that i t  i s  not 
part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State , "  and 
that Britain "desires to see established . • .  an independent Palestine State , "24 
If thi s was not clear to the Zionists the British mandatory also declared: 
It has been the hope • • •  ever since the Balfour Declaration was i ssued 
that in time the Arab population • • •  would become reconciled to the 
further growth of the Jewish National Home . This hope has not been 
fulfilled. The alternatives • . •  are either ( i )  to seek to expand the 
Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strong­
ly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or ( i i )  to per­
mit further expansion . • .  only i f  the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce 
in i t .  'Ihe former policy means rule by force • • •  contrary to the whole 
spirit of • • .  the League of Nations, as well as to the . • •  Mandate . 
'lberefore His Majesty ' s  Government • • •  have decided that the time has 
come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred 
to above • • • •  25 
'Ihat the Bri tish never legally acquired sovereignty over Palestine 
i s  revealed in the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the 
case of the legal status of South-West Africa (Naffi)bia) . The Court adverted 
to the le� nature of the mandate system under the League of Nations: 
• • •  'Ihe provi sions of Article- 22 of the Covenant • • •  and the principles 
embodied therein, showed that the creation of this new international 
institution did not involve any cession of territory or transfer of 
. t 2b sovereign y • • • •  
Addi tionally, the Court ruled that the change in a mandated ter-
208 
rl tory could not be effectuated "without proper consultation • • •  of all 
the peoples of the Territory i tself1127 and that the 
Mand.ate was created , in the interest of the inhabitants of the 
territory, and of humanity in general, as an international insti­
tution with an international object--a sacred trust of civilization.28 
Juridically, the Court ruled that 
The Mandatory i s  not free to deal with the territory or people as­
signed to it as though either were its own . ,  . A  territory or entity 
under mandate is • • •  to be distinguished from a colonial possession • • • •  29 
In an earlier case of Re Ezra Goralshvih (1925) the Palestine 
Supreme Court applied the decision of the League of Nations Council that 
inhabitants of mandated territories were not be be regarded as nationals30 
of the mandatory power. But, significantly, this Court of British 
composition ruled: 
• . .  to hold that the petitioners are British subjects would involve 
holding that the crown, having accepted the responsibility of gover­
ning Palestine as a mandatory, has thereby acquired sovereignty, 
a view for which no authority has been cited • . . .  31 
In short, the Court agreed that the British had no legal sovereign 
jurisdiction over Palestine and its indigenous population. 
Strangely, it is well known that the Balfour Declaration is  void 
even by reason of its conf1.ict with assurances and pledges given by the 
British Government to the Arabs and the Palestinians. But its nullity 
depends much more importantly upon reasons arising from the secret entre-
nous with a political movement (Zionism) having no legal privileges and 
rights in Palestine and from the illegal extra territorial capacity of 
Britain or the War Cabinet to make it .  It  is  absurd to think that Britain 
could, in the nature of international law, determine or dictate policy 
over another nation ' s  territory, a territory over which i t  had no sovereign 
rights. 32 The absurdity of this proposition is  best perceived by suggesting 
that Britain· in 1917 could dictate or determine policies in the territory 
of Arizona or Oklahoma, areas of the United States in which Britain would 
have no juridical rights . In other words, the declaration is void and 
invalid, per se, without the need of extraneous considerations . Regard­
less of its real meani ng, regardless of its safeguard which is stipulated 
in favor of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine--a safeguard which, in any 
event, was openly and callously di sregarded by the mandatory and Zionists-­
and regardless also of its incompatibility with pledges made to the Arabs, 
the declaration is legally null and void for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the British, as author of the declaration, possessed no 
dominion or sovereignty in Palestine or the Turkish Empire enabling it 
to make promises of any rights, whatever their nature and extent and how­
ever extraterritorially imposed, in favor of Zionist Jewry of the world. 
It is immaterial whether these "rights" were meant to be terri torial, 
political or cultural . 'Ihe declaration was, per se, void on the basis 
of the international legal principle that a donor cannot give away what 
does not legally belong to him. Nonnan Bentwich, a Zionist Jew who held 
for several years the office of Attorney General of Palestine under the 
mandate, declared himself, that the concept of "the Jewish national home" 
did not mean or imply the grant of rights of political sovereignty to Jews 
over Arab Palestine. 33 
Secondly, but related to the first reason, the declaration i s  
also void . o n  the legal ground that i t  violated the natural and legi.. timate 
rights of the people of Palestine (more importantly, of Greater Syria) 
who desired independence . It was immaterial whether the declaration sought 
to impose the creation of Zionist Judenstaat or simply of a "national home" 
for emigrating Jews offered Palestinian citizenship; it was in either case 
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invalid and could not, in any way, impair the rights of the Palestinian 
people to determine their own course of statehood. The legal right of a 
foreign state to dispose of other people ' s  territory in violation of their 
right of self-determination is not an accepted principle of international 
law. It should be ludicrous to even di scuss this rather obvious principle 
of legal conduct. Nonetheless, Balfour had already written in an official 
government memorandum dated August 11,  1919, four months after the concept 
of the Palestine Mandate was accepted and its basic self-governing ol:r 
jectives (independence and statehood) laid down in Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations whi ch was adopted April 25, 1919: 
In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consult­
ing the wishes of the present (Arab) inhabitants of the country • • •  The 
four great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism i s  • • .  of far 
profounder import than the desires . . .  of the 700, 000 Arabs who now 
inhabit that ancient land. 34 
Considering that the concept of international mandates was pre­
dicated upon the principle of self-determination of peoples, 35 Balfour' s  
memorandum, after the intenational mandate system was adopted by the 
League , is seen perfidiously as a calculated and extreme violation of 
the accepted international legal principle embodied in Article 22 which 
provided that 
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turki sh Empire have 
reached a stage of development where their existence as indpendent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering 
of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory un+il such 
time as they are able to stand alone. 
In the light of Balfour' s  official statement how is one to see 
the actions and designs of the British Government calling for an official 
violation of the mandate trust as other than blatant perfidy, a calculated 
and premeditated violation of an international l egal trust? 
'Ihirdly, the declaration i s  not the result of an agreement between 
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states. It is no more than a letter addressed to Lord Rothschild, a 
private British citizen, who had no legal title in international law to 
enter into an official contractual obligation ( there i s  no legal con­
tractual obligation in the declaration ) ,  since its recipient, a Zionist 
Bri. tish subject, did not even represent "the Jewish community" or the 
Zioni st Organization which, in any event, were not subjects of inter-
national law. The Balfour Declaration concerned a territory with which 
Bri. tain had no legal relation; consequently, neither :Britain or the Zionist 
Organization could acquire the area of Palestine in regard to any terri. torial 
interests they may have separately or entrenously had in mind. 
Fourthly, some Zionists argue that even though the declaration 
lacked initial juridical value, J6 it was validated by its inclusion in the 
Palestine Mandate . The argument of an ex post facto validation of the de­
claration by the Palestine Mandate has no legal l::asi s .  Because, i f ,  a s  
should be clear, Britain possessed no legal sovereignty over Palestine and, 
consequently ,  no legal authority to make the declaration, the inclusion of 
the declaration in the mandate did not and could not cure its invalidity. 
Actually, the inclusion of the declaration in the mandate system, instead 
of making i t  legal , had the effect of invalidating the mandate i tself and 
violating Article 22 of the League Covenant. For an illegal agreement can­
not make valid and legal what i s  already inherently invalid and illegal . 37 
Fifthly, the opposition of the Palestine Arab Jews to the establi sh­
ment of a Jewi sh national home in Palestine reveals that the Zionist scheme 
was a foreign idea, extrinsi c to Palestine. Such an alien scheme could· not 
be construed as a recognition of a right of self-determination in favor of 
the Jewish community then living in Palestine, which in any case represented 
about three percent of the Palestine population. 38 (Nor could thi s alien 
scheme be considered even today (1948) as a national liberation movement. )  
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'Ihe Balfour Declaration, espoused as a legal title by Zionism-
Israel to establish a Jewish State in Arab Palestine, is a hi storical 
fraud . 'Ihe declaration, historically and juridically analyzed, does not 
create a valid grant to Zionist Jewry of any legal rights in Palestine.* 
As Henry Cattan, a jurist of international repute , said, the 
Declaration was nothing but an illegal and mischievous promi se 
which has brought the most disastrous consequences to Palestine 
and the Middle East. 39 
Contrary to the Zionists' protestations, the declaration does 
not provide international authority for the Zionist state in Palestine .40 
It does not legally recognize "the right of ' tbe Jewish people' to 
national rebirth" in Palestine, neither in a historical analysis nor 
international law. 
*Thi s writer' s  opinion of the "Declaration" i s  that it i s  actually only an 
ambigously worded expression of sympathy for Zionist �olitical aspirations 
addressed to Lord Rothschild (another English citizen) and without sub­
stance in international law. It can in substance be equated even less with 
the Gulf o f  Tonkin resolution which had absolutely no substance in inter­
national law. Even Leonard Stein, as lawyer and Zioni st, after providing 
his own historical and juridical analysi s, makes the judgment statement: 
"The Declaration was a political and not a legal document • . • .  " See Stein, 
op. cit . ,  p .  553. Thi s writer agrees with Lasswell that the declaration 
can be regarded "as the cleverest thing done by the Allies in the nature of 
war propaganda . "  The minutes o f  the War Cabinet meeting held on October J 1 ,  
1917, reveal James Balfour ' s  own attitude o n  the political need for a war­
time statement: "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that . • • •  
If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal ( i . e . ,  the Zionist 
program ) ,  we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda ooth in 
Russia and America . "  See PRO CAB22/4. The declaration did provide a highly 
effective platform from which the Zionists would incrementally advance 
nationalist Jewi sh state goals in Palestine with the aid of powerful and 
officiously placed governmental pro-Zioni sts. See, for example ,  the Zionist 
lobbyi st techniques in Michael Adams and Chri stopher Mayhew, Publish i t  not . . •  
The Middle East Cover-Up (London: Longman Group LTD, 1975), Chapter Three 
"Poli tical Pressures . "  Weizmann himself confirms the success of Zionist 
political techniques, for example ,  in early 1930s: see Weizmann, Trial and 
Error (New York : Harper Brothers, 1949 ) ,  p .  335. Also see for intimacy of 
Zionist lobby' s contacts with British Cabinet Blanche Dugdale ,  Diaries of 
Blanche Dugdale (London: Valentine Mitchell , 197J ) .  Zionist contributions 
to political leaders, and the consequent influence of the Jewish lobby, for 
example ,  in the United State$, are di scussed with frankness in an article 
by Dan Margali t in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, September 20, 1974, re­
printed in Israeli Mirror, Middle East International Publications, No. J4, 
October 1974. But it should be noted that had the Balfour Declaration 
actually never existed, Zionist nationalists would still have implemented 
programs and activities seeking eventually an exclusivist Jewish State 
in Palestine but their tasks would have been more difficult. Because 
it should be recognized that the primary tactic Zionism utilized to suc­
ceed at its nationalist goal has been to organize and lead Jewish public 
political. expression i n. countries that had the international power to 
assist them in their political-national goal s .  Through organized domestic 
Jewish public opinion exacting collective political pressures upon elected 
government representatives the i nternational Zionist Organi zation (in the 
United States its satellite the Zionist Organization of America) felt i t  
could have compelled political support from elected official s. 
Chapter Eight 
1 'lhe Bri tish Goverrunent, as author of the Balfour Declaration, 
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had never possessed any legal sovereignty or dominion in Palestine . 
2walid Khalid1 , ed. , From Haven to Conquest (Beirut: 1he Insti tute 
For Palestine Studi e s , _  1971), pp . 195-200. Dr. Khalidi. reproduced an 
interview among Balfour, then Erl ti sh Foreign Secretary, Felix Frank­
furter, President 1.'iilson' s consultant at the Pari s Peace Conference 
i n  1919, Lord Eustance Percy, Bri tish diplomat and later Conservative 
Member of Parliament, and Uni ted States Supreme Court Justice 
Brandei s ,  in Hr. :Balfour' s apartment, 23 Rue Ni tot, Pari s ,  on June 
24, 1919 . '!his information i s  derived from personal notations 
collected by Felix Frankfurter during thi s private conference 
and later reproduced in E. L .  Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds . ,  
Document8 on 3ri ti sh "?orei Polic , 191 -19 9 ,  Vol . IV, Ist Series 
London :  Her Majesty ' s  Stationary Offi ce , 1952 ) ,  pp. 1276-78 . 
'!hi s document i s  reproduced for the Appendix. 
3Richard P. Stevens, "Smuts and Weizmann : A Study in South African­
Zionist Cooperation, " Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Baha Abu-Laban, eds. , 
Settler Re · mes in Africa and the Arab �'lorld : The Illusion of Sndurance 
Wilmette, Illi noi s :  The i· :edina Uni versi ty Press International , 1974 , 
p .  18l�. Stevens, noted historican of Zionism, asserts that 11 • • •  :Jeiz­
mann' s relatively quiet academic years were suddenly changed by events 
precipitated by the outbreak of war in August ,  1914. The entry of the 
Ottoman !Bmpire into the conflict against Britain opened new possibilities 
for Zionist diplomacy. A British advance into the Middle East to 
safeguard oil supplies and communications, possibly paving the way 
for Jewi sh settlement i n  Palestine under Briti sh auspi ces, had long 
been expected . Now, with Bri tish forces in motion i n  the area, Weizmann 
saw the postwar possi bili tie s . 0  See Stevens, i bi d . , p .  183. 
4Ibid. , pp. 183-84. 
5Arthur Ruppin, at the time of the Balfour Declaration, was head 
of the �·lorld Zionist Organi zati on ' s  department of colonization in 
Palestine. A native of Germany, he settled in Pale3tine in 1907 and 
directed the first Zionist office in Jaffa. Elon wri tes that he "headed 
the main office of colonization--as a kind of 'minister' of agriculture 
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THE HEBREW MiGRATiON 
$ Around the year 1200 B.C . •  the Hebrews, led by Pro-
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THE DOVi/NFALL OF THE HEBREW 
f) In 923 B.C.,  during the reign of King Solomon, the 
Hebrew Kingdom suffered a rupturous spl it .  The King·  
dam of lsr<iel took the nor th ern part while the south 
was dominated by the Kingdom of Judea. 
® Jn 722 B.C . .  the n orthern kingdom was swept over by 
' �--.._.the Assyrians. 
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O In 538 B.C. The Persian invas·ion. 
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a Jewish Holdings 
Figure 4. Palestine: Jewish Holdings, 1945. 
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THE ARJ'.\B POPULATrON 
AND THE JEWiSH M!NOR!TV 
'3) In 1 9 1 8, the Jewish comm unity in Pales­
tine constituted 8% of the total population. 
They ovmcd 2.5% of the land . 





0 In 19·18. following an extensive Jewish im­
migraticn drive. their ratio increased to 
33% of the i)opt:lztion. Their ownership 
of land amounted to 5.67':·u of Palestine. 
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